Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the presence of the StyleSmuggler Rust-based Linux implant. The rule identifies the malicious binary by its static SHA256 hashes or a combination of indicators including masquerading as a kernel thread, utilization of gvfsd-related filenames and directories, and interaction with Redis session data.
This rule performs a comprehensive hunt for activities associated with the MuddyWater (also known as Boggy Serpens) threat group, specifically relating to their 'Operation Olalampo' campaign. It monitors for spearphishing artifacts (lure documents and attachments), execution of specific malware and drop artifacts, the use of LOLBins by Office applications, unauthorized remote access via AnyDesk, Telegram-based C2 communication, and persistence mechanisms such as registry run keys and specific file extensions (.wdlp).
This rule detects the presence of HardBreacher proof-of-concept executables or DLLs containing the string 'SolidSnake.dll'. This identifier is associated with the payload delivery mechanism for a Kaspersky Endpoint Security exploit.
Detects WinRAR SFX droppers deploying CCProxy proxy server with associated configuration and account files (CCProxy.ini, AccInfo.ini, renamed svchost.exe)
Detects WinRAR SFX droppers deploying CCProxy proxy server with associated configuration and account files (CCProxy.ini, AccInfo.ini, renamed svchost.exe)
Detects WinRAR SFX droppers deploying CCProxy proxy server with associated configuration and account files (CCProxy.ini, AccInfo.ini, renamed svchost.exe)
This rule detects inbound HTTP GET requests to a specific IP address (103.86.86.244) requesting a file named 'deploy.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using PowerShell one-liners (cradles) like 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) to fetch and execute malicious scripts directly from a remote C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects the presence of files known to be part of the SynkLoader malware delivery chain by matching their SHA256 hashes. It specifically identifies a malicious MSI installer, a Python-based loader (ss.py), and a fake msvcp150.dll runtime file used for DLL side-loading.
Detects the presence of GoCaracal, a Go-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) attributed to the Dark Caracal threat group, based on unique strings and function names indicative of its implant capabilities, including shellcode injection and system discovery.
Detects the presence of Toy Ghouls' mqtt-bird-agent or matrix-bird-agent backdoor binaries. These binaries are identified by specific filenames, the inclusion of ChaCha20-Poly1305 cryptographic indicators, and operations involving the Windows MachineGuid registry key used to seal configuration files.
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
This rule detects potential cryptocurrency mining activity where known miner executables (specifically XMRig) or malicious scripts/processes are masquerading as or being spawned by 'LockAppHost.exe' or 'LockAppHost14a02b.exe'. It also monitors for subsequent attempts by these processes to terminate security-related tasks or establish persistence via registry run keys.
Detects the SynkLoader RAT by identifying the pythonw.exe process loading a spoofed msvcp150.dll from a specific staging path (\fl\ang\), combined with correlative beaconing activity via repeated network connections to remote endpoints.
Detects the ProRAM macOS ARM64 Mach-O implant, identified by specific internal codesign strings, download URLs (cloudfront.net/helper), and local file drop paths ($HOME/updated) consistent with the Funnull threat actor's activity.
Detects the presence of known StyleSmuggler implant binaries (noted as Rust-based implants masquerading as gvfsd-user or kworker) by matching file SHA256 hashes.
Detects the presence of the StyleSmuggler Rust-based Linux implant. The rule identifies the malicious binary by its static SHA256 hashes or a combination of indicators including masquerading as a kernel thread, utilization of gvfsd-related filenames and directories, and interaction with Redis session data.
Pycodevx Rat C2 Beacon
YARA-L
Detects outbound HTTP(S) requests carrying the 'pyCodeVx', 'pyCodeV3', 'pyCodeV4', or 'NEWW' string marker in the URI, User-Agent, headers, or body, indicating beaconing by the pyCodeVx Python-based RAT (and its variants) to its command-and-control infrastructure
Detects the execution of known GoCaracal malware samples, identified by specific file hashes or staging file paths, occurring in conjunction with low-level keyboard hook installations using SetWindowsHookEx. This behavior is indicative of active keylogging activity.
Detects the CurlRAT malware interactive shell behavior where legitimate Linux system daemons (atd, crond, agetty, polkitd) are trojanized or abused to execute shell commands with attacker-supplied network endpoints (IP:Port).
Detects Toy Ghouls backdoor binaries (cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe) via known MD5 hashes or the presence of these files alongside a config.toml configuration file.
This rule detects the execution of a file named 'report.bin' and correlates it with subsequent network connections originating from the same process. This behavior is indicative of a potential C2 heartbeat or exfiltration activity involving a non-standard or obfuscated executable.
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