Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous bulk configuration data collection from Cisco vManage via REST API endpoints typically used by UAT-8616. The rule identifies repeated HTTP GET requests to critical configuration, device, and system information endpoints on port 8443, which may indicate an attacker attempting to export SD-WAN configuration data following an exploitation event.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
This rule detects network connections to or from known suspicious IP addresses and requests to known suspicious domains. These indicators are often associated with command and control (C2) activity, malware distribution, or other malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects URLs that contain common redirection or link parameters (u=, url=, redirect=, r=, link=, target=, dest=) where the value of the parameter is a long, alphanumeric string that appears to be an encoded domain. This pattern can indicate attempts to obfuscate the true destination of a link, often seen in phishing campaigns or malicious redirection attempts. The rule specifically looks for encoded parameters containing common top-level domains like .com, .net, or .org.
This rule detects activities associated with AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) attacks, specifically targeting network-based credential interception. It monitors for the execution of well-known poisoning tools (e.g., Responder), ARP spoofing utilities (e.g., ettercap, arpspoof), the creation of suspicious network listeners on protocols used for NBT-NS/LLMNR poisoning, and the execution of credential relaying tools like Impacket.
Detects the execution and network activity of known reverse tunneling and proxy tools such as Chisel, Ngrok, and FRP. These tools are commonly abused by adversaries to establish persistence, bypass firewalls, and facilitate command and control (C2) communication. The rule monitors for specific process names, command-line arguments, and DNS requests related to these services.
This rule detects the use of the 'msiexec.exe' utility to fetch and potentially execute an '.msi' installer package directly from a remote source via HTTP. This behavior is a known technique for bypassing application control by abusing a signed system binary to download and install malicious packages.
Detects HTTP traffic containing a specific session cookie pattern characteristic of PowerShell Empire C2 agent communication, utilizing regex to identify base64-encoded session identifiers.
Detects high-frequency DNS query patterns characterized by long, potentially encoded, subdomain labels (exceeding 40 characters) that are indicative of DNS-based command and control (C2) beaconing activity.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity leveraging DNS tunneling. It identifies high-frequency DNS queries that contain unusually long subdomain labels (51 characters or more), which is a common technique used to encode data or commands within DNS protocol traffic to bypass network security controls.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic containing TLS certificates with common names associated with known command-and-control (C2) frameworks like Metasploit and Empire. These frameworks often use self-signed certificates with default or easily identifiable issuer names when establishing C2 communication.
Detects multiple TCP connection attempts to port 22 (SSH) from the same source within a 60-second window, which is indicative of a brute-force or password guessing attack against SSH services.
Detects high-volume, established TLS connections to common public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers (Google, Cloudflare, OpenDNS). Persistent high-frequency connections to these resolvers can be indicative of DNS tunneling, where an adversary encapsulates command-and-control or data exfiltration traffic within encrypted DNS queries to bypass network monitoring.
This rule detects SMB traffic indicative of remote service creation over the SVCCTL named pipe, a pattern characteristic of tools like PsExec used for lateral movement and remote code execution.
Detects anomalous ICMP traffic patterns, specifically ICMP Echo Request packets with unusually large payload sizes (dsize > 64) and specific byte signatures consistent with known ICMP tunneling tools such as icmpsh or ptunnel, which are used to establish covert C2 channels.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity using DNS by identifying high-frequency, long, and random subdomain queries. It monitors for DNS requests that exceed 40 bytes in size, feature complex alphanumeric subdomains, and exceed a defined threshold of 10 requests within a 60-second window, which is indicative of DNS tunneling or command-and-control exfiltration.
Detects network connections resolving to specific domains or UUID-based API endpoints used by Lorem Ipsum's primary C2 cluster following the late-May ClickFix pivot. This rule identifies known command and control (C2) infrastructure by matching specific domain names and a UUID-based API endpoint pattern in network connection URLs.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to a MyBB forum administrative panel targeting the 'user-users' module, specifically attempting to assign a user to the 'Administrator' group (group ID 4). This pattern is indicative of an exploitation attempt or unauthorized administrative account manipulation.
Detects anomalous ICMP Echo Request packets (type 8, code 0) that contain payloads exceeding 64 bytes. ICMP Echo requests with large, non-standard payloads are a classic indicator of ICMP tunneling, which can be used to bypass network firewalls and encapsulate non-ICMP traffic for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by alerting only when multiple such packets are seen from the same source.
Detects clear-text attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using 'wevtutil' or 'Clear-EventLog' command patterns within network traffic, indicating a potential attempt to remove evidence of malicious activity on a host.
Detects outbound WebSocket connections from endpoints to known infrastructure associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for successful connections or attempts to specific domains (glitch.me, onrender.com, theworkpc.com) or connections containing WebSocket-related headers in the metadata, which indicate C2 activity.
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