Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the presence of the Docro Hijacker browser hijacker component (Adblock.dll) designed to tamper with Chrome's 'Secure Preferences' file. It specifically looks for indicators of HMAC-SHA256 integrity check bypass mechanisms used to force-install malicious browser extensions.
Detects NSIS installer/archive contents bundling the specific unsigned/renamed UpdateAssistant.exe (aka AppUpdateHelper.exe) payload alongside its associated staged runtime DLLs and known malicious file paths/hashes used as cover noise for DLL sideloading staging
Detects a host making 3 or more outbound connections within 5 minutes to AWS-hosted IP addresses known to host NJRAT C2 infrastructure from the GTA6 lure campaign, consistent with periodic RAT beaconing rather than a one-off incidental connection.
Detects a host making 3 or more outbound connections within 5 minutes to AWS-hosted IP addresses known to host NJRAT C2 infrastructure from the GTA6 lure campaign, consistent with periodic RAT beaconing rather than a one-off incidental connection.
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
Detects the Silver Fox HVNC malware dropper initiating browser instances via the command line to access known malicious C2 domains or infrastructure. The rule specifically monitors for known malicious binaries (UpdateAssistant.exe, AppUpdateHelper.exe, SysMaintenance.exe) launching browsers with suspicious command-line parameters associated with this campaign.
This rule detects potentially malicious keylogging activity by identifying binaries named UpdateAssistant.exe or AppUpdateHelper.exe that import keylogging-related APIs (GetAsyncKeyState/GetKeyboardState). To minimize false positives, the rule correlates these findings with suspicious metadata such as unsigned binaries, untrusted signers, or execution from non-standard directories like AppData subfolders or Temp.
Detects active phishing threat-intelligence indicators whose domain name uses one of the disposable TLDs observed across IronToll's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .icu, .buzz, etc.). Scoped to the structured ThreatType classification only — dropped the free-text 'Description has phishing' fallback, since KQL's 'has' is a substring/token match with no negation awareness (e.g. a description stating an indicator is 'not related to phishing' would still match), which could pull in indicators unrelated to actual phishing activity.
This rule detects the execution of a malicious AutoIT loader script (identified by the filename 'kojuyn.ini' and a specific SHA-256 hash). The loader is designed to deobfuscate runtime API names and payload paths from XOR-encoded strings, bypassing static analysis. The detection links the presence of this script with the execution of a corresponding AutoIT interpreter binary.
Detects network communication associated with Mantax Otax Android malware, including traffic to identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and attempts to retrieve dynamic configuration files from GitHub.
Detects network traffic (TLS SNI or HTTP Host) to Firebase domains (firebaseio.com, firebaseapp.com, firebasedatabase.app) associated with Mantax Otax and other Android ransomware families for ransom negotiation chat channels.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a specific AutoIT-based malware delivery chain. It tracks the execution and presence of specific malicious file names and SHA256 hashes, as well as network connections to a identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP address (158.51.122.136). The detection spans file creation, process execution, image loading, and network communication events to identify the multi-stage attack lifecycle.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a specific AutoIT-based malware delivery chain. It tracks the execution and presence of specific malicious file names and SHA256 hashes, as well as network connections to a identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure IP address (158.51.122.136). The detection spans file creation, process execution, image loading, and network communication events to identify the multi-stage attack lifecycle.
Detects known KATARU IoT malware binaries via embedded strings and known SHA-256 hashes
Detects KATARU IoT malware samples embedding the DirtyFrag (CVE-2026-43284) Linux local privilege escalation exploit copied from public PoC code, as part of a chained LPE attempt targeting root shell spawning
Detects KATARU IoT malware embedded exploit code for CVE-2026-31431 (Copy Fail) Linux privilege escalation, identified by shared exploit-chain strings and syscall sequences used to spawn su as root
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
This rule monitors for process creation or file interaction events associated with a specific SHA256 file hash identified as malicious. It uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) logs to correlate both process execution and file activity related to this indicator of compromise.
Detects the GhostContainer .NET-based backdoor assembly deployed on compromised Microsoft Exchange servers, requiring multiple corroborating unique indicators (C2 header, proxy class name, virtual path parameters) alongside .NET/PE structure to reduce false positives
Detects HVNC backdoor payload containing hardcoded AV/EDR process names combined with process enumeration APIs and a hex-suffixed mutex naming pattern, reducing false positives from generic AV name or API string matches alone
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
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