Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects large encrypted data uploads (over 65KB) on TCP port 8443, which is an alternate port often used for TLS/HTTPS traffic. The rule triggers if 10 such uploads occur from the same source within 60 seconds, indicating a potential policy violation or data exfiltration attempt.
This rule detects attempts to push malicious firmware to a device via TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol). It specifically looks for UDP traffic on port 69 (TFTP) where the packet content starts with "|00 02|" (indicating a TFTP write request) and the data size is greater than 10000 bytes, suggesting a firmware image transfer.
This rule detects attempts to overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) or disk structure using the 'dd' command via a remote SSH connection. Specifically, it looks for the string 'dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda' within TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH). This command, if executed, would wipe the primary disk, leading to system destruction.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) communication over the MQTT protocol. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 1883 (the standard MQTT port) from the home network to any destination. The detection is triggered by the presence of a specific byte sequence ('|10|') at the beginning of the payload, which corresponds to an MQTT PUBLISH message type. A threshold of 5 such messages within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives, indicating a sustained pattern of MQTT PUBLISH activity that could be indicative of C2.
This rule detects obfuscated protocol data in non-standard command and control (C2) channels over TCP. It triggers when TCP traffic flows from the home network to any destination, is established, has a data size between 101 and 499 bytes, and occurs at a high frequency (30 times in 60 seconds from the same source). This pattern is indicative of trojan activity, specifically related to command and control communications.
This rule detects when an executable file (.exe) is dropped into a shared network folder. It specifically looks for SMB traffic containing both ".exe" and "\\share\\" in the content, indicating a potential attempt to distribute malicious executables or move them laterally within a network.
This rule detects attempts to use cloud services (specifically AWS SSM or Azure Management) for internal lateral movement. It triggers when HTTP requests are made to 'ssm.amazonaws.com' or 'management.azure.com' with the URI containing 'SendCommand'. A threshold of 5 such events from the same source within 30 seconds is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potential browser session token injection via a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. It looks for HTTP responses (flow:to_client) that contain the strings "document.cookie", "=", and "XMLHttpRequest" (case-insensitive) within the file data. The combination of these strings in a client-bound HTTP response suggests an attempt to manipulate browser cookies, possibly to inject session tokens, often seen in MitM scenarios where an attacker intercepts and modifies traffic to compromise user sessions.
This rule detects attempts to dump router configuration via a Telnet session. Specifically, it looks for the string "show running-config" being sent to a Telnet server on the home network. This command is commonly used on network devices to display their current running configuration, and its use over an unencrypted protocol like Telnet could indicate unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
This rule detects the creation of a tar archive using the 'tar -czf' command, specifically when the archive is being created in the '/tmp/' directory over an SSH connection. This activity is indicative of data staging, where an attacker might be preparing data for exfiltration or further malicious use.
This rule detects potential network scanning activity targeting LDAP services (port 389) for user session information. It specifically looks for LDAP queries containing "(objectClass=user)" and "lastLogon" within the established TCP flow to the server. A threshold of 5 such queries from the same source within 30 seconds triggers the alert, indicating a possible attempt to enumerate active user sessions.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate domain trusts by querying LDAP for objects with the 'objectClass=trustedDomain' attribute. This activity is often performed by attackers during the discovery phase to map out the network topology and identify potential lateral movement paths. The rule specifically looks for TCP traffic to port 389 (LDAP) on the home network, containing the specified LDAP filter, and uses a threshold to prevent excessive alerts from legitimate, but frequent, queries.
This rule detects attempts to remotely disable the Windows Event Log service over SMB (port 445). It specifically looks for TCP traffic to port 445 on the home network, containing the case-insensitive strings "EventLog" and "StopService". This activity is indicative of an attacker trying to hinder forensic analysis or evade detection by stopping logging services.
This rule detects attempts to modify macOS Plist files over an SSH connection. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) where the payload contains both '/Library/Preferences/' and '.plist' (case-insensitive). This activity is flagged as potential defense evasion, as modifying Plist files can be used to alter system behavior or application settings to evade security mechanisms.
Detects processes making network requests to the '/api/css.js' endpoint, which is indicative of the ErrTraffic malware.
This rule detects when a single account initiates 5 or more successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections within a one-hour window. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain widespread access within a network, potentially through credential stuffing, brute-force attacks, or lateral movement using compromised credentials.
This rule detects a brute-force attack against a POP3 email account. It triggers when 20 or more TCP connections are made to port 995 (POP3S) on the HOME_NET within a 30-second window from the same source IP address. This pattern is indicative of an attacker repeatedly attempting to guess credentials.
This rule detects potential lateral movement attempts originating from IIS web servers (identified by 'w3wp.exe' as the initiating process) to other internal IP addresses using common lateral movement ports (SMB, RDP, WinRM, SSH). It specifically looks for successful network connections from an IIS server to a private IP address on one of the specified ports, where the remote IP is not the local IP.
This rule detects an unusually high volume of network share access attempts from a single IP address and account within a short time frame (5 minutes). This could indicate an adversary attempting to discover or access network shares, potentially for data exfiltration or lateral movement.
This rule detects a high volume of HTTP/2 requests (more than 3000 per minute) originating from a single remote IP address, especially when these requests target a diverse set of URIs (more than 10 distinct URIs). This pattern can indicate a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, a web scanner, or other malicious automated activity attempting to overwhelm a service or enumerate resources.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by monitoring network events for specific URL patterns and user agent strings associated with known C2 frameworks like AzureVeil and Adaptix. It identifies beaconing if multiple devices communicate with the same remote IP address using these indicators within a 15-minute window, with more than 5 beacon counts and more than 1 distinct device.
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