Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads.
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Detects a network connection initiated by programs or processes running from suspicious or uncommon files system locations.
Detects a Python process initiating a network connection. While this often relates to package installation, it can also indicate a potential malicious script communicating with a C&C server.
Detects a network connection initiated by "wordpad.exe" over uncommon destination ports.
This might indicate potential process injection activity from a beacon or similar mechanisms.
This might indicate potential process injection activity from a beacon or similar mechanisms.
Detects an initiated network connection over uncommon ports from "dfsvc.exe". A utility used to handled ClickOnce applications.
Detects an a non-browser process interacting with the Reddit API which could indicate use of a covert C2 such as RedditC2
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains.
LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet.
Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls.
Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads.
Detects a non-browser process communicating with the Notion API. This could indicate potential use of a covert C2 channel such as "OffensiveNotion C2"
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Detects external IP address lookups by non-browser processes via services such as "api.ipify.org". This could be indicative of potential post compromise internet test activity.
Detects a Python process initiating a network connection. While this often relates to package installation, it can also indicate a potential malicious script communicating with a C&C server.
'This hunting query will identify instances where a single user account has seen a high incidence of failed attempts from highly volatile IP addresses
Changing IP address for every password attempt is becoming a more common technique amongst sophisticated threat groups. Often threat groups will randomise
the user agent they are using as well as IP address. This technique has been enabled by the emergence of services providing huge numbers of residential IP
addresses. These services are often enabled through malicious browser plugins. This query is best executed over longer timeframes.
Reduce the timeRange if you have too much data. Results with the highest "IPs", "Failures" and "DaysWithAttempts" are good candidates for further
investigation. This query intentionally does not cluster on UserAgent, IP etc. This query is clustering on the highly volatile IP behaviour.'
Changing IP address for every password attempt is becoming a more common technique amongst sophisticated threat groups. Often threat groups will randomise
the user agent they are using as well as IP address. This technique has been enabled by the emergence of services providing huge numbers of residential IP
addresses. These services are often enabled through malicious browser plugins. This query is best executed over longer timeframes.
Reduce the timeRange if you have too much data. Results with the highest "IPs", "Failures" and "DaysWithAttempts" are good candidates for further
investigation. This query intentionally does not cluster on UserAgent, IP etc. This query is clustering on the highly volatile IP behaviour.'
This query uncovers seen IPAddressV4 network subnets
Action "PnpDeviceConnected" reports the connection of any plug and play device.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
'Query shows 1200+ failed attempts by cIP per hour on server, then successful logon. Only includes > 1 user agent string or port. Could indicate successful probing and brute force success on IIS servers.'
Microsoft Defender for Identity raises alert on suspicious Kerberos ticket, pointing to a potential overpass-the-hash attack.
Once attackers gain credentials for a user with higher privileges, they will use the stolen credentials to sign into other devices and move laterally.
This query finds related sign-in events following overpass-the-hash attack to trace the footprint of the impersonated user.
Once attackers gain credentials for a user with higher privileges, they will use the stolen credentials to sign into other devices and move laterally.
This query finds related sign-in events following overpass-the-hash attack to trace the footprint of the impersonated user.
This query surfaces alerts related to Gootkit and enriches with command and control information, which has been observed delivering ransomware.
This query surfaces devices that are in a specific IPAddressV4 subnet
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