Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects various phases of the Grixba infostealer infection lifecycle, including persistence via file drops in public user directories, malicious DLL/payload creation, reconnaissance data exfiltration, security software tampering (Windows Defender, AMSI, WLDP), and event log clearing via wevtutil.
This rule detects potential phishing or cloaking activity where a web server response contains JavaScript logic that checks the visitor's User-Agent string using 'navigator.userAgent' and conditionally redirects the user via 'window.location'. This technique is commonly used to redirect specific targets (e.g., mobile devices or specific browsers) to malicious sites while serving benign content to others, often for credential harvesting or malware delivery.
Detects suspected command and control (C2) activity leveraging Cloudflare Tunnel or Workers. The rule identifies two patterns: 1) Repeated polling (>5 connections in 10 minutes) to Cloudflare infrastructure by suspicious scripting processes (e.g., PowerShell, WScript), and 2) A 'dead-drop' resolver pattern where a process contacts a Cloudflare domain, followed by a DNS query to an unrelated domain shortly thereafter, suggesting the retrieval of a new C2 address.
Detects HTTP and DNS requests directed towards the .workers.dev domain, which are commonly leveraged by threat actors for command and control (C2) redirection and domain fronting. This activity is frequently associated with the Gamaredon (Shuckworm/ACTINIUM) threat group's infrastructure.
This rule detects suspicious process command lines that indicate potential tunneling activity. It looks for commands containing 'tunnel', '--url', and '--logfile', while excluding legitimate 'cloudflared.exe' processes. This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish covert communication channels or exfiltrate data.
Detects network connections to known ShinyHunters infrastructure, including specific IP addresses and DNS queries for 'azurenetfiles.net', which has been linked to their operations targeting Oracle PeopleSoft servers via gadget chain exploitation.
This rule detects DNS queries with suspicious characteristics that may indicate DNS tunneling, data exfiltration, or command and control activity. It identifies queries with unusually long names, long first labels combined with high entropy, or a high number of subdomains combined with a long first label. Exclusions are made for common legitimate DNS suffixes and specific service-related domains.
Identifies execution of the Windows PowerShell cradle used by GLASSWORM's WASM loader. It looks for 'irm' fetching a URL containing the specific '/win32/i/_' path structure, piped to 'iex'.
This rule detects the use of TLS protocol on port 443 with a specific content signature, indicating potential Command and Control (C2) activity. It triggers an alert if 20 such connections are observed from the same source within 60 seconds.
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign (attributed to Storm-2755 and Storm-2657). Identifying these connections indicates potential communication with adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network communication to the malicious domain 'mitarchive.info' from common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave). This domain is associated with the StegoAd browser extension, which intercepts Google and WordPress login flows to exfiltrate stolen credentials and 2FA codes.
Detects network connections originating from common web browsers (msedge.exe or chrome.exe) to a specific set of known malicious or suspicious domains. The rule specifically monitors DNS queries for these domains or any web-based communication (ports 80/443) targeting them, which may indicate command-and-control activity or drive-by-download attempts.
This rule detects when a user clicks on a URL that contains a domain identified as malicious. The rule specifically looks for `UrlClickEvents` where the extracted domain from the URL matches any of the domains listed in the `malicious_domains` array. This can indicate a successful phishing attempt or an accidental click on a known malicious link.
This rule detects the presence of Blackbeard malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its known C2 infrastructure. It correlates file events with specific hashes and network events with specific remote IP addresses.
Detects network connections to a specific suspicious IP address (94.156.181.89) or to domains associated with Cloudflare Tunnel (.trycloudflare.com). This could indicate command and control activity, data exfiltration, or other malicious network communication.
This rule detects a high volume of UDP network connections originating from a single process on a device. A count exceeding 50 UDP connections from the same process to the same remote IP address is considered anomalous and could indicate a UDP flood or other denial-of-service attempt.
Detects suspicious network connections to 'outlook-one.vercel.app' or 'api.telegram.org' when initiated by common web browsers (msedge.exe, chrome.exe, firefox.exe) or Outlook (outlook.exe). This pattern can indicate phishing attempts, credential harvesting, or data exfiltration via Telegram bots.
Detects unauthenticated HTTP POST requests targeting Oracle PeopleSoft PSEMHUB and PSIGW endpoints that are characteristic of the CVE-2026-35273 remote code execution exploit gadget chain.
Detects anomalous network and file activity associated with the libarchive ZIP size boundary bypass vulnerability (Exploitarium PoC). The rule identifies processes like 'debuginfod' or 'curl' interacting with specific /buildid/*/section/ endpoints via loopback interfaces, correlated with the creation of known PoC marker files or logs in temporary directories.
This rule monitors process execution events for the presence of the Chisel network tunneling tool. It identifies Chisel by its executable names (e.g., chisel.exe, chisel_linux) and command-line arguments typical of a Chisel client or server configuration, including SOCKS proxy setups and known indicator ports.
This rule detects lateral movement activity associated with the Impacket toolkit. It monitors for the execution of common Impacket scripts (e.g., psexec.py, smbexec.py, wmiexec.py) or binaries (psexec.exe/PsExec64.exe) spawning from suspicious parent processes or interacting with sensitive Windows shares (ADMIN$, IPC$). Additionally, it flags Python processes performing SMB connections to multiple internal hosts, as well as cmd.exe/powershell.exe instances spawned from services.exe that reference Impacket tool names in their command lines.
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