Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects repeated manual HTTP GET requests from many distinct source IPs to a canary token resource. The URI pattern follows a format indicative of a tracked canary token resource, and the threshold of 49 unique source IPs accessing the resource within a prolonged period suggests potential unauthorized reconnaissance or probing activities.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
This rule detects network communication (via DNS queries, web logs, or device network events) with a list of known malicious domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity.
Detects periodic POST requests to an external endpoint containing specific request parameters (name, value, type) and a 'User-token' header, consistent with the expected beaconing intervals of the curlRAT malware (12h or 30s fast-poll).
Detects potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks targeting Grafana instances. The rule identifies suspicious 'grafana_api_request' calls that occur shortly after an unauthenticated discovery call ('tools/call') within the same session, where the target URL in the request header is not included in a defined allowlist of known internal Grafana hosts.
Detects interaction with known infrastructure associated with the PREY-0058 campaign, which utilizes Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing lures mimicking passkey or MFA registration pages to target Microsoft 365 and other SaaS applications.
Detects network connection attempts or established connections to a specific remote IP (103.141.13.26) on UDP port 3479. This pattern is often associated with command and control infrastructure or unauthorized data communication.
This rule monitors for network connections, firewall traffic, and Entra ID authentication events involving known malicious IP addresses (the 'Wall of Shame'). The rule specifically flags interactions occurring over common VPN ports, suggesting potential unauthorized access or persistence attempts via VPN services.
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries associated with the QTFY proxy infrastructure, including specific domains, known proxy management system IPs, and suspicious IP ranges. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) activity utilizing proxy services to obfuscate traffic.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries associated with the QTFY proxy infrastructure, including specific domains, known proxy management system IPs, and suspicious IP ranges. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) activity utilizing proxy services to obfuscate traffic.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries associated with the QTFY proxy infrastructure, including specific domains, known proxy management system IPs, and suspicious IP ranges. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) activity utilizing proxy services to obfuscate traffic.
Detects suspicious GET requests to the Magento '/customer/section/load/' endpoint with specific parameters ('sections=customer' and 'force_new_section_timestamp=true'). These requests are indicative of reconnaissance activity related to the StyleSmuggler campaign, potentially associated with exploitation of Magento vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-54236.
This rule detects network connections initiated by non-browser processes to domains commonly associated with software activation tools (e.g., massgrave.dev, activated.win). These domains are frequently used to download scripts or binaries related to unauthorized license activation, which may represent potential security risks or policy violations.
This rule monitors network connections, DNS resolutions, and email URLs to detect traffic communicating with a known adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure panel. By correlating security logs, DNS events, and email URL data against this specific indicator of compromise, it identifies potential interaction with phishing sites designed to capture credentials or session tokens.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the PEEP Browser RAT, specifically HTTP beacons targeting the URI path '/api/commands'. It monitors for unique HTTP headers ('X-PEEP-Agent-Id', 'X-PEEP-Agent-Key') and connections to known malicious infrastructure.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) and behavioral patterns associated with the Lazarus Group's 'Operation Dream Job' campaign. It tracks known malicious hashes, domains, and IP addresses, alongside suspicious activities such as PDF viewer abuse, DLL side-loading, process injection, persistence mechanism creation (Registry/Scheduled Tasks), and recruitment-themed phishing lures.
Detects the use of a specific magic string ('sxcdewqaz!@#') commonly associated with the Fire Ant implant to trigger or activate reverse-tunneling capabilities over TCP ports 443, 541, 8443, and 10443.
This rule monitors for internal network connection attempts initiated by the 'mcp-grafana' process to destinations it has not contacted in the previous 14 days. By establishing a baseline of legitimate data source connections, the rule alerts when the process performs a rapid fan-out or discovery against multiple new internal hosts, which may indicate unauthorized network reconnaissance or lateral movement attempts by the Grafana service.
This rule monitors network connections, DNS resolutions, and email URLs to detect traffic communicating with a known adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure panel. By correlating security logs, DNS events, and email URL data against this specific indicator of compromise, it identifies potential interaction with phishing sites designed to capture credentials or session tokens.
This rule detects the use of raw sockets by 'ERAAgent.exe' by monitoring for socket I/O control (Ioctl) operations involving 'SIO_RCVALL'. This configuration, often associated with promiscuous mode, allows an application to capture all network traffic received by the network interface, a behavior commonly used by network sniffing tools or malicious implants to intercept sensitive data.
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