Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the presence of files on endpoints that match a list of known malicious SHA256 hashes associated with the Nuso malware. It queries DeviceFileEvents to identify any file with a matching hash.
Detects GhostBackdoor malware execution via known file hash.
Detects suspicious command-line executions involving common Windows system binaries (rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, certutil.exe, wmic.exe) combined with keywords often associated with network communication or data transfer (http, https, base64, /transfer). This pattern can indicate attempts at downloading malicious payloads, exfiltrating data, or executing encoded commands.
Detects connections to domains associated with observed ACR Stealer command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule detects a single process creating a large number of files with diverse file types within a short time frame (5 minutes). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity such as ransomware encrypting files, data staging for exfiltration, or malware dropping multiple components.
Detects multiple registry value set events where the registry value data contains keywords like 'ransom' or 'payment', or the registry key contains 'Run'. This behavior can indicate ransomware activity attempting to establish persistence or communicate its demands.
This rule detects various indicators of DLL sideloading and process masquerading often associated with threat actor campaigns such as OceanLotus (APT32) and other malicious installers (FireAnt MetaKit). It monitors for specific DLL loads by unsigned or unexpected processes, the execution of masqueraded binaries, and suspicious command-line patterns used to stage malicious payloads.
Detects a specific network handshake pattern (05 01 00) associated with the SystemBC malware acting as a SOCKS5 proxy. This pattern is characteristic of the initial communication phase used by SystemBC to establish C2 connectivity, often utilized by ransomware affiliates.
Detects artifacts related to the ValleyRAT malware family, specifically identifying markers such as 'Phantom Persistence Module', 'RegisterApplicationRestart', and specific 'RSL_' strings within process command lines, image paths, or module loads using Windows Event Logs and Sysmon data.
Detects the suspicious execution of fltMC.exe or the loading of FLTLIB.dll from temporary directories, which is a known behavior of JFMBackdoor malware. It also detects known SHA256 hashes associated with this threat.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains associated with known Kimsuky campaign activity and NUKESPED malware. It identifies the execution of the NUKESPED secondary payload 'zlrenu8.exe' and a specific sandbox-evading JSE loader chain where WScript or CScript spawns hidden PowerShell instances using 'certutil' to decode files stored in the ProgramData directory.
Detects execution and staging activity associated with the NUKESPED (ThreatNeedle) malware family. The rule looks for the execution of known secondary executable names, payload files staged in the ProgramData directory, and a specific process lineage where PowerShell is spawned from WScript or CScript to launch processes from the ProgramData directory.
Detects the execution of the NUKESPED backdoor (specifically the file named zlrenu8.exe), which is associated with Kimsuky's espionage operations, including screen capture activities.
Detects outbound network connections from devices to known FortiBleed command and control (C2) servers and sniffer infrastructure IP addresses. This rule helps identify potential compromises involving the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation.
Detects HTTP GET requests for specific malicious archives (calculator.rar, EditorToolsPdf.zip) originating from suspected compromised Ukrainian domains (basecon.com.ua, online.zp.ua). This behavior is associated with the STOCKSTAY malware used by the threat actor Turla.
This rule detects network connections to specific domains known to be associated with malicious activity or to a suspicious API pattern often used by malware for command and control. The domains 'openanyworddocument.com', 'kittyfreespace.com', 'searchdocumentsfree.com', 'autoupdatet.com', 'autoupdaters.com', and 'autoupdatethis.com' have been observed in various campaigns. The regex pattern '/api/(init|cl)/[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}' targets a common API endpoint structure used for initialization or client communication by certain types of malware, often involving a GUID.
Detects HTTP response bodies containing common PE/Shellcode magic headers (MZ, PE, or NOP sleds) which are associated with the delivery of payloads designed to exploit or utilize the Windows KernelCallbackTable for process injection. The detection focuses on suspicious content delivered over HTTP connections.
This rule detects potential Remote Access Trojan (RAT) activity by identifying specific indicators associated with Nuitka-compiled binaries, specifically the 'chost.exe' filename or paths containing 'win-driver-xd7d'. Additionally, it monitors for suspicious Python-based loader executions ('loader.py') initiated from temporary directories, which is a common persistence or execution technique for such malware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests characterized by a specific URL pattern consisting of two segments of 4-16 alphanumeric characters, typically observed in Emotet C2 traffic. The rule specifically matches requests with a Content-Type header set to application/octet-stream, which is indicative of malicious binary payload transfer or communication.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the NjRAT (Bladabindi) remote access trojan, specifically identifying its pipe-delimited command-and-control protocol patterns (e.g., '|ll|' or '|kl|').
Detects the transmission of a Metasploit Meterpreter stage over HTTP, identified by an application/octet-stream response containing the DOS MZ header signature.
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