Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a pattern of MFA fatigue or 'push-bombing' where a user receives 5 or more MFA challenge requests within 10 minutes, immediately followed by a successful authentication event. This pattern is characteristic of attackers who have obtained user credentials and are attempting to bypass MFA by repeatedly triggering push notifications until the user grants access.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
Detects anomalous account recovery or MFA reset activity performed by a single help-desk user account. A high volume of reset actions across numerous distinct users within a short duration is a key behavioral indicator of potential help-desk account compromise or insider abuse involving unauthorized account takeovers.
Detects a suspicious sequence where an account undergoes a help-desk-initiated password or credential reset, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the registration of a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) device for that same account. This pattern is characteristic of social engineering attacks, such as those used by UNC3944/Scattered Spider, where an adversary impersonates a user to gain initial access and subsequently establishes persistence by adding an MFA device they control.
Detects a suspected Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue attack, characterized by a user denying three or more consecutive MFA authentication requests in a short period (10 minutes) followed by a successful authentication approval. This behavior often indicates an adversary bombarding a user with push notifications to eventually solicit an accidental or coerced approval.
Detects a pattern of MFA fatigue or 'push-bombing' where a user receives 5 or more MFA challenge requests within 10 minutes, immediately followed by a successful authentication event. This pattern is characteristic of attackers who have obtained user credentials and are attempting to bypass MFA by repeatedly triggering push notifications until the user grants access.
Detects the registration of a new MFA device or authenticator by a user shortly after a password reset event, where the registration originates from an IP address classified as a hosting provider, datacenter, or VPN. This pattern is indicative of a help-desk or vishing-based account takeover attack where an adversary registers their own MFA device to gain persistent access.
Detects high-privileged Entra ID accounts successfully reaching the verification stage of the Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) process. While SSPR is automatically enabled for administrative accounts, this activity is anomalous and potentially indicates an attacker focusing on discovered privileged accounts after performing broader enumeration.
Detects when a user registers a new MFA or authentication method, such as a software token or authenticator app, within one hour of a suspicious sign-in event. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or bypassing authentication controls following account compromise via phishing or credential harvesting.
This rule monitors for updates to a user's multi-factor authentication (MFA) configuration, specifically detecting when a new device is registered or activated. Attackers often register their own devices as MFA second factors to maintain persistent access to a compromised user account.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence of suspicious identity activities indicative of a post-account-takeover pivot. The rule identifies a user profile engaging in corporate VPN SAML SSO probing, triggering a MFA enrollment interrupt in Azure, and subsequently accessing multiple Microsoft 365 applications (Azure Portal, OfficeHome, SharePoint) within a 30-minute window.
Detects a burst of MFA push/approval prompts (5+ in 10 minutes) to one user culminating in an eventual approval after repeated denials/timeouts — the push-bombing technique Scattered Spider and Mutant Spider pair with helpdesk vishing to exhaust remaining MFA resistance.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency MFA method resets, deletions, or updates performed by a single administrative account within a 15-minute window. This activity is indicative of a compromised support or helpdesk account being leveraged to bypass multi-factor authentication across multiple user accounts for unauthorized access or account takeover.
This rule detects potential MFA fatigue attacks (Push Bombing) by monitoring sign-in logs for a high volume of authentication prompts directed at a single user within a one-hour window. It specifically identifies patterns where a user receives multiple denied MFA push requests followed by at least one successful approval. The rule also accounts for suspicious behavior such as requests originating from multiple IP addresses or geographic locations.
Detects multiple consecutive MFA challenge events (ResultCode 50074 or 50140) for a single user session occurring on unmanaged devices (trustType is null or unknown) while using the Chrome browser. This pattern may indicate an attempt to bypass or exhaust MFA mechanisms, or credential abuse on non-compliant devices.
Detects the addition of a new strong authentication method (MFA/authenticator device) to an account. This activity is a common indicator of persistence following a successful AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing attack or initial account compromise, as attackers establish their own MFA device to maintain long-term access.
Detects modifications or additions to Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) security information for high-value users, specifically targeting those with executive titles (Director, VP, President, etc.). This behavior is frequently associated with account takeover attempts where an attacker registers their own MFA device to a compromised privileged account to maintain persistence.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
Detects the registration of a new MFA authentication method (such as an authenticator app, phone, or software OTP) by a user, specifically flagging cases where the action occurs from an unfamiliar location or device context within 24 hours of a prior sign-in event. This pattern is often associated with post-compromise persistence efforts where attackers register their own MFA devices to maintain access to a compromised account.
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