Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects inbound HTTP GET requests to a specific IP address (103.86.86.244) requesting a file named 'deploy.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using PowerShell one-liners (cradles) like 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) to fetch and execute malicious scripts directly from a remote C2 infrastructure.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
Audits Direct Send traffic against an approved-IP watchlist, flagging unauthenticated inbound mail spoofing an internal domain from an unrecognized source IP. Fixed: RecipientDomain/SenderFromDomain were referenced but never defined (would have errored at runtime); replaced with derived SenderDomain/RecipientDomain consistent with the sibling rules. Removed a noisy display-name-contains-domain OR-branch. Replaced an always-true-in-practice auth check (required every one of SPF/DKIM/DMARC to show literal "Pass", which fails for many legitimate senders that pass via alignment on only one protocol) with the same CompAuth/all-three-fail logic used elsewhere in this set.
This rule detects modifications to the PostgreSQL authentication configuration file (pg_hba.conf), which controls client authentication. It also identifies replication connection requests from source IP addresses that have not been observed in the previous 7 days, indicating a potential attempt to exfiltrate database data via unauthorized replication.
Detects unauthenticated attempts to invoke Grafana API tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) by utilizing spoofed Mcp-Session-Id headers while bypassing bearer token authentication requirements. This primarily targets unauthorized access to API functionality on Grafana instances configured with bearer-token authentication (v1.1.0+).
Detects instances of an mcp-grafana server responding with an HTTP 200 status code to a 'tools/call' request without an Authorization header, indicating potential unauthenticated remote tool execution on a vulnerable or misconfigured server.
Detects instances of an mcp-grafana server responding with an HTTP 200 status code to a 'tools/call' request without an Authorization header, indicating potential unauthenticated remote tool execution on a vulnerable or misconfigured server.
This rule detects a high volume of inbound network connection attempts to the default Redis port (6379) originating from local loopback or local host addresses, excluding known legitimate Redis and web server processes. This activity is indicative of potential unauthorized access attempts or exploitation of local Redis instances.
Detects incoming S7comm/ISO-TSAP connection attempts directed at Siemens Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) originating from an external network. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized access or reconnaissance attempts against Industrial Control System (ICS) assets.
Detects network connections using the S7comm protocol (port 102) targeting Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) originating from IP addresses not present in the defined allowlist of authorized engineering workstations. This behavior may indicate unauthorized access, reconnaissance, or malicious activity within an Industrial Control System (ICS) environment.
This rule detects modifications to the PostgreSQL authentication configuration file (pg_hba.conf), which controls client authentication. It also identifies replication connection requests from source IP addresses that have not been observed in the previous 7 days, indicating a potential attempt to exfiltrate database data via unauthorized replication.
This KQL query identifies potentially suspicious inbound connection attempts to internet-facing devices. It filters and correlates data from DeviceInfo (device metadata) and DeviceNetworkEvents (network activity) to pinpoint external threats based on multiple connection attempts (3+) from the same public IP address. It also provides geographical context for the source of threats.
Detects S7comm 'GET' or 'Read' operations directed at Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) data areas such as Data Blocks or Ladder Logic from unauthorized IP addresses. This activity is indicative of industrial reconnaissance or unauthorized interaction with control systems.
Detects Cisco network devices experiencing unexpected reloads, crashes, or watchdog resets that are correlated with prior incoming WebVPN, AnyConnect, or SSL VPN HTTP requests. The rule also identifies multiple device reloads occurring within a short 15-minute window, which may indicate a distributed or repeated exploitation attempt against the SSL VPN infrastructure.
Identifies suspicious inbound bulk email campaigns by correlating sender behaviour, recipient spread, URL evidence, Safe Links click telemetry, external SharePoint links, post-delivery remediation actions, and campaign delivery outcomes.
The query is designed to help analysts prioritise campaigns that may require investigation or remediation by scoring indicators such as freemail sender domains, multiple recipients, rotating sender infrastructure, personalised subject lines, external SharePoint usage, allowed clicks, blocked clicks, ZAP actions, manual remediation, and failed post-delivery actions.
It is especially useful for phishing triage, campaign scoping, post-delivery investigation, and identifying threats that reached user inboxes or received user interaction.
Microsoft documents EmailEvents as containing email processing events in Defender for Office 365, UrlClickEvents as containing Safe Links click information, and EmailPostDeliveryEvents as containing post-delivery email actions such as remediation activity.
The query is designed to help analysts prioritise campaigns that may require investigation or remediation by scoring indicators such as freemail sender domains, multiple recipients, rotating sender infrastructure, personalised subject lines, external SharePoint usage, allowed clicks, blocked clicks, ZAP actions, manual remediation, and failed post-delivery actions.
It is especially useful for phishing triage, campaign scoping, post-delivery investigation, and identifying threats that reached user inboxes or received user interaction.
Microsoft documents EmailEvents as containing email processing events in Defender for Office 365, UrlClickEvents as containing Safe Links click information, and EmailPostDeliveryEvents as containing post-delivery email actions such as remediation activity.
Detects HTTP requests to known UNC6671 AiTM reverse-proxy phishing kit IPs on MFA/OTP interception URI paths (push-tap, duo-push, oauth2 2fa, community verify), indicating live MFA bypass.
This rule detects potential NTLM relay activity directed toward WSUS servers by monitoring network connections. It specifically identifies Windows devices identified as 'wsus' that communicate over both SMB (TCP 445) and Microsoft SQL Server (TCP 1433) ports within a 10-minute window, suggesting an attacker attempting to relay authentication to the WSUS backend database.
This rule detects sustained network communication (at least 5 connections within a 300-second window) between internal hosts and a specific list of IP addresses identified by Unit 42 as malicious infrastructure used for AI token jacking. These servers operate as transfer stations, likely utilizing platforms like new-api or one-api to facilitate the illicit resale of stolen frontier-AI API keys. The rule incorporates an exclusion for internal security scanning and proxy infrastructure to minimize false positives, and it is specifically designed to flag exfiltration or unauthorized API usage patterns associated with stolen credentials (T1539) and potential proxy-based obfuscation of command and control or data relay (T1090).
This rule detects potential NTLM relay activity directed toward WSUS servers by monitoring network connections. It specifically identifies Windows devices identified as 'wsus' that communicate over both SMB (TCP 445) and Microsoft SQL Server (TCP 1433) ports within a 10-minute window, suggesting an attacker attempting to relay authentication to the WSUS backend database.
Detects unauthorized POST requests to the '/Windchill/login/' directory targeting .jsp files. This path is not used by legitimate PTC Windchill/FlexPLM traffic and is indicative of an adversary attempting to interact with a webshell or exploit a vulnerability such as CVE-2026-12569.
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