Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic on non-standard ports (excluding port 443) where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) field contains 'dl.google.com'. This pattern is frequently observed as a method for C2 tunneling tools like Xray-core to disguise malicious command and control traffic by masquerading as legitimate Google service traffic.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, or HTTP Host headers containing patterns consistent with IT-support-themed vishing lure domains, specifically 'helpdesk-support-office-#.com'. Such domains are often used to impersonate technical support services to facilitate social engineering, credential harvesting, or malware delivery.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic associated with known authentication-themed lure domains often used in phishing campaigns. These domains mimic multi-factor authentication (MFA) registration or SSO setup processes to deceive users into credential theft.
This rule monitors network traffic and internal logs for connections to known malicious IP addresses or domain names associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (often impersonating services like HBO Max). The logic explicitly filters out known threat intelligence scanners and security researcher probes. It performs correlation by requiring domain/message matches for generic IP-based alerts to reduce noise, and aggregates events per host over 15-minute windows to produce consolidated alerts.
This rule monitors network traffic and internal logs for connections to known malicious IP addresses or domain names associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns (often impersonating services like HBO Max). The logic explicitly filters out known threat intelligence scanners and security researcher probes. It performs correlation by requiring domain/message matches for generic IP-based alerts to reduce noise, and aggregates events per host over 15-minute windows to produce consolidated alerts.
Detects network traffic matching a list of known malicious domains and IP addresses observed in CommonSecurityLog events, tightened to reduce noise from scanners/TI feeds, sinkholed infrastructure, and generic reused IPs by requiring domain-specific selectors and deduplicating repeated matches per host.
This rule detects anomalous access patterns on a specific IIS host (agent.3bb.co.th) by comparing recent traffic against a 30-day historical baseline. It identifies requests from accounts or source IPs not seen in the baseline, activity occurring during off-hours, or traffic from external sources. The rule further filters for high-volume or high-path diversity requests, which are indicative of automated reconnaissance or potential brute-force activity against the web application.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects a host initiating rapid sequential SMB tree connections to more than 10 distinct remote hosts within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of network reconnaissance, specifically the enumeration of accessible SMB shares, which is a common precursor to lateral movement and large-scale ransomware encryption activity as observed in DragonForce-related incidents.
This rule detects network connections or process command lines associated with known malicious domains, IP addresses, or payload URLs. Additionally, it correlates connections to common public file-sharing platforms or APIs (e.g., Gofile, Telegram) if these events occur on the same device within a 60-minute window of a confirmed malicious infrastructure event, reducing false positives from legitimate uses of shared infrastructure.
Detects network requests targeting Dahua devices that attempt to exploit CVE-2021-33044. The exploitation involves sending a crafted 'global.login' RPC call with specific parameters (clientType 'NetKeyboard', loginType 'Direct', authorityType 'Default') to bypass authentication and retrieve administrative session tokens.
Detects browser navigation events where the target URL is a locally generated 'blob:' URI that includes keywords associated with common credential harvesting targets (e.g., login, Microsoft 365, DocuSign). Adversaries use blob URIs to render phishing content directly from memory, which can help bypass certain static URL reputation filters and email security gateways.
Detects network traffic (TLS SNI or HTTP Host) to known domains associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaigns. These domains mimic passkey, SSO, or account security portals to steal credentials and session cookies.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects anomalous access to WSO2 API Manager Store and Publisher endpoints involving the retrieval of sensitive information like consumer keys and secrets. The rule specifically targets requests authenticated with JWTs that exhibit headers indicative of 'alg=none' or other unsupported/forged algorithm patterns, often associated with CVE-2026-5430 exploitation attempts. The rule uses statistical baseline monitoring to identify volume spikes in requests to these sensitive paths.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects network traffic directed towards Microsoft Graph API that utilizes the 'python-httpx' User-Agent. This combination is often associated with automated scripts, potentially used by adversaries (e.g., Storm-3121/Storm-3032) for automated data collection and exfiltration from Microsoft 365 environments.
This rule detects activity associated with the 'Ghostcode' threat campaign by monitoring multiple telemetry sources. It identifies connections to known malicious IP addresses and domains, patterns consistent with phishing kit hosting, and specific URL structures used in credential harvesting or payload delivery. The rule correlates sign-in logs, device network events, DNS queries, and email telemetry to identify potential compromise.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Cortex XDR)
Cortex XDR
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
Detects network activity (DNS lookups, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) associated with proxy infrastructure (iproyal.com and lightningproxies.net) known to be used by the HEAVYGRAM/CHOSEN BRICK threat actors to mask Telegram-based command and control traffic.
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