Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious .ru domains and DNS queries for these domains, indicative of C2 beaconing activity likely associated with a supply chain compromise affecting the Pub.dev ecosystem.
This rule detects potentially malicious behavior associated with Microsoft Office applications, such as Word, initiating suspicious WebDAV network connections, dropping executable or sensitive files, or spawning known LOLBAS processes (rundll32, explorer, regsvr32) from suspicious directories like Temp or WebDAV paths. It also includes a blocklist for known malicious file hashes associated with these patterns.
Detects the presence of the known Cyclops Blink implant by file hash (SHA256) on an endpoint, followed by a network connection to associated C2 infrastructure within one hour, aligning with typical implant beaconing or file transfer behavior.
Matches known HOOKEDGE malware samples attributed to BlueDelta (APT28) via SHA256 hash comparison
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects execution or file presence associated with HOOKEDGE/HEADLACE malware. This rule uses a dual-approach: matching known malicious file hashes (SHA256) and monitoring for specific script files (bat, vbs, cmd) following a GUID-formatted naming convention typically used by the HOOKEDGE installer chain.
Detects the execution of known GoCaracal malware samples, identified by specific file hashes or staging file paths, occurring in conjunction with low-level keyboard hook installations using SetWindowsHookEx. This behavior is indicative of active keylogging activity.
Detects the CurlRAT malware interactive shell behavior where legitimate Linux system daemons (atd, crond, agetty, polkitd) are trojanized or abused to execute shell commands with attacker-supplied network endpoints (IP:Port).
Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
Detects Java-based Metasploit/Meterpreter payload files (.class/.jar) dropped post-exploitation, as observed following PaperCut RCE exploitation chain
Detects indicators of the ProRAM malware dropper, specifically identifying the download of 'sideload.exe' from an external IP or the presence of file artifacts related to its staging process in %TEMP% and %LOCALAPPDATA% directories.
Detects inbound network connections from known IP addresses associated with the StyleSmuggler malware distribution, which is used to inject malicious scripts into web applications.
Detects PHP scripts that masquerade as WordPress cache classes but contain functionality for decrypting commands using AES-256-CBC and executing them via shell_exec. The detection identifies the presence of hardcoded encryption keys, use of php://input, and common PHP obfuscation/encryption methods alongside shell execution functions.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as 'php-fpm' or 'postgres' that match known SHA-256 hashes associated with the RedTail malware family. The rule identifies processes attempting to hide their identity using techniques similar to prctl(PR_SET_NAME) to rename themselves while running malicious code.
Detects gem packages containing a .yardopts file linking to attacker-controlled Ruby scripts abused for RCE during RubyDoc.info documentation builds
Detects the execution of known WinProtector rogueware binaries. These files often present fake 'threat detected' popups to coerce users into paying for fraudulent software and are frequently bundled with other malware, such as Sality.
Detects the Sality malware secondary loader creating a new thread within the same infected process, a technique known as self-injection, used to execute decrypted payloads. The rule specifically looks for 'CreateRemoteThreadApiCall' events where the initiating process ID matches the target process ID and correlates this behavior with the creation of mutexes associated with the Sality malware family.
Detects NSIS installer/archive contents bundling the specific unsigned/renamed UpdateAssistant.exe (aka AppUpdateHelper.exe) payload alongside its associated staged runtime DLLs and known malicious file paths/hashes used as cover noise for DLL sideloading staging
Detects NSIS installer/archive contents bundling the specific unsigned/renamed UpdateAssistant.exe (aka AppUpdateHelper.exe) payload alongside its associated staged runtime DLLs and known malicious file paths/hashes used as cover noise for DLL sideloading staging
Detects the malicious NFe-themed ZIP dropper MOTOROLA_MOB_COM_NFe_2026-07-16_21781624.zip by known hash and archive structure
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