Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects remote creation or modification of system processes for persistence
Detects unauthenticated access to Docker daemon API for container escape
Detects remote modification of file and directory permissions via SMB
Detects high-volume RPC endpoint mapper requests indicating inter-process communication abuse
This rule detects a high volume of successful sign-in attempts to Exchange Online from a single IP address where the UserPrincipalName ends with '@' (indicating an anonymous or malformed UPN) and Conditional Access was not applied. This pattern can be indicative of anonymous SMTP relay abuse, often used for spamming or phishing campaigns.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to a specific Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) domain and canister ID (tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io or tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai). This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity, where compromised systems communicate with an adversary-controlled server.
This rule detects instances where a single remote IP address exhibits a high number of idle network events (more than 200 idle events) and a high total number of network events (more than 500 total events) within a one-minute interval. This pattern can be indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication, where an adversary establishes a connection and then waits for commands, or data exfiltration, where data is sent in bursts with idle periods in between. It highlights unusual network communication patterns that might suggest malicious activity.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling activity by looking for an unusually high volume of DNS queries of type TXT or NULL, or DNS queries with exceptionally long names (50 characters or more), originating from multiple distinct clients within a one-hour window. This pattern is often indicative of adversaries exfiltrating data or establishing command and control through DNS.
Flags HarborWatch RAT C2 traffic from mysql.exe to known malicious IPs.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects suspicious large file transfers over the network, specifically looking for connections where more than 100MB (104857600 bytes) of data has been sent or received. It then aggregates these transfers by device and remote IP within one-hour bins and flags if five or more such large transfers occur within that hour. This behavior can be indicative of data exfiltration, often associated with ransomware attacks or other malicious data theft activities.
This rule detects suspicious network connections where the initiating process command line contains keywords indicative of evasion techniques such as 'obfuscate', 'encode', or 'encrypt'. It specifically looks for these activities over common web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443) and triggers an alert if 10 or more such attempts are observed from a device within an hour.
This rule detects the execution of a VDSO hijacking payload over an SSH connection. It specifically looks for the case-insensitive strings "vdso" and "mmap" within the TCP payload of an established SSH session, indicating an attempt to manipulate the Virtual Dynamic Shared Object (VDSO) for privilege escalation or other malicious purposes.
This rule detects potential Process Doppelganging attempts by looking for specific Windows API calls related to Transactional NTFS (TxF) within HTTP traffic. Specifically, it looks for the presence of "NtCreateTransaction" and "NtCreateSection" in the file data of HTTP responses, indicating a payload that might be attempting to leverage TxF for process creation manipulation.
This rule identifies web traffic containing the custom User-Agent string 'HarborWatchAgent', which is indicative of Command and Control (C2) communication by the HarborWatch Agent. It searches both endpoint network events and network appliance/proxy logs for this specific User-Agent string.
Privnote DNS Resolution
Cortex XDR
Identifies endpoints resolving privnote.com, a self-destructing message service abused by UNC3753 to transmit malicious installation links while bypassing chat and email filtering.
cURL Request to Raw IP for Installer
Cortex XDR
Detects cURL making direct HTTP requests to raw IPv4 addresses specifically seeking 'installer' binaries. This staging pattern is utilized by UNC3753 to deploy RMM payloads on victim machines.
This rule detects network traffic containing the string "/etc/sudoers" over TCP port 22 (SSH). This could indicate an attempt to modify the sudoers file for privilege escalation, as the sudoers file controls which users can execute commands with superuser privileges.
This rule detects attempts to modify a user's logon script via remote registry access. Specifically, it looks for TCP traffic on port 445 (SMB/CIFS, often used for remote registry) where the content "UserInitMprLogonScript" is present, indicating an attempt to alter this specific registry key. This activity is often associated with persistence techniques used by attackers to maintain access to a system.
Botnet C2 Panel Access Detected
Suricata
This rule detects potential access to a botnet command and control (C2) panel. It triggers when HTTP URI requests contain both 'panel' and 'bot' (case-insensitive) within the URI. A threshold of 5 such requests from the same source within 60 seconds is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects HTTP traffic where the referer header contains domains commonly associated with advertising networks (doubleclick.net, adnxs.com, googlesyndication) and the URI contains file extensions typically used for executable or script files (exe, ps1, msi, hta, vbs). This combination suggests a malvertising redirect attempt leading to the download of malicious files.
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