Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DNS queries to privnote.com, which UNC3753 uses to transmit self-destructing text containing malicious installation links to targets.
Detects JavaScript used to fingerprint browser and client configurations
Detects creation of malicious stored procedures in SQL databases
This rule detects network traffic indicative of AnyDesk remote desktop software being used as a command and control (C2) channel. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to 'anydesk.com' or 'relay.anydesk.com' domains. A threshold of 5 connections within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) channel activity by identifying HTTP requests where the URI contains specific keywords commonly associated with C2 infrastructure switching or staging. The keywords include 'stage2', 's2', 'next', 'pivot', and 'relay'. This indicates an attacker might be moving to a new phase of their operation or redirecting C2 communications.
This rule detects DNS queries for 'pastebin.com' that occur at a high frequency (5 times within 60 seconds from the same source IP). This pattern is indicative of a Dead Drop Resolver Command and Control (C2) mechanism, where attackers use services like Pastebin to host C2 instructions or data, and malware frequently queries these services to retrieve commands or exfiltrate data. The rule specifically targets DNS traffic on port 53.
Detects outbound network activity to the known malicious domain sfrclak.com or IP address 142.11.206.73. This behavior may indicate malware beaconing, command-and-control communication, or interaction with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network connections over common exfiltration ports (80, 443, 53) to external IP addresses originating from executables running out of uncommon, temporary, or public directories. This behavior frequently indicates custom or unrecognized malware binaries conducting data exfiltration or establishing Command and Control (C2) communication.
This rule detects SSH connections initiated by 'ssh.exe' that involve remote port forwarding ('-R' flag) or potential SSH tunneling (command line containing both '@' and ':'). This behavior can be indicative of adversaries establishing covert communication channels or maintaining persistence.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of a compromised host attempting to beacon to a botnet command and control server. Specifically, it looks for HTTP requests where the URI path contains "/gate.php". This pattern is commonly associated with botnet communication.
This rule detects the use of self-signed TLS certificates on newly registered domains, specifically those ending in .xyz, .top, .club, .online, or .site. It looks for certificates where both the issuer and subject Common Name (CN) fields are present, and the subject CN matches a pattern indicative of a newly registered domain (5 to 20 alphanumeric characters followed by one of the specified TLDs). This pattern is often associated with malicious infrastructure setup.
DNS Full Zone Transfer Request
Suricata
This rule detects a DNS Full Zone Transfer Request. A zone transfer is a type of DNS transaction used to replicate DNS database files (zone files) from a primary DNS server to a secondary DNS server. While legitimate for DNS server synchronization, unauthorized zone transfers can be used by attackers to gather extensive information about a network's infrastructure, including hostnames, IP addresses, and other sensitive data, which can then be used for further reconnaissance and targeting. The rule specifically looks for UDP traffic to port 53 (DNS) and the content '|00 FC|' at offset 2, which corresponds to the AXFR (Authoritative Zone Transfer) query type.
This rule detects a DNS incremental zone transfer request. This type of request is used to synchronize DNS zone data between DNS servers. While legitimate in some network configurations, it can also be abused by attackers during reconnaissance to gather information about a network's internal structure.
This rule detects network connections to known threat intelligence vendor portals. It specifically looks for HTTP traffic where the host header matches one of the specified domains: intel471.com, ke-la.com, recordedfuture.com, or flashpoint.io. This could indicate an analyst or automated system accessing threat intelligence resources.
This rule detects attempts to modify file timestamps over SMB. Specifically, it looks for the 'SetFileTime' operation within SMB traffic on port 445. This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to hide their presence or activities by making malicious files appear to have legitimate creation or modification times, a technique known as timestomping.
EternalBlue SMB Exploit Attempt
Suricata
This rule detects attempts to exploit the EternalBlue vulnerability over SMB (Server Message Block) protocol. It specifically looks for a sequence of bytes indicative of the exploit payload within the SMB traffic.
This rule detects TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) requests for bootloader files. Specifically, it looks for UDP traffic on port 69 (the standard TFTP port) where the packet content starts with the byte sequence "00 01". This pattern is characteristic of a TFTP read request for a file, often used in network booting scenarios to retrieve bootloader files. The rule flags this activity as a "Possible Pre-OS Persistence" mechanism, suggesting an adversary might be attempting to establish persistence before the operating system fully loads, potentially through techniques like bootkits or modifying boot records.
LDAP Domain Trust Enumeration
Suricata
This Suricata rule detects attempts to enumerate domain trusts via LDAP. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 389 (LDAP) where the content of the packet contains the string "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" in a case-insensitive manner. This activity is indicative of an attacker trying to discover relationships between domains, which is a common step in reconnaissance and lateral movement within an Active Directory environment.
This rule detects potential SSH agent forwarding abuse, which can be used for lateral movement within a network. It specifically looks for a byte sequence ('|00 00 00 1c 0b|') within TCP traffic on port 22 (SSH) flowing to the server, indicating an established connection. This byte sequence is characteristic of SSH agent forwarding requests.
This rule detects a DNS Amplification Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. It triggers an alert when UDP traffic destined for port 53 (DNS) on the home network has a data size greater than 512 bytes and exceeds a threshold of 100 packets within 5 seconds, tracked by destination IP address. This pattern is indicative of a DNS amplification attack where small queries result in large responses, overwhelming the target.
This rule detects a specific type of Kerberos AS-REQ (Authentication Service Request) that lacks pre-authentication, which is characteristic of a 'Golden Ticket' attack (ATT&CK T1558.001). The rule specifically looks for UDP traffic on port 88 (Kerberos default port) to the home network, containing the byte sequences '|30|' and '|a1 03 02 01 05|'. These content checks are indicative of the structure of a Kerberos AS-REQ packet without the expected pre-authentication data.
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