Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
Detects files matching known SHA256 hashes of the masqueraded MSP360 RMM v2.5.0.67 installer and associated ScreenConnect/utility payloads used in phishing-to-dual-RMM campaigns
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule identifies potential malicious activity by detecting the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256 and MD5) on endpoints and monitoring for DNS queries or network connections to a known malicious staging domain (yapw.life). The detection correlates file execution, file activity, and network communication to identify stages of an attack such as malware installation or C2 communication.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication and malicious process execution associated with the Vidar stealer malware. It monitors both network connections and process command lines for indicators of known Telegram C2 channels and secondary Steam community profile C2 infrastructure. The rule specifically highlights activity originating from processes other than common web browsers to identify suspicious automated beaconing or control.
This rule monitors network, DNS, and HTTP activity to identify connections to known infrastructure associated with the ClickFix social engineering campaign and Vidar infostealer malware. The rule correlates device network events, HTTP request events, and DNS queries against a list of known malicious domains, IP addresses, and URL patterns used for C2, staging, and lures.
Detects network communication to domains and specific file paths associated with the MacSync macOS stealer, which is used for malware dropper delivery and command-and-control (C2) operations. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators such as specific malicious URLs, iCloud path abuse, and C2 infrastructure interaction.
Detects outbound network connections to domains, URLs, and IP:Port combinations identified as malicious in the ThreatFox OSINT feed. This rule covers various commodity malware C2 and payload delivery infrastructure.
Detects the SCKit Go-based credential-stealing implant found in compromised npm and PyPI packages. The detection logic focuses on unique build-info module paths, specific C2 encryption protocol headers, and embedded campaign identifiers related to 'memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin' and 'MemoryOS' supply chain compromises.
This rule detects the execution of processes associated with known malicious SHA256 file hashes linked to OpenSUpdater. It monitors DeviceProcessEvents from the past 30 days to identify instances where these specific file hashes are executed on endpoints.
This rule monitors DeviceProcessEvents for the execution of known malicious binaries associated with the SilverFox malware. It specifically looks for occurrences of three distinct SHA256 file hashes within the last 30 days.
Detects JavaScript loaders associated with the Exvicy/ErrTraffic campaign. The rule identifies obfuscated code that utilizes atob() for Base64 decoding, single-byte XOR operations, TextDecoder for content processing, and dynamic code execution via 'new Function()'. This pattern is commonly used to inject malicious payloads into compromised WordPress sites.
Detects behavior consistent with the RevStealer malware, specifically focusing on cross-process operations against web browsers originating from hidden AppData subdirectories and the creation of its unique single-instance mutex.
This rule detects installation of known malicious npm packages associated with the PhantomSub campaign, which abuse WhatsApp spam channels. It also identifies network connections to known remote C2 channel-list URLs or domains used by these packages to automate channel joining.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests associated with the Telepuz modular loader. The rule monitors for specific URI patterns, request body parameters, and suspicious User-Agent strings indicative of PowerShell or MSHTA command-and-control communication.
Detects network activity related to the BEAST ransomware targeting VMware ESXi systems. The rule identifies attempts to stage encryption operations via SSH, including detecting references to known filenames ('encryptor.elf', 'beast_esxi') and the use of the 'vim-cmd' utility to power off virtual machines as part of the preparation for file encryption.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
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