Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
Detects obfuscated PHP code within the Admin Menu Editor Pro plugin, specifically targeting indicators associated with the supply chain compromise of versions 2.35 and 2.36. The rule searches for common PHP execution functions used in web shells within the context of the vulnerable plugin directory.
This rule detects the presence of specific SilverFox malware payload files by matching their SHA256 hashes against known indicators of compromise. This identification is typically used for file integrity monitoring, endpoint scanning, or gateway-based file filtering to prevent malicious code execution.
Detects communication between a host and a suspected malicious domain (noah-ssh.com.cn) characterized by a specific API request containing a millisecond timestamp and a subsequent HTTP response containing a 'download_link' field. This pattern is indicative of the SilverFox malware relay mechanism, likely used for staging and downloading additional malicious payloads.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader, which employs specific anti-sandboxing and anti-analysis techniques. The detection relies on identified file hashes, as well as heuristic analysis of process filenames containing common media-related keywords in sensitive directories and command line arguments indicating the presence of Global mutexes.
This rule detects the presence of the Amatera (ACR Stealer) loader by identifying characteristic indicators, including specific Telegra.ph dead-drop URLs, domain-fronting artifacts using github.com, and hardcoded C2 IP addresses. It also identifies credential theft targeting by searching for artifacts related to password managers such as KeePass, Bitwarden, WinAuth, and Authy, combined with the presence of C2 communication indicators.
This rule detects outgoing HTTP POST requests to the public BSC testnet RPC endpoint ('bsc-testnet-rpc.publicnode.com') containing an 'eth_call' request, which is a technique used by the 'EtherHiding' campaign to fetch malicious JavaScript payloads directly from blockchain smart contracts, bypassing traditional web-based C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network traffic originating from the local network to external destinations that exhibit characteristics associated with the Xray-core tool, specifically the use of a spoofed TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) of 'dl.google.com' paired with a server certificate that does not contain 'Google' in the subject. This technique is used to bypass network filters by masquerading command and control traffic as legitimate Google traffic.
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
Detects the GHAPPIER loader identified across 65 public npm/GitHub repositories and 22 developer accounts, based on its embedded remote-fetch/eval pattern and campaign markers
Detects outbound HTTP requests to the Telegram Bot API containing hardcoded bot tokens and chat IDs associated with the malicious 'indexed-btree' npm package campaign. This indicates active data exfiltration or command-and-control communication.
Detects outbound TLS traffic behavior consistent with the WaterPlum RAT, characterized by periodic, low-volume connections to non-CDN/cloud providers. The rule identifies potential beaconing activity by monitoring TLS SNI fields against a list of known legitimate service providers and applying a frequency threshold.
Detects outbound TLS traffic behavior consistent with the WaterPlum RAT, characterized by periodic, low-volume connections to non-CDN/cloud providers. The rule identifies potential beaconing activity by monitoring TLS SNI fields against a list of known legitimate service providers and applying a frequency threshold.
Detects outbound TLS traffic behavior consistent with the WaterPlum RAT, characterized by periodic, low-volume connections to non-CDN/cloud providers. The rule identifies potential beaconing activity by monitoring TLS SNI fields against a list of known legitimate service providers and applying a frequency threshold.
Detects file artifacts referencing OtterCandy malware, which combines OtterCookie and RATatouille RAT capabilities, associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
Detects file artifacts referencing OtterCandy malware, which combines OtterCookie and RATatouille RAT capabilities, associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
Detects OtterCookie JavaScript-based RAT/infostealer malware artifacts associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
Detects file artifacts referencing InvisibleFerret, a Python-based backdoor used by WaterPlum/North Korean IT worker actors for persistent access to victim networks
Detects file artifacts referencing InvisibleFerret, a Python-based backdoor used by WaterPlum/North Korean IT worker actors for persistent access to victim networks
Detects file artifacts referencing InvisibleFerret, a Python-based backdoor used by WaterPlum/North Korean IT worker actors for persistent access to victim networks
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