Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the execution of the IOX tunneling tool, which is used for port forwarding and intranet proxy purposes. It specifically looks for the executable name 'iox.exe' and common command-line arguments associated with its forwarding and proxy functionalities, such as '.exe fwd -l', '.exe fwd -r', '.exe proxy -l', and '.exe proxy -r'. Additionally, it includes specific MD5, SHA1, and SHA256 hashes for version 0.4 of the tool to enhance detection accuracy.
Detects the execution of the "cloudflared" tool with command-line arguments indicative of establishing or running a tunnel. This activity has been observed in post-compromise scenarios by threat actors, such as the Akira ransomware group, to maintain persistence and remote access to compromised networks by creating covert communication channels.
Detects the execution of the Cloudflared Quick Tunnel utility, which can be used by adversaries to establish tunnels for various services like HTTP, RDP, SSH, and SMB. This tool has been observed in use by threat groups, including Akira ransomware, to create ad-hoc tunnels that generate random subdomains on trycloudflare.com.
This rule detects network connections initiated by executables (excluding common internet browsers and known applications) to a list of legitimate, popular websites that have been previously identified as 'dead drop resolvers' in cyberattacks. Attackers leverage these trusted websites (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, Google Drive) to host C2 infrastructure or relay data, aiming to blend in with normal network traffic and evade detection. The rule specifically filters out connections from a comprehensive list of legitimate browser executables and other applications to reduce false positives.
This YARA rule detects the OrcusRAT backdoor by identifying specific bytecode patterns associated with its functionalities. These functionalities include retrieving TCP connections, gathering operating system information, taking screenshots, extracting passwords, and processing keylogger actions. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns within a file that also has a valid DOS header (MZ signature).
This YARA rule detects the NoodRAT backdoor by identifying specific byte sequences (patterns) associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include changing the system name, decrypting configuration data, encrypting and sending data, and receiving and decrypting data. The rule specifically targets Linux ELF executables, indicated by the magic byte `0x464C457F` at offset 0.
Detects a network connection initiated by programs or processes running from suspicious or uncommon file system locations. This often indicates malware execution or persistence from areas not typically used by legitimate applications for network communication.
Detects the execution of Impacket's psexec.py by monitoring for specific file share access patterns on the IPC$ share. The rule looks for EventID 5145 (a detailed file share access event) where the ShareName is '\\*\IPC$' and the RelativeTargetName contains 'RemCom_stdin', 'RemCom_stdout', or 'RemCom_stderr'. These file names are characteristic of how Impacket's psexec.py communicates with the remote service.
Detects Kerberos Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) requests that utilize RC4 encryption. This is often indicative of Kerberoasting attacks, where adversaries request service tickets for Service Principal Names (SPNs) and then attempt to crack the RC4-encrypted hash offline to obtain plaintext credentials. The rule specifically excludes requests from computer accounts (service accounts ending with '$') to reduce false positives.
This rule detects suspicious command-line patterns indicative of reverse shell attempts. It looks for various common techniques used to establish a reverse shell, including bash, sh, netcat, socat, Perl, Python, Ruby, and PHP one-liners that connect back to an attacker-controlled host. The rule also includes patterns for xterm reverse shells and specific shell commands often used in conjunction with reverse shells.
This rule detects the usage of cleartext protocols over a network by monitoring firewall logs for allowed connections to specific destination ports commonly associated with unencrypted services. These ports include HTTP (80, 8080), FTP (21), Telnet (23), and various database or application-specific ports (e.g., 1433, 3306, 1521, 27017, 50000, 11211, 15672, 5900-5904). The rule specifically looks for 'forward' or 'accept' actions, or connections not marked as 'blocked', indicating active cleartext communication. The primary goal is to identify potential credential exposure or sensitive data transmission over insecure channels.
This rule detects PowerShell script blocks that utilize .NET's SslStream for establishing encrypted network connections. Specifically, it looks for the use of 'System.Net.Security.SslStream', 'Net.Security.RemoteCertificateValidationCallback', and '.AuthenticateAsClient' which are indicative of a client-side SSL/TLS connection being programmatically established, potentially for command and control (C2) purposes to evade detection.
This rule detects RDP traffic communicating with the loopback address (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on either the source or destination port 3389, specifically looking for Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) events (EventID 5156). This behavior is indicative of RDP over a reverse SSH tunnel, where RDP traffic is redirected locally to bypass network restrictions or for covert communication. The rule explicitly filters out events originating from 'AppContainer Loopback' and known Thor processes to reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of Netcat (nc.exe, ncat.exe, netcat.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments often associated with establishing listener modes, reverse shells, or proxy connections. Netcat is a versatile networking utility that can be used by adversaries for command and control (C2) communication, data exfiltration, or creating backdoors, often leveraging non-application layer protocols.
Detects a network connection initiated from a process located in the "C:\Users\Public" folder. Attackers are known to drop their malicious payloads and malware in this directory as it's writable by everyone. This rule helps hunt for potential suspicious or uncommon activity in the environment.
Detects the use of the 'spoolss' named pipe over SMB, which can be leveraged to trigger NTLM authentication from a target machine with the print spooler service enabled. This technique is often used in NTLM relay attacks or other forms of printer spooler abuse to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
This rule detects suspicious DNS queries specifically targeting 'api.telegram.org'. This domain is used by Telegram Bot API, which can be leveraged by various types of malware (e.g., RATs, ransomware) for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration. Monitoring these queries helps identify systems potentially communicating with malicious Telegram bots.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with the Small Sieve malware. This rule specifically looks for HTTP GET requests to 'api.telegram.org' with a specific chat_id and 'text=com/' in the URI, which are indicators of Small Sieve's use of the Telegram Bot API for C2.
Detects a network connection initiated by an "Msiexec.exe" process over port 80 or 443. Adversaries might abuse "msiexec.exe" to install and execute remotely hosted packages. This rule helps hunt for potentially anomalous or suspicious communications.
Detects svchost.exe initiating an outbound network connection on TCP port 3389 (RDP) to a loopback address (127.0.0.0/8 or ::1/128). This behavior is indicative of RDP traffic being tunneled, potentially via a reverse SSH tunnel, to bypass network restrictions or for covert remote access.
Detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity to domains identified as being used in the 'Operation Triangulation' campaign, which targeted iOS devices with 0-day exploits. This rule specifically looks for connections to a list of known malicious domains via proxy logs.
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