Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,155 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,301
1,070
640
289
288
Contributors
918
814
769
696
224
Categories
20,456
11,839
5,876
5,155
4,865
Platforms
2,858
2,017
816
524
213
Products / Services
1,336
1,144
831
576
366
MITRE Techniques
1,822
1,307
787
747
577
CVEs
9
7
7
6
6
IDS Classtypes
538
151
101
57
48
IDS Protocols
375
373
132
64
42
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the ShinyHunters threat actor, including specific malicious domains, IP addresses, and artifacts found in command lines or event data. It aggregates telemetry from network events, Entra ID sign-in logs, cloud application activity, email logs, process execution, and general device events to detect interaction with known malicious infrastructure or execution of threat-actor specific artifacts.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects network traffic patterns indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rule identifies suspicious TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) strings matching common SaaS login portals (Microsoft, Okta, Google) paired with SSL/TLS certificates issued by 'Let's Encrypt' that contain suspicious subject names, suggesting a freshly generated infrastructure for credential harvesting.
Detects adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing activity utilizing reverse-proxy kits (such as Evilginx2, EvilProxy, or Modlishka) to bypass MFA. The rule identifies suspicious login requests by correlating common identity provider login paths with missing security headers (CSP/HSTS) and anomalous server or hostname characteristics typical of proxied phishing infrastructure.
Detects network traffic associated with the SilkParasite threat actor, specifically identifying the use of typosquatted domain names in TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields and a suspicious TLS CA certificate subject.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal hosts to known command and control infrastructure associated with the SilkParasite campaign and the SpiceRAT malware family.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from internal hosts to known command and control infrastructure associated with the SilkParasite campaign and the SpiceRAT malware family.
This rule detects a specific network exploit attempt targeting Dahua devices (CVE-2021-33045), where an attacker attempts to bypass authentication by manipulating the login parameters, specifically by forcing the system to interpret requests as coming from the local loopback interface.
Detects network activity (DNS, HTTP, and direct IP connections) associated with known command-and-control infrastructure shared by SpiceRAT, NodeEdgeRAT, and NomadRAT malware, identified as part of the SilkParasite campaign.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses. These indicators are commonly associated with command and control (C2) infrastructure or malicious activity, and alerting on these connections can help identify compromised systems within the environment.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
This rule detects instances where the Terraform CLI tool connects to suspected lookalike domains associated with supply chain compromise attempts (e.g., hashicorp-aws[.]com or hashicorp-terraform[.]io) during common initialization or application workflows. It correlates process execution with network connection logs and optionally validates the presence of a related .terraform.lock.hcl file associated with the malicious origin.
This rule detects network connections from internal devices to a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses. These indicators are commonly associated with command and control (C2) infrastructure or malicious activity, and alerting on these connections can help identify compromised systems within the environment.
Detects Node.js processes making outbound network connections to the AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address 169.254.169.254, which may indicate unauthorized data collection or discovery via server-side request forgery (SSRF).
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are lured to 'cloudrobots.cloud' and subsequently execute malicious commands via Windows shell tools (cmd, powershell, mshta, etc.). The rule correlates browser network events to a specific domain, subsequent process launches by explorer.exe, and suspicious registry modifications associated with the Windows RunMRU, which is often abused to store and execute commands pasted by victims.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents and DnsEvents for connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses associated with phishing campaigns. It alerts on any network communication or DNS resolution attempt targeting these indicators, providing visibility into potential user interaction with phishing infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
This rule detects potential automated network scanning activity originating from hosts that have recently executed cPanel-related processes or binaries. It flags devices that exhibit a high frequency of connection attempts across a diverse range of remote ports and IP addresses within a short timeframe after cPanel interaction, which is characteristic of worm propagation or automated exploitation attempts targeting web server management interfaces.
Detects rapid TCP connection attempts to port 445 (SMB) from a single source IP address, indicative of network scanning or reconnaissance activities typically used by the DragonForce ransomware or similar automated threats for lateral movement.
Page 40 of 246