Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when an Outlook OST (Offline Storage Table) file is accessed over SMB (Server Message Block) protocol. The detection is triggered by the presence of the string ".ost" (case-insensitive) in the network traffic on port 445 (SMB). This activity could indicate an attempt to collect local email data.
This rule detects a Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Information Base (MIB) walk dump, which is often used for configuration collection. It specifically looks for UDP traffic destined for port 161 (the standard SNMP port) within the home network, containing the byte sequence "30 82" at a depth of 2 bytes. A threshold of 50 such events from the same source within 30 seconds triggers the alert, indicating a potential network scan or reconnaissance activity.
This rule detects attempts to access network device configurations via SNMP (UDP port 161) by looking for the string "public" in the UDP payload. A threshold of 10 occurrences within 30 seconds from the same source IP is set to trigger an alert, indicating a potential network scan or reconnaissance activity targeting SNMP with a common community string.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of BloodHound's domain trust collection activity over SMB. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB) directed to the home network, containing the strings "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" and "SYSVOL" (case-insensitive). This combination suggests an attacker is querying Active Directory for trusted domain objects and potentially enumerating the SYSVOL share, which are common steps in BloodHound's reconnaissance phase to map out trust relationships within a domain.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate Group Policy Object (GPO) settings by identifying LDAP queries containing the string "(objectClass=groupPolicyContainer)" over TCP port 389 (LDAP). This activity is often associated with reconnaissance or discovery phases of an attack, where an adversary is trying to understand the domain's GPO structure.
This rule detects attempts to modify domain trust relationships via LDAP write operations. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 389 (LDAP) to the home network, containing the case-insensitive strings "trustType" and "trustDirection". This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to establish or alter trust relationships between domains for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This rule detects when a Windows logon script (specifically a .bat file) is written to the NETLOGON share over SMB. This activity is often associated with persistence techniques where an attacker modifies or creates a logon script to execute malicious code when a user logs on to a domain-joined machine.
This rule detects attempts to inject a malicious URL into the Outlook Home Page setting for persistence. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic (flow:to_client,established) containing the strings "HomePageURL" and "http" (case-insensitive) in the file data, indicating a potential attempt to modify Outlook's home page setting to point to an attacker-controlled URL.
This rule detects attempts to modify the 'Image File Execution Options' (IFEO) registry key to set a debugger for an application. This technique is often used by adversaries for persistence, allowing them to execute their malicious code whenever the legitimate application starts. The rule specifically looks for network traffic (TCP, port 445, typically SMB) containing the strings 'Image File Execution Options' and 'Debugger' in a case-insensitive manner, indicating a potential attempt to manipulate this registry setting over the network.
This rule detects network traffic on TCP port 445 (SMB) containing the string "AppInit_DLLs" case-insensitively. This string is associated with the AppInit_DLLs mechanism in Windows, which can be abused for process injection and persistence by loading arbitrary DLLs into user-mode processes. The rule specifically looks for this string in traffic flowing to the server on an established connection.
This rule detects the installation of a root certificate via an HTTP response. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic flowing from the server to the client (to_client, established) where the URI contains ".cer" (case-insensitive) and the file data contains the string "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----". This combination suggests a certificate file being delivered over HTTP, which could be indicative of a malicious root certificate installation attempt, often used in man-in-the-middle attacks or to establish persistence for malware.
This rule detects network traffic containing the string "LSSharedFileList" (case-insensitive) on TCP port 22 (SSH). This string is associated with macOS Login Items, which can be used for persistence by adversaries. The rule specifically looks for this content in traffic flowing from the client to the server.
This rule detects network traffic on port 445 (SMB) where the content of the traffic contains both "Monitors" and "spoolsv" (case-insensitive). This combination of keywords suggests an attempt to register a port monitor DLL via the Print Spooler service, which is a known technique for persistence and privilege escalation.
This rule detects network traffic (TCP on port 445, typically SMB) containing the strings 'CodeIntegrity' and 'Disabled' (case-insensitive). This pattern suggests an attempt to disable code signing policies, potentially via a registry modification, which is a common defense evasion technique used by malware.
This rule detects network traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the strings "Network Providers" and "ProviderPath" (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of an attempt to register a malicious Network Provider DLL for credential capture, a technique used by adversaries to persist and steal credentials.
This rule detects network traffic containing the string "/etc/pam.d/" over TCP port 22 (SSH). This could indicate an attempt to modify Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) configuration files, potentially for authentication bypass or persistence on a Linux system. The detection is focused on traffic originating from the home network to the home network, suggesting internal activity or a compromised host communicating within the network.
This rule detects network connections to known command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with OMG Cable or Hak5 devices. It specifically looks for HTTP requests where the host header matches 'c2.hak5.org' or 'wifi-pineapple.com'. This indicates potential malicious activity where an attacker might be using these devices for command and control.
This rule detects attempts to flush auditd rules by looking for the command 'auditctl -D' within TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH). This action is often performed by attackers to remove monitoring and evade detection after gaining access to a system.
This rule detects bidirectional Command and Control (C2) communication utilizing the Telegram Bot API. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the host is 'api.telegram.org' and the URI contains '/bot'. A threshold of 10 occurrences within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects network traffic containing the string "signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN)" case-insensitively, indicating a process attempting to ignore the SIGTERM signal. This behavior can be used by malware or adversaries to achieve persistence on Linux systems by making a process harder to terminate gracefully.
This rule detects attempts to clear Windows network connection history remotely over SMB (port 445). It specifically looks for traffic containing the strings "NetworkList" and "delete" (case-insensitive) within TCP sessions directed to the HOME_NET on port 445. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to remove forensic evidence of their network presence.
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