Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connections to the hardcoded GammaSteel fallback C2 IP address (165.22.170.129) and domain (justsstop.ru). These hardcoded IOCs are used as a failsafe when primary S3 exfiltration fails or DDR configurations are lost, indicating an active data theft operation.
Detects anomalous DNS responses from compromised resolvers indicating DNS hijacking
Detects enumeration of group memberships for permission group discovery
Detects executables signed with self-signed code certificates for trust bypass
Detects access to platforms selling zero-day vulnerability intelligence
Detects unusual protocol combinations indicative of network sniffing activity
Detects compromised websites being abused as C2 relay infrastructure
Detects XOR-encrypted payload delivery used to evade signature detection
Detects OAuth bearer tokens being reused from unexpected IP addresses
Detects newly issued self-signed certificates on suspicious domains used for C2
Detects TFTP transfers used to deliver bootkit or firmware persistence payloads
Detects IP geolocation lookups used to determine system geographic location
Detects AXFR DNS zone transfer requests for network reconnaissance
This rule detects potential VXLAN traffic duplication for exfiltration purposes. It specifically looks for TCP traffic on port 4789 (the default VXLAN port) directed towards the home network. A threshold of 10 connections from the same source within 30 seconds triggers the alert, indicating a high volume of VXLAN traffic that could be indicative of data exfiltration.
This rule detects network traffic patterns indicative of the XMRig cryptominer communicating with a mining pool. Specifically, it looks for HTTP POST requests to the URI '/api/v1/jobs' with 'job_id' present in the client body, which is a common behavior for XMRig when requesting mining jobs.
This rule detects attempts to abuse an IoT device's firmware update page by sending a large POST request containing the word "firmware" (case-insensitive) to TCP port 80 on the home network. This activity is indicative of an attempt to corrupt the device's firmware, potentially leading to denial of service or unauthorized control.
This rule detects attempts to remotely lock out user accounts via SMB (Server Message Block) by looking for specific content within TCP traffic on port 445. It specifically targets the 'NetUserSetInfo' function call, which can be used to modify user account properties, in conjunction with the keyword 'lockout'. This combination suggests an attacker is attempting to trigger a mass account lockout.
This rule detects a Slowloris Slow HTTP DoS attack. It triggers when a single source IP sends 100 HTTP GET requests within a 300-second window to the internal network. Slowloris attacks work by holding open many HTTP connections to a web server, eventually exhausting the server's connection pool and making it unavailable to legitimate users.
This rule detects a denial-of-service attack characterized by a high volume of HTTP GET requests targeting a server within a short timeframe. Specifically, it triggers if a single destination IP address receives 500 or more HTTP GET requests within a 10-second window, indicating a potential HTTP request flood aimed at exhausting service resources.
This rule detects a CHARGEN Reflection Amplification Attack. It specifically looks for UDP traffic on port 19 (the CHARGEN service port) directed towards the home network. A threshold of 50 packets within 5 seconds, tracked by destination, is used to identify potential amplification attempts, indicating a denial-of-service attack.
This rule detects potential C2 beaconing activity over HTTP. It specifically looks for HTTP GET requests where the URI path consists of 8 to 16 lowercase alphanumeric characters. The rule uses a threshold of 20 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP address to identify beaconing behavior.
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