Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic characterized by a specific rotating domain generation algorithm (DGA) pattern using .xyz TLD with a 10-digit timestamp, in combination with a specific URI structure containing 'script?id=' and the suspicious 'tag=WinUpdateHelper' parameter. This behavior is indicative of C2 communication.
Detects network activity related to the exploitation of the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) vulnerability known as Follina (CVE-2022-30190), characterized by URIs containing both the CVE identifier and the MSDT string.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns targeting FortiClient EMS systems, specifically on port 8013. This pattern is indicative of exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-35616, where an external entity communicates with a vulnerable FortiClient EMS instance multiple times in a short window.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header) to the domain 'couldinstallup.com', which is associated with Command and Control (C2) activity by the threat group Mustang Panda.
This rule monitors network DNS queries for patterns commonly associated with webhook notification services or potential C2 infrastructure. It looks for specifically formatted domains (e.g., 'api.[random]-notifier.[tld]', 'build-notifier' substrings, or custom API subdomains on common cloud-native TLDs) which may indicate the use of webhook services for data exfiltration or adversary command and control.
Detects the 'ff-agent' process exhibiting unusual network behavior, specifically involving multiple network protocols or connections to a high number of distinct remote ports within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication, network reconnaissance, or proxy activity.
This rule detects execution of commands or network traffic containing strings indicative of EDR bypass attempts, obfuscation frameworks, or C2 hosting/infrastructure. This usually signals active adversary efforts to evade defensive controls or setup command-and-control communication.
These YARA rules detect indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with a campaign where malicious actors compromised developer accounts to distribute malicious Google Chrome extensions. The rules search for a specific set of C2 IP addresses, domains, extension names, and unique extension IDs known to be part of this supply chain attack.
This rule monitors network HTTP header traffic for specific strings commonly associated with social engineering, scamming, or phishing campaigns, such as '4.8-star' ratings or 'over 2 million users' claims, which are often used to deceive users into interacting with malicious content.
Detects specific user-initiated HTTP requests that contain suspicious prompts, such as requests for lists of names or email formats. This behavior is often associated with reconnaissance or data collection activities, potentially related to social engineering or phishing preparations.
Detects an internal host performing network scanning against multiple internal IP addresses or multiple ports, which is indicative of lateral movement, reconnaissance, or automated worm-like activity within the local network.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting Ruckus devices using known CVEs.
Detects network logs identifying exploitation attempts or vulnerability scans targeting known Ruckus Wireless vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-22653, CVE-2020-22658, CVE-2023-25717). The rule parses CommonSecurityLog entries where the device, message, or activity fields contain references to these specific vulnerabilities.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at a '/save.php' URI, a common signature associated with the Kratos phishing kit used for capturing and exfiltrating user credentials.
This rule detects potential automated bot, crawler, or scraper activity by identifying network requests that contain suspicious strings in the URI (e.g., 'captcha') or User-Agent header (e.g., 'bot', 'crawler', 'spider'). The rule aggregates events by DNS query and remote IP, flagging entities that exhibit high-frequency requests across multiple unique User-Agents, which is a common behavior of sophisticated web scrapers or automated scanning tools attempting to bypass simple detection.
This rule detects network connections to a suspicious domain associated with the 'Maccy' application, as well as file and process activity involving files named 'Maccy' that interact with the same suspicious domain. This is indicative of potential unauthorized application execution or malicious activity masquerading as the Maccy utility.
Detects instances where Chrome or Microsoft Edge are launched in headless mode with remote debugging enabled. This configuration exposes the browser's debugging interface, typically on port 9222, which can be leveraged by attackers for browser exploitation, data exfiltration, or persistence within the browser context.
Detects execution of gsocket-related tools (gs-netcat, gsocket, gs-sftp) or command-line patterns typically used for remote shell access or socket redirection, such as using -e with a shell, -l/-p for listening, or redirecting I/O from common temporary directories.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious access attempts to a MinIO storage service by monitoring network traffic for default credentials, specific API calls like 'ListBuckets', or access to sensitive paths like 'terraform-state'. It triggers when traffic either targets the 'minio.internal' hostname or the local loopback address on port 9000, specifically looking for common MinIO administrative indicators.
KQL Query from file: The Hunt for QR Phisher
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with CrySome RAT Command and Control (C2) communication, including direct connections to a known hardcoded IP address on port 5555 and the observation of the '##CRYCFG##' configuration marker within the TCP stream.
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