Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the loading of known vulnerable drivers by their file names. Adversaries often leverage these vulnerable drivers to achieve privilege escalation or persistence on a system, typically by exploiting a known vulnerability in the driver to execute arbitrary code in kernel mode. The list of driver file names included in the detection logic corresponds to drivers identified as vulnerable, often used in 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks.
Detects processes with names used by Qilin malware (`hosts.exe`, `dato.exe`) that are launched without a visible window and subsequently make an outbound network connection. This pattern is indicative of a hidden C2 beacon, a technique used by Qilin to evade user detection.
Detects when an Okta ThreatInsight security threat is detected. This indicates that Okta has identified suspicious activity, potentially from a malicious IP address, attempting to access an organization's Okta tenant.
Detects the XOR decryption function used in macOS variants of OceanLotus (APT32). This rule targets a specific byte sequence identified in the malware's decryption routine.
Detects Airstalk malware, used by the CL-STA-1009 threat cluster. This rule identifies both PowerShell and .NET variants that misuse the AirWatch MDM API for C2 and data exfiltration.
Detects the loading of version.dll from a non-standard directory, a technique associated with DLL Sideloading. This specific variant was observed being used by a loader for TorNet and PureHVNC.
Detects Airstalk malware, which exists in both PowerShell and .NET variants. The rule identifies specific strings related to its C2 communication over the AirWatch MDM API, tasking, and other unique artifacts.
Detects the use of msiexec.exe to remotely download and execute an MSI package, which then spawns an encoded PowerShell command. This TTP is associated with NetSupport RAT loaders.
Yara rule that detects EggStremeFuel backdoor.
Detects a User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempt using the CMSTP COM interface. This specific rule looks for the process chain associated with the ValleyRAT campaign, where bypass.exe uses this technique to launch Nvidia.exe with elevated privileges.
Detects PowerShell execution patterns consistent with the Caminho Loader, which uses LSB steganography to extract a payload from a downloaded image file. This rule requires PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104).
CyberSecurityNews has reported a raising case about a new wave of phishing emails masquerading as breach notifications from LastPass.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
Detects various activities associated with the UTA0388 threat actor and their GOVERSHELL malware family. This includes network connections to known C2 infrastructure, creation of persistence via scheduled tasks, and execution of the malware payload, often involving DLL side-loading. The detection logic covers network communication with known C2 domains and IPs, creation of scheduled tasks with specific names, execution of the malware from common staging directories with specific flags, and the dropping of GOVERSHELL DLLs or files with known hashes.
Yara rule that detects WeaselStore infostealer.
Detects potential BRICKSTORM C2 activity. This rule identifies processes initiating a WebSocket connection over HTTPS, which is a technique used by BRICKSTORM for its command and control channel. The rule filters for processes that lack file metadata, a common characteristic of Go-based malware like BRICKSTORM.
KQL Query
Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2025-49144, a local privilege escalation vulnerability in Notepad++ installers (v8.8.1 and prior) where the installer calls regsvr32.exe without specifying the full path. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges by placing a malicious regsvr32.exe alongside this legitimate Notepad++ installer. The vulnerability is triggered when the installer attempts to register the NppShell.dll file, which is a component of Notepad++.
This rule detects the presence of Agenda Ransomware based on specific strings found within the file. These strings include references to 'Qilin' (a known alias for Agenda Ransomware), ransom notes detailing encrypted files and financial information, threats regarding law enforcement, and indicators of the ransomware being written in Rust ('rust', 'cargo'). It also looks for API calls 'Sleep' and 'SleepEx' which can be used for evasion, and an .onion address for communication.
These domains are actively used in phishing campaigns impersonating legitimate software platforms like Homebrew, LogMeIn, and TradingView to distribute Odyssey Stealer and AMOS malware. Blocking these domains can prevent access to malicious download sites.
Detects the creation of files with the ".funksec" extension, which is appended to encrypted files by the FunkLocker ransomware. This indicates that a system is actively being encrypted by this specific ransomware.
Detects specific registry markers associated with the FlowCloud malware, which is known to be used by the threat group TA410. The rule identifies unique registry paths where FlowCloud stores its configuration and drivers for its keylogger components.
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