Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential ransomware lateral movement patterns by correlating specific network connection attempts (SMB/RDP/RPC) with the observed creation of files having the '.prinzeugen' extension on the same host within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a ransomware strain propagating across the network and performing encryption.
Detects browsers loading external anomalous scripts from known malvertising domains while visiting plaintext HTTP sites (Router injection). This rule specifically looks for network connections on port 80 (HTTP) that are joined with device network events where the remote URL matches a regex for known malvertising domains (.xyz, .top, .site) and ends with '.js', indicating an injected script.
Detects network activity associated with the ROOTBOY actor, specifically identifying internal devices communicating with known malicious command and control (C2) IP addresses and subsequently attempting to access specific suspicious domains or URLs linked to the actor's infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections made to specific non-standard ports (7777, 8080, 8443) where the remote URL contains substrings associated with proxy or tunneling activities ('proxy', 'tunnel', 'hide'). This behavior is commonly associated with malware attempting to evade security controls by routing traffic through unauthorized intermediaries or obfuscated tunnels.
Detects a user who interacted with a code-of-conduct lure subsequently authenticating through an anonymous proxy or anonymisation service. This rule correlates URL click events or sign-in events with subjects related to 'code of conduct' or 'policy acknowledgement' and then checks if the subsequent authentication occurred via an anonymous proxy.
This rule detects network traffic containing keywords commonly associated with Indian payment gateways and financial transactions (NEFT, RTGS, IMPS, GST, PAN, IFSC). This could indicate data exfiltration or suspicious activity involving financial information, potentially related to malware like Remcos RAT.
Detects network events where a remote URL contains repeated null bytes (\0 or \x00) on port 21, which could indicate an attempt to exploit the Squidbleed vulnerability or similar memory dump patterns.
Detects network communication patterns indicative of RedLine Stealer activity by looking for specific keywords in the RemoteUrl field during inbound or outbound connections.
This rule detects successful OAuth logins originating from IP addresses identified as residential proxies. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass geo-blocking or other IP-based restrictions, potentially using stolen credentials (Valid Accounts) or after a successful phishing campaign (Spearphishing Link) to gain initial access or maintain persistence.
This rule detects the use of JSON-RPC 'eth_call' by a non-browser process during network connection events. It specifically looks for network activity where the process is not a known web browser (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) and the network traffic or command line contains the string '"method":"eth_call"'. This behavior is often associated with malware or cryptocurrency-related threats attempting to resolve dynamic commands or addresses.
This rule detects network connections where a non-browser process (specifically excluding Chrome, Edge, and Firefox) attempts to resolve dynamic commands or addresses using the JSON-RPC 'eth_call' method. It specifically targets scenarios where this activity is associated with known malware structures like SessionGate, Remus, or AnimateClipper, rather than a standalone executable name. The detection logic looks for 'eth_call' in either the DomainName or the ContextProcessCommandLine fields during network connection events.
This rule detects successful OAuth sign-ins originating from a residential proxy IP address, correlated with a successful identity logon event for the same user. This pattern can indicate an adversary using residential proxies to bypass geo-restrictions or blend in with legitimate user traffic while attempting to access accounts via OAuth.
This rule monitors network logs (from proxies and firewalls) for web traffic (HTTP GET requests) containing suspicious JavaScript code injection patterns in the request context or message fields. It specifically looks for common XSS indicators such as <script tags, eval(), document.write(), fromCharCode(), and atob().
This rule detects a pattern of network shared folder access followed by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') within a 45-minute window. This behavior is indicative of ransomware preparing to encrypt data on network shares.
Detects Jellyfin's automated ffprobe media scan pipeline spawning suspicious network-related shell commands. This indicates active exploitation of the PixelSmash vulnerability (CVE-2026-8461) via zero-click library scans.
Detects non-browser HTTP POST requests containing both 'access_token' and step-style parameters (e.g., 'step', 'stage', 'counter' followed by a number) in proxy or firewall telemetry. This rule specifically targets patterns associated with malware communication, such as SessionGate, Remus, or AnimateClipper, by excluding common browser user agents.
Detects high-volume SSH or network logon failures from a single source IP address within a short time window, indicative of a brute force attack. The rule specifically mentions consistency with 'mpbrute2.bin' tooling used in the 'FortiBleed' campaign.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to high-volume Server Message Block (SMB) share enumeration and the execution of a specific Python script named 'backup_dfs.py'. It combines three detection logics: identifying processes executing 'backup_dfs.py', detecting an unusual number of SMB network connections to common administrative shares (SYSVOL, NETLOGON, DFS), and flagging high-volume SMB-related identity directory events targeting SYSVOL or NETLOGON. This behavior could indicate an adversary performing discovery of network shares, collecting data, or preparing for data exfiltration.
Detects curl.exe downloading payloads to generic .dat or .exe files in AppData, or hitting known staging IPs.
Detects a specific two-step HTTP pattern characteristic of OysterLoader's initial C2 communication. The malware first sends a registration request containing a 'WordPressAgent' User-Agent string, followed by a login request with a 'FingerPrint' User-Agent string to the same destination. This version checks for the User-Agent strings in the 'AdditionalFields' column.
Detects a specific persistence mechanism where a scheduled task named 'TPMProfiler' is used to run QEMU, establishing an SSH backdoor. This technique was identified by Huntress in post-exploitation activity related to SolarWinds WHD exploitation.
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