Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the TrustSink rogue MFA provider, specifically tracking the domain 'trident-sip-filter.ngrok-free.dev' and its associated OIDC discovery path. It aggregates signals from sign-in logs, audit logs, DNS queries, and network proxy traffic to identify attempts to interact with this malicious infrastructure.
Detects network traffic (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with the known TukTuk C2 infrastructure domain 'borjumaniya.store'.
Detects anomalous Telnet (TCP port 23) traffic associated with Mirai-variant botnet propagation, such as scanning for new targets or inbound compromise attempts, often following cPanel/WHM vulnerabilities.
Detects malicious prompt injection attempts within an LLM conversation session. The rule monitors for ingested content containing common instruction-override keywords (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'system prompt override'), followed immediately by the agent process executing unauthorized actions such as process launch, network connections, or file creation within the same session/user context.
Detects high-volume, systematic querying of LLM inference endpoints, which may indicate unauthorized model extraction, distillation attempts, or targeted data exfiltration from an LLM.
Detects a suspicious pattern of activity where a single source IP performs network reconnaissance followed by rapid-fire failed authentication attempts against multiple distinct hosts within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of automated, agentic AI-driven offensive tooling rather than manual activity.
Detects malicious prompt injection attempts within an LLM conversation session. The rule monitors for ingested content containing common instruction-override keywords (e.g., 'ignore previous instructions', 'system prompt override'), followed immediately by the agent process executing unauthorized actions such as process launch, network connections, or file creation within the same session/user context.
Detects a suspicious pattern of activity where a single source IP performs network reconnaissance followed by rapid-fire failed authentication attempts against multiple distinct hosts within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of automated, agentic AI-driven offensive tooling rather than manual activity.
This rule correlates web clicks on Google Sites URLs containing keywords related to GlobalProtect with the subsequent creation or renaming of an unsigned or improperly signed GlobalProtect.msi file on the same endpoint within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a spearphishing attempt using a masqueraded landing page to deliver malicious or unauthorized software.
Detects outbound HTTPS connections to major generative AI inference endpoints originating from non-browser, non-development tool processes at regular intervals. This activity is indicative of beaconing behavior, where malware (specifically families like LAMEHUG) leverages LLM APIs for dynamic command generation, payload obfuscation, or C2 instruction retrieval, bypassing traditional security controls.
Detects anomalous remote access patterns on a single endpoint, specifically involving AnyDesk or TeamViewer sessions originating from multiple distinct geographical locations combined with usage by multiple distinct user accounts. This pattern is consistent with DPRK IT worker fraud (Wagemole) involving shared laptop farms.
This rule detects potential prompt injection attacks against internal AI-powered assistants, agents, or LLM gateways. It monitors network HTTP requests for common patterns used to override system instructions, bypass safety filters, or force the model to adopt a privileged, unauthorized persona (e.g., administrator or debug mode). These techniques are often used in social engineering to manipulate the AI's output or security posture.
Sweeps Defender Advanced Hunting telemetry for known Sauron Loader indicators: 5 malicious SHA256 hashes (MSI installer, rnp.dll loader, tdwp.dll decrypter, embedded RSA private/public key blobs) across file/process/image-load events, plus 4 C2 domains and their full URLs across network and DNS telemetry. No IP indicators were published in the source reporting (C2 is domain-based over HTTPS) — the IP bucket is intentionally omitted rather than filled with placeholder data.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
Detects known file hashes associated with SideCopy/ReverseRAT.
This rule detects malicious activity by monitoring for specific known indicators, including hashes of malicious files (ProcessRollup2), network connections to known C2 infrastructure (NetworkConnectIP4), and URL clicks (UrlClick) associated with malicious domains or paths. It acts as a multi-stage indicator correlation rule to identify execution or communication with known threats.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known indicators of compromise, including specific SHA256 file hashes, a known malicious IP address, and URLs associated with identified threats. The detection spans file creation/execution, network connections, and URL visits to block or alert on interactions with suspicious infrastructure.
This rule detects potential malicious activity by monitoring for known indicators of compromise, including specific SHA256 file hashes, a known malicious IP address, and URLs associated with identified threats. The detection spans file creation/execution, network connections, and URL visits to block or alert on interactions with suspicious infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Operation SideCopy, including specific file hashes, known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, malicious domains, and URLs. It triggers on file creation, process execution, and network connections matching these known indicators.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the threat actor SideCopy and their associated malware, such as ReverseRAT. It hunts for specific malicious SHA256 file/process hashes, connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure (IPs and domains), requests to known malicious URLs, and user interaction with these URLs via email clicks.
Detects network and DNS activity associated with the SideCopy threat group, specifically monitoring for connections to known C2 domains, C2 IP addresses, or the usage of port 5863 typically associated with the ReverseRAT backdoor.
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