Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a malicious PNG file used by the Ousaban VBS downloader that embeds a ZIP archive containing a payload named 'SysMain.exe' appended after the PNG IEND chunk.
Detects Reynolds ransomware's technique of ntdll loader hijacking for process injection, bypassing userland API hooks. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for the loading of GDI32.dll alongside ntdll internal loader routines, combined with API calls such as WriteProcessMemory, NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection, and RtlEncodeRemotePointer, which are consistent with loader-level injection techniques. It also filters out common legitimate processes to reduce false positives.
Detects attempts by the GreenBlood ransomware to disable Windows Defender's real-time monitoring by modifying the registry. This rule specifically looks for 'reg.exe' commands that add 'DisableRealtimeMonitoring=1' to the Windows Defender policy key.
Detects network connections initiated by 'Browser_Updater.exe' to a known malicious IP address (45.251.243.210) or a specific domain containing 'iis.jpg'. This activity is indicative of initial access or command and control related to a specific campaign.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
This rule detects the OXLOADER malware's technique of hijacking the CRT initializer table. It identifies an unsigned process loading a randomly named .ocx file (a copy of dui70.dll with an injected .xtext section) from a temporary or download path. The detection is further refined by correlating this with multiple VirtualAlloc calls, consistent with the malware's three rolling-XOR decryption stubs activated via the RegisterClipboardFormatW CRT initializer hook.
This rule detects the creation or manipulation of mutexes by processes that contain keywords associated with the Remcos RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Specifically, it looks for command-line arguments containing "Remcos_Mutex_Inj", "Remcos_Mutex", "mutex", or "CreateMutex". This activity can indicate the presence or execution of Remcos RAT on a system, as mutexes are often used by malware for single-instance enforcement or inter-process communication.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with Emotet malware by monitoring for successful network connections to suspicious remote ports frequently used by the malware. The rule flags endpoints that establish connections to at least three of these high-risk ports within a one-hour window, which is indicative of automated C2 beaconing behavior.
This rule detects the creation or manipulation of mutexes by processes that contain keywords associated with the Remcos RAT (Remote Access Trojan). Specifically, it looks for command-line arguments containing "Remcos_Mutex_Inj", "Remcos_Mutex", "mutex", or "CreateMutex". This activity can indicate the presence or execution of Remcos RAT on a system, as mutexes are often used by malware for single-instance enforcement or inter-process communication.
Detects file creation events related to known GLASSWORM VS Code extension files or WebAssembly (WASM) loader JavaScript shims. It also identifies process execution where the VS Code extension host spawns 'node.exe' with known GLASSWORM JavaScript shims. This rule aims to identify the presence and execution of the GLASSWORM malware.
Detects the SHEETCREEP RAT (vaultsvc.exe) creating the 'Global\WinSync_' mutex, often from non-standard locations. This rule correlates process image paths with named object events to identify suspicious activity.
This rule detects attempts by the Rokarolla trojan to disable Google Play Protect on Android devices. It monitors for Accessibility Service actions, Android Accessibility Events, or App Control Actions that target 'com.google.android.gms' and contain keywords like 'play_protect', 'PlayProtect', 'finskyEula', 'security_scan', or 'disable'. This behavior indicates the malware is trying to suppress security scans by Google Play Protect.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the BTMOB Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It monitors for suspicious network behavior by correlating DNS requests to ip-api.com (a common geolocation service used by malware to identify the victim's location/public IP) with subsequent C2 communication to cloud services (Google Pub/Sub, Azure MQTT) or non-standard network traffic on port 3478 (often used for STUN/NAT traversal, but excluded for known browsers and communication tools) within a 30-minute window.
Detects the execution of suspicious binaries spawned by the Windows script hosts (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) from the AppData directory. This pattern is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan, which masquerades as an Adobe Reader update prompt and drops its payload into temporary folders to execute.
Detects the use of 7za to extract archives into the Avast Software directory, a behavior observed in Pay2Key ransomware campaigns to perform DLL hijacking for execution, persistence, or privilege escalation.
Detects the execution or creation of files named GT_NET.exe or Gt_net.exe, which are associated with the Grixba ransomware (Play Ransomware group). The rule also identifies files that masquerade as SentinelOne by utilizing SentinelOne-related product, company, or description metadata but are located outside of the legitimate SentinelOne installation directory.
Detects the installation of the BTMOB Android RAT by identifying sideloaded application installations combined with the enablement of sensitive features such as Android Accessibility Services, device administrator registration, or the granting of high-risk permissions (SMS, camera, audio recording) typically used by mobile banking trojans.
Detects suspicious network activity using the STUN/TURN protocol on port 3478 initiated by non-browser and non-conferencing processes. The rule specifically targets unsigned processes or those located in user-writable directories (such as Temp or AppData), which are common indicators of Grandoreiro malware sideloading and establishing C2 communication tunnels.
Detects Grandoreiro banking trojan activity by identifying the loading of specific DLLs (e.g., mingwm10.dll, libwebp.dll, libffi-6.dll) from non-standard or user-writable directory paths, which is characteristic of the Grandoreiro DLL side-loading technique.
Detects activity consistent with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, including DLL sideloading, screen capturing, keystroke hooking, unauthorized network connections to known banking infrastructure, and suspicious data exfiltration bursts.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns characteristic of the Grandoreiro banking trojan, which tunnels Command and Control (C2) communications over STUN/WebRTC (UDP port 3478). The rule identifies processes that are not known web browsers or conferencing applications initiating these STUN connections, a technique used by the malware to blend with legitimate collaboration traffic.
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