Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule identifies suspicious outbound network beaconing by analyzing flow statistics for consistency in interval and payload size. It flags processes that demonstrate periodic communication (heartbeats) to external endpoints on non-standard ports. The detection logic calculates a 'beacon_score' based on the consistency of the communication interval, small average payload sizes, low variance in payload sizes, and the number of connections. Additional weighting is applied to connections made by typically non-network processes (e.g., svchost, explorer, wscript) or those connecting to ports associated with known malware like SystemBC.
Detects frequent, persistent outbound TLS connections to api.telegram.org. This behavior is indicative of a malware sample or backdoor polling the Telegram Bot API for command and control (C2) instructions, effectively using the legitimate Telegram infrastructure to tunnel malicious communication.
Form-grabbing and credential stealing malware-as-a-service
Detects SSH, SFTP, or SCP connections originating from internal edge appliances such as pfSense firewalls or Synology NAS devices directed at internal network hosts. This activity is consistent with VerdantBamboo BRICKSTORM lateral movement, where compromised edge infrastructure is leveraged as a pivot point to gain access to the internal network.
This rule detects potential DNS hijacking or redirection by comparing the returned IP address from a DNS query against a known list of authoritative IP addresses for specific domains. If an internal DNS resolver returns an IP address that does not match the authoritative record, it flags the event as a potential DNS response mismatch. It includes risk scoring based on the number of distinct affected hosts.
Detects activity associated with the TA4922 (Silver Fox) threat actor, specifically involving Atlas RAT and RomulusLoader. The detection logic utilizes four primary telemetry sources: network connections to known C2 IP addresses, DNS queries for the 'srt.tw' domain, suspicious outbound connections from user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, etc.) over non-standard ports, and the execution of a specific malicious ZIP archive file identified by its SHA256 hash.
Detects Python processes binding to or establishing network connections on the local loopback interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on non-standard ports. This behavior may indicate a local backdoor, proxy, or C2 listener implemented in Python that is not associated with common development tools or environments.
This rule detects when a user clicks on a URL that contains a domain identified as malicious. The rule specifically looks for `UrlClickEvents` where the extracted domain from the URL matches any of the domains listed in the `malicious_domains` array. This can indicate a successful phishing attempt or an accidental click on a known malicious link.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to a specific Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) domain and canister ID (tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io or tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai). This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity, where compromised systems communicate with an adversary-controlled server.
Detects outbound network activity to the known malicious domain sfrclak.com or IP address 142.11.206.73. This behavior may indicate malware beaconing, command-and-control communication, or interaction with attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects a high volume of successful sign-in attempts to Exchange Online from a single IP address where the UserPrincipalName ends with '@' (indicating an anonymous or malformed UPN) and Conditional Access was not applied. This pattern can be indicative of anonymous SMTP relay abuse, often used for spamming or phishing campaigns.
This rule detects potential enumeration of ServiceNow API endpoints or unauthorized access attempts from a known malicious IP address. It monitors HTTP header events specifically for common ServiceNow API patterns, aggregating requests to identify high-volume activity or interactions with sensitive endpoints like 'related_list_edit'.
Detects web requests containing patterns indicative of Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts targeting the Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Instance Metadata API (metadata.google.internal). The rule monitors for attempts to access metadata endpoints, including token retrieval paths.
This rule detects potentially suspicious modifications to Nginx configuration files or the usage of FastCGI directives such as fcgiwrap, fastcgi_pass, and proxy_pass. It specifically monitors for actions related to configuration changes (write, modify, create) or the establishment of backend communication via FastCGI parameters, which may indicate an attempt to gain remote code execution or persistence on a web server.
Detects anomalous network traffic patterns from SOHO/IoT and edge devices indicative of Tor-based C2 communication, including DNS queries for .onion domains, outbound connections to known Tor relay ports, and high-volume encrypted traffic over non-standard high-range ports.
Detects high-velocity port scanning bursts from a single source IP address targeting multiple destinations, often indicative of botnet reconnaissance activity such as the JDY botnet used to identify edge devices vulnerable to specific exploits like CVE-2026-35616.
Identifies anomalous enumeration of local network sessions via cmd.exe using the 'net session' command, a technique observed during EtherRAT's post-exploitation phase for lateral movement reconnaissance. The rule specifically looks for the command line arguments '/d /s /c' in conjunction with 'net session'.
Detects network connections from common web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Electron) to loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 or Localhost) where the URL path contains sensitive keywords like /code, /textbox, /credentials, or /secrets. This behavior is often associated with browser-based exploitation attempts, such as targeting local development servers or internal browser automation interfaces to extract sensitive information.
Detects high-frequency access to sensitive web paths (e.g., /admin, /vault, /credentials) from common web browsers on a device. This activity may indicate malicious credential harvesting, administrative panel enumeration, or sensitive data exfiltration performed by an adversary or malicious browser extension.
Detects network connections from common web browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Electron) to loopback addresses (127.0.0.1 or Localhost) where the URL path contains sensitive keywords like /code, /textbox, /credentials, or /secrets. This behavior is often associated with browser-based exploitation attempts, such as targeting local development servers or internal browser automation interfaces to extract sensitive information.
Detects high-frequency access to sensitive web paths (e.g., /admin, /vault, /credentials) from common web browsers on a device. This activity may indicate malicious credential harvesting, administrative panel enumeration, or sensitive data exfiltration performed by an adversary or malicious browser extension.
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