Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a DHCP-driven DNS update for a hostname not present in the asset inventory.
Dynamic DNS registration lets a device choose the name under which it is reachable,
and an attacker can use that to impersonate a service or make a rogue host appear
legitimate to anything resolving by name.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP'
and action in ('DNS_UPDATE_REQUEST', 'DNS_UPDATED')
| groupby macaddress, srcip, user, resultcode
Dynamic DNS registration lets a device choose the name under which it is reachable,
and an attacker can use that to impersonate a service or make a rogue host appear
legitimate to anything resolving by name.
Onboarding: WIN-DHCP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 79).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=dhcp where sourcename='WIN-DHCP'
and action in ('DNS_UPDATE_REQUEST', 'DNS_UPDATED')
| groupby macaddress, srcip, user, resultcode
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
Detects known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the Ebury Linux backdoor, including specific file hashes, implants like libkeyutils.so.1.10.2, malicious IP connections, and associated network/email artifacts using Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects potential SSH agent hijacking where process command line activities reference SSH authentication sockets or environment variables, followed closely by a successful SSH connection to a remote host from the same device.
The following analytic detects SSH connections presenting client banners that do not match known, common SSH client software by leveraging Zeek ssh logs.
Unusual or unknown SSH client banners may indicate custom tooling, offensive frameworks, tunneling utilities, or malware using SSH for command-and-control or lateral movement.
Unusual or unknown SSH client banners may indicate custom tooling, offensive frameworks, tunneling utilities, or malware using SSH for command-and-control or lateral movement.
Sweeps network, process command-line and URL-click telemetry for the Kimsuky payload C2 domain and its subdomains using an anchored match, which avoids lookalike or suffix-matching domains.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
IOC sweep (SHA256, domains, URLs, IPs, sender emails) for the RedFlick-style VHDX/LNK/WebDAV campaign against Moldovan and Ukrainian civil society, with false-positive controls.
Detects network connections to known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the TraderTraitor campaign, including trojanized Terraform providers (FLATROOF/ROOFDECK malware families) using specific domains and URL paths.
Detects network connections to known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the TraderTraitor campaign, including trojanized Terraform providers (FLATROOF/ROOFDECK malware families) using specific domains and URL paths.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Sweeps proxy, firewall and endpoint network telemetry for requests to the three published BraZetsu Pastebin dead-drop raw URLs used to retrieve the XOR-encrypted C2 config.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects when a device connects to a wireless network SSID that has not been observed in the baseline over the previous 14 days.
Detects the PatchAgent Stage 3 HTTP C2 protocol recovered from the decrypted shellcode: plain HTTP requests to /api/checkin, /api/cmd/, or /api/result/ combined with the hardcoded, truncated User-Agent "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)" (a real browser UA continues past this). Matching the API path plus the exact short UA keeps this durable across C2 IP rotation (observed on 46.30.188[.]99 and 185.228.83[.]217, port 8443).
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