Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Matches known Vidar Stealer sample SHA256 hashes spanning versions 2.0 through 3.4 as identified by Zscaler ThreatLabz
Detects Vidar Stealer v2.x-3.x custom VM bytecode interpreter used to deobfuscate strings via a fetch-decode-execute loop with sparse opcode dispatch and single accumulator
Detects Vidar's custom stream cipher used for string/config decryption: FNV-1a mixing of the VM-derived key combined with golden-ratio nonce mixing and per-build ARX round constants
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
Detects network traffic indicating the use of Slack APIs as a command and control (C2) channel or for exfiltration. The rules monitor for specific TLS SNI strings, hardcoded Slack bot tokens, and specific channel IDs associated with the 'indexed-btree' malware campaign, which utilizes Slack as a C2 platform.
Detects the 'sharedLoad.min.js' loader script associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package family. This script utilizes X25519 ECDH for key exchange and AES-256 decryption to retrieve and execute a second-stage payload hosted on a Sepolia smart contract.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known FeralWolf threat actor malware, including MQTTDoor, MatrixDoor, RDPSocksProxy, GenieLocker ransomware, fscan, and tools leveraging CVE-2026-31431.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Operation SideCopy, including specific file hashes, known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, malicious domains, and URLs. It triggers on file creation, process execution, and network connections matching these known indicators.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Operation SideCopy, including specific file hashes, known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, malicious domains, and URLs. It triggers on file creation, process execution, and network connections matching these known indicators.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects network traffic associated with NarwhalRAT malware utilizing the pCloud API as a command-and-control (C2) channel or dead-drop resolver. The rule monitors both HTTP requests containing specific folder identifiers and authentication parameters, as well as TLS SNI indicating connections to api.pcloud.com.
Detects the execution of known HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) backdoor binaries identified by specific file names and staging directory paths. These binaries are designed to create hidden desktop sessions and perform input injection to facilitate unauthorized remote control of a compromised host.
Detects network beaconing activity associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan. The rule monitors for specific C2 communication patterns, including the 'client;' string and the 'VVx-4.3' version marker, which are characteristic of this malware's host reconnaissance and command-and-control exfiltration phase.
Detects the presence of PureLogs Stealer, a .NET-based information stealer, by identifying specific family name strings embedded within PE files that conform to the .NET assembly structure. This rule targets the static analysis of malicious binaries often used in credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects specific hash matches of the Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) Mach-O binary payloads (arm64/x86_64), which are associated with the Macfinger 'ClickFix' distribution chain.
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