Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for any outbound network connections to a specific list of known malicious domains. The rule identifies potential command and control (C2) communication by matching remote URLs against a hardcoded set of domains associated with known threats.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for any outbound network connections to a specific list of known malicious domains. The rule identifies potential command and control (C2) communication by matching remote URLs against a hardcoded set of domains associated with known threats.
Detects network DNS queries to known SpiceRAT-associated hostnames that resolve to specific C2 IP addresses. The rule identifies suspicious network activity by aggregating resolution counts and monitoring for connections to multiple dispersed IPs, which is consistent with command-and-control behavior.
Detects anomalous DNS query patterns where a single host resolves multiple unique subdomains associated with Dahua or QuickDDNS services. This behavior is indicative of passive reconnaissance, often used to map public-facing IoT devices such as cameras and DVRs.
Detects TLS connections where the certificate subject is 'azure.uzrailwaystax.com' and the issuer is 'TLC DV TLS CA', indicating potential impersonation of the Uzbekistan railway authority infrastructure, likely associated with SilkParasite activity.
Detects high-frequency HTTP requests to the Dahua easy4ipcloud.com password recovery endpoint. The rule monitors for abnormal volumes of reset requests from a single IP address, which is indicative of an attacker attempting to use offline-generated recovery codes to bypass authentication on Dahua IoT devices.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency, and highly regular HTTP requests directed at Dahua camera infrastructure for the purpose of harvesting snapshots. The rule uses statistical analysis to identify automated collection patterns, such as a high volume of requests across multiple devices with low variance in request intervals.
Detection rules identifying suspicious communication patterns associated with Dahua P2P Cloud Relay devices, including WSSE authentication attempts and device probing to known cloud relay endpoints. These patterns are consistent with reconnaissance and exploitation activity against IoT devices within the context of Operation CameraSwarm.
Detects network activity related to 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns. The rules monitor for DNS queries, TLS SNI requests, and HTTP requests to the malicious domain 'cdnsuicaches.com' used for hosting malicious scripts, as well as the identification of the 'cookie-captcha-complete' string in HTTP traffic, which is a known indicator of a ClickFix social engineering overlay.
Detects the presence of MeshAgent remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, often used for persistence or unauthorized remote access. The rule correlates process execution indicators (including potential renaming of mvtcs.exe) with network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with Settra ransomware.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (/sendPhoto) that contain sensitive system information, including host credentials (port, login, password) and Shodan host data. This behavior is indicative of an information-stealing malware attempting to exfiltrate captured credentials via a Telegram bot.
This rule detects activities associated with the AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) malware family by monitoring for known malicious file hashes on endpoints and network communication with domains linked to its command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects high-frequency, diverse Microsoft Graph API requests initiated by an identity, indicative of automated reconnaissance or enumeration of the cloud environment. The rule tracks requests across multiple categories such as organization settings, user/group identities, privilege information, application configurations, and resource access within a 30-minute window.
Detects a suspicious web navigation pattern indicative of NovaCookies or similar AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing infrastructure. The rule correlates a legitimate website visit with an immediate subsequent request to a .vu domain, within a short time window (30 seconds), using the same process (e.g., browser process). This identifies the redirect chain from a legitimate host to a disposable phishing landing page commonly used for credential harvesting.
Detects network traffic patterns indicative of a Netcat-based reverse shell associated with the UAT-11823 (Sandworm) threat group. The rule monitors for characteristic command output such as 'uid=' and 'gid=', shell error strings containing '/bin/sh', and root shell prompts ('root@#') following suspected exploitation of CVE-2026-20079.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects outbound network connections from internal devices to a set of known malicious IP addresses (45.151.45.31 and 46.166.79.31) which may indicate command and control communication or other malicious activity.
Detects the AnonyMousKIT activity sequence, identified by the dispatch of a templated device-recovery lure via the WhatsApp Business API followed by a Telegram Bot API webhook alert to the operator within a 10-minute window. This temporal relationship between the outbound lure and the operator-side notification is used as a signature for the C2 orchestration.
Detects network activity characteristic of JWR or Outsider-style live phishing kits. The rule monitors for specific instruction tokens (e.g., card entry, verification codes, success indicators) in network requests within a short time window, indicating an operator-driven phishing session.
Detects HTTP traffic proxying Microsoft authentication paths (OAuth 2.0 authorization or CDN assets) via non-Microsoft domains. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack using typosquatted infrastructure to intercept user sessions.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack targeting Microsoft 365. The rule identifies HTTP response bodies containing 'login.microsoftonline.com' and 'Enter Password' being served from a web server identified as 'openresty'. This configuration is common for phishing kits that proxy traffic between the victim and the legitimate service to harvest credentials and session cookies.
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