Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of identity-related operations performed by a single user within a 2-hour window. The chain consists of a password reset, MFA method modification, new device registration, and a subsequent privilege escalation event (such as role assignment or application consent). This pattern is consistent with helpdesk-vishing campaigns often used by threat actors like Scattered Spider to perform full account takeovers.
Detects successful user sign-ins from geographically distant locations occurring within a timeframe that is physically impossible to traverse (implied speed > 900 km/h). The rule further filters for scenarios where the device used for authentication appears non-compliant or uses an unrecognized method, potentially indicating an attacker utilizing stolen credentials and bypassing MFA.
Detects Azure sign-in events claiming successful hardware-key or FIDO2 authentication where the authentication issuer is not part of a known-good allow-list. This behavior is indicative of a rogue MFA provider, such as the TrustSink attack, which issues forged tokens claiming MFA requirements were satisfied.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects instances where a user account modifies security information, registers a new MFA method, or resets a password shortly after a successful sign-in from a country not observed for that user within the previous 30 days. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary adds persistence or MFA bypass methods to a newly compromised account.
Detects MFA fatigue or push-bombing attacks where a user account experiences an abnormally high volume of MFA request denials in a short duration (10 minutes), followed by a successful authentication event. The rule specifically looks for evidence where the successful authentication potentially originates from a different IP address than the failed attempts.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects a sequence of events where a user's MFA configuration is modified (typically via a help-desk impersonation vishing attack) followed closely by a successful sign-in from a new IP address. This pattern is indicative of attackers hijacking sessions or stealing credentials by coercing victims into resetting MFA settings.
Detects user sign-ins that utilize an 'External Authentication Method' within 3 days of a password reset event. This behavior may indicate an adversary has successfully established persistence using a rogue authentication provider (e.g., via a TrustSink or similar malicious configuration) that survives password remediation and is capable of capturing or intercepting subsequent authentication tokens.
Detects Azure AD sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was reportedly satisfied by an External Authentication Method (EAM) claim without evidence of a traditional secondary authentication challenge. This behavior is indicative of a 'TrustSink' technique where a rogue or compromised OIDC provider injects a spoofed assertion of MFA success into the authentication token.
Detects potential theft and reuse of session or refresh tokens for Microsoft 365 services (Exchange/SharePoint) by identifying multiple authentication events for the same user account from different geographic locations and IP addresses within a short timeframe, specifically when no new MFA challenge was performed.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by identifying a pattern where a successful multi-factor authentication sign-in event is quickly followed by another successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, device, or geographic location. This behavior is indicative of session cookie theft and replay, commonly associated with phishing toolkits like Evilginx or NovaCookies.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token replay attacks where a user successfully authenticates with MFA and is followed shortly by a subsequent successful login for the same user from a different IP address or device without a fresh MFA challenge, suggesting the use of a stolen session cookie.
Detects instances where a Claude session token is reused from a new IP address without the completion of an MFA challenge, indicating a potential session hijacking or session theft attempt.
Detects Azure AD/Entra ID authentication events where a session token or cookie is used without performing a fresh interactive MFA challenge, which is characteristic of session hijacking or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) relay attacks (e.g., NovaCookies) used to bypass security controls after initial authentication.
Detects high-risk administrative actions in Microsoft 365, such as new MFA method registration, OAuth app consent grants, or email forwarding rule creation, occurring in sessions that lack fresh authentication (often indicative of a session-cookie replay attack).
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
This rule detects persistence by identifying accounts that continue to authenticate using an External Authentication Method (EAM) both before and after a password reset event. This behavior suggests that an adversary has established a persistent authentication mechanism (such as an EAM) that survives a standard password reset, indicating potential account compromise and bypass of primary authentication controls.
Detects successful Azure AD sign-in attempts that utilize legacy or basic authentication protocols (e.g., POP, IMAP, SMTP, Exchange ActiveSync) where Conditional Access MFA enforcement was not applied. This behavior indicates a potential attempt to circumvent modern authentication security controls, often associated with AiTM-facilitated account takeover or legacy protocol abuse.
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