Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies their MFA phone number, followed within 30 minutes by a sign-in event flagged with 'impossibleTravel' or 'unfamiliarFeatures' risk. This pattern is indicative of potential SIM-swap fraud, where an attacker has hijacked the user's phone number to receive MFA prompts and then attempts to access the account from an anomalous location.
Detects Azure AD sign-in events indicative of a session token replay attack. The rule identifies successful sign-ins where the traffic source originates from known residential proxy infrastructure (anonymizing services often used by attackers) and the authentication process lacks a fresh interactive MFA challenge, suggesting the use of a stolen, valid session token.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized device registration or Intune enrollment activity by monitoring Azure Sign-in logs. It specifically flags accounts that exhibit rapid, multiple device registration attempts (>= 2 in 5 minutes) combined with suspicious indicators such as scripted User Agents ('python-requests'), the presence of Primary Refresh Tokens (PRT), specific device naming patterns, or concurrent Intune enrollment activity. These behaviors are common indicators of automated adversary activity aiming to bypass conditional access policies by enrolling illicit devices.
Detects a suspicious correlation between the registration of new authentication methods or application integrations and the subsequent modification of Conditional Access policies within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of the activation phase of a TrustSink attack, where an adversary sets up a malicious MFA provider and forces its use by expanding Conditional Access policy scope.
This rule detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by identifying a sequence where a user experiences a sign-in interruption (ResultType 50199) followed by a successful sign-in with the same SessionId but from a different, anomalous User-Agent (typically associated with automated tools like Axios). This pattern indicates the reuse of intercepted session tokens to bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns in Microsoft 365 logs where a valid session is utilized across multiple distinct devices within a short timeframe (under 5 minutes) without a corresponding multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge. This behavior is indicative of a session token replay attack, where an adversary uses a stolen session cookie to bypass MFA and access cloud services.
Detects instances where a user account modifies security information, registers a new MFA method, or resets a password shortly after a successful sign-in from a country not observed for that user within the previous 30 days. This pattern is indicative of potential account takeover where an adversary adds persistence or MFA bypass methods to a newly compromised account.
Detects MFA fatigue or push-bombing attacks where a user account experiences an abnormally high volume of MFA request denials in a short duration (10 minutes), followed by a successful authentication event. The rule specifically looks for evidence where the successful authentication potentially originates from a different IP address than the failed attempts.
Detects high-frequency authentication attempts originating from user agents associated with automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright, Puppeteer, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of automated credential stuffing, brute force attacks, or CAPTCHA/2FA bypass attempts orchestrated by headless browsers.
Detects a suspicious sequence of administrative actions where a user's phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) factor, such as FIDO2, passkeys, or certificates, is removed and immediately replaced by a weaker authentication method like SMS, voice call, or TOTP. This behavior, when performed by an administrator account on a different user account, is a common indicator of an MFA bypass attempt often associated with social engineering or insider threat scenarios.
Detects modifications to Entra ID Conditional Access or Okta authentication policies that introduce MFA exclusions, trusted network bypasses, or authentication-strength downgrades. This activity is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistence or bypass MFA following a successful initial account compromise.
Detects high-risk identity modifications (password or MFA resets) following an IT helpdesk ticket that lacks mandatory security controls, such as callback verification, manager approval, or established ticket history. This behavior is indicative of vishing and social engineering attacks aimed at helpdesk personnel to compromise user accounts.
Detects suspicious account management activities, such as password resets or MFA re-enrollment, performed by an operator on a high-privileged or administrator account outside of typical business hours (06:00-20:00). This behavior is often indicative of help-desk impersonation or credential takeover attempts targeting Identity Provider (IdP) administrative roles.
Detects instances where an account assigned a help-desk or support role performs an MFA, password, or credential reset on an account tagged as an executive or VIP. This behavior is indicative of social engineering and help-desk impersonation attacks commonly utilized by threat actors to perform rogue MFA takeovers.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events indicating account takeover: a password reset, followed by an MFA factor re-enrollment, and concluding with a successful login from a geographically impossible location compared to recent history. This pattern often signifies a help-desk-assisted account compromise or token theft.
Detects anomalous sign-in patterns indicative of real-time MFA relay attacks, where a user principal authenticates successfully from multiple distinct IP addresses and geographical locations within a short time window (15 minutes), suggesting the active interception of credentials and MFA challenges by a Phishing-as-a-Service platform.
Detects high-frequency authentication attempts originating from user agents associated with automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright, Puppeteer, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of automated credential stuffing, brute force attacks, or CAPTCHA/2FA bypass attempts orchestrated by headless browsers.
Detects a suspicious sequence of administrative actions where a user's phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication (MFA) factor, such as FIDO2, passkeys, or certificates, is removed and immediately replaced by a weaker authentication method like SMS, voice call, or TOTP. This behavior, when performed by an administrator account on a different user account, is a common indicator of an MFA bypass attempt often associated with social engineering or insider threat scenarios.
Detects modifications to Entra ID Conditional Access or Okta authentication policies that introduce MFA exclusions, trusted network bypasses, or authentication-strength downgrades. This activity is highly indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistence or bypass MFA following a successful initial account compromise.
Detects high-risk identity modifications (password or MFA resets) following an IT helpdesk ticket that lacks mandatory security controls, such as callback verification, manager approval, or established ticket history. This behavior is indicative of vishing and social engineering attacks aimed at helpdesk personnel to compromise user accounts.
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