Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (DNS queries, network connections, file creation, and process execution) to identify matches against a predefined list of known malicious indicators, including IP addresses, domains, and file hashes (SHA256). The rule differentiates between confirmed malicious activity and low-confidence indicators, providing a prioritized view of potential threats.
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
Detects the handshake process for Blackwood/Chisel reverse SOCKS5 or TCP-over-HTTP tunneling to a known malicious Iranian-hosted C2 IP address. The detection matches specific HTTP headers used by the Chisel tool during its initialization phase.
Detects a network connection handshake indicating the use of Chisel, a fast TCP/UDP tunnel over HTTP, specifically identifying potential command-and-control beaconing activity.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where Kubernetes API resources (namespaces, secrets, configmaps, pods, or nodes) are enumerated, followed by a search query against the Slack API, indicative of a potential reconnaissance phase or sandbox escape attempt.
Detects SQL injection exploitation attempts against MOVEit Transfer targeting the CVE-2023-34362 vulnerability, followed by the deployment and subsequent interaction with the 'human2.aspx' webshell associated with Cl0p ransomware mass-exploitation campaigns.
This rule detects anomalous spikes in network connections from a device to major LLM provider API endpoints (OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Anthropic) by establishing a baseline for each device and identifying deviations exceeding a statistical threshold. Such behavior may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration or mass data processing using LLM services.
Detects HTTP GET requests for AgtaBackupAgent.msi or AgtaBackupAgent.version, which are indicative of the download phase of the AgtaBackup Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
This rule detects network communication attempts to a specific set of domains associated with the AgtaBackup Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for outbound connections directed toward known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure used by this threat actor.
Detects the 'HCENC1:' marker in HTTP request and response bodies, which is associated with RUSTYSHADE malware used by the APT36 (Transparent Tribe) threat group for Command and Control communications.
This rule detects established TLS connections to external hosts that utilize a specific self-signed certificate associated with TA419 phishing infrastructure. The rule specifically flags connections presenting a TLS certificate with Subject and Issuer fields containing 'C=US, ST=Kansas, L=Millsstad, O=Castro Inc, CN=CI'.
This rule detects established TLS connections to external hosts that utilize a specific self-signed certificate associated with TA419 phishing infrastructure. The rule specifically flags connections presenting a TLS certificate with Subject and Issuer fields containing 'C=US, ST=Kansas, L=Millsstad, O=Castro Inc, CN=CI'.
This rule detects established TLS connections to external hosts that utilize a specific self-signed certificate associated with TA419 phishing infrastructure. The rule specifically flags connections presenting a TLS certificate with Subject and Issuer fields containing 'C=US, ST=Kansas, L=Millsstad, O=Castro Inc, CN=CI'.
This rule detects established TLS connections to external hosts that utilize a specific self-signed certificate associated with TA419 phishing infrastructure. The rule specifically flags connections presenting a TLS certificate with Subject and Issuer fields containing 'C=US, ST=Kansas, L=Millsstad, O=Castro Inc, CN=CI'.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
This analytic identifies the use of Chromium-based browsers (like Microsoft Edge) running in headless mode with the `--dump-dom` argument.
This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
This analytic identifies non-browser processes reaching out to public IP lookup or geolocation services,
such as `ipinfo.io`, `icanhazip.com`, `ip-api.com`, and others.
These domains are commonly used by legitimate tools, but their usage outside of browsers may indicate
network reconnaissance, virtual machine detection, or staging by malware.
This activity is observed in post-exploitation frameworks, stealer malware, and advanced threat actor campaigns.
The detection relies on Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) telemetry and excludes known browser
processes to reduce noise.
such as `ipinfo.io`, `icanhazip.com`, `ip-api.com`, and others.
These domains are commonly used by legitimate tools, but their usage outside of browsers may indicate
network reconnaissance, virtual machine detection, or staging by malware.
This activity is observed in post-exploitation frameworks, stealer malware, and advanced threat actor campaigns.
The detection relies on Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) telemetry and excludes known browser
processes to reduce noise.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
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