Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network traffic attempting to modify SSH authorized_keys or the sshd_config file using SCP or SFTP protocols, which is a common technique used by attackers to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
This rule detects suspicious SMB traffic targeting raw disk volumes (e.g., PhysicalDrive, C:) or sensitive Windows files such as NTDS.dit and SYSTEM hive files. This behavior is indicative of credential dumping attempts, often performed using tools like secretsdump.py or Invoke-NinjaCopy, which bypass standard file system access controls to exfiltrate critical system credentials.
Detects network traffic attempting to access sensitive Windows Registry keys (SAM, SECURITY, LSA Secrets, winlogon DefaultPassword) over the SMB protocol, which is indicative of credential harvesting activities.
This rule detects potential scanning behavior (port or host sweeps) against specific, commonly targeted service ports (e.g., 443, 80, 8080) and correlates it with suspicious HTTP URI path requests associated with common exploit attempts (e.g., OWA, ECP, or management API paths).
Detects FTP protocol traffic (on port 21) initiated by a process named 'squid.exe' or containing 'squid' in its filename. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts related to the Squidbleed vulnerability, where a compromised Squid proxy might be used for unauthorized FTP communications.
Detects the modification of the 'fDenyTSConnections' registry key using 'reg.exe' to force-enable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a system, followed by an immediate connection attempt to port 3389. This behavior is indicative of an adversary or RMM-based tool attempting to establish unauthorized remote access for lateral movement.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious processes ('servertool.exe' or 'encrypt.exe') within 60 minutes of an inbound RDP connection being accepted on a device. This could indicate an adversary establishing remote access and then deploying tools for further compromise, such as data exfiltration or encryption for ransomware.
Detects command-line activity or process execution related to the EternalBlue (MS17-010) exploit suite, commonly used for lateral movement and remote code execution against SMB services (ports 445/139).
Detects the execution of cmd.exe triggered by explorer.exe shortly after a network connection is established to the Peyara Remote Mouse service on TCP port 1313. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote command execution via synthetic keystroke injection, bypassing standard interactive session protections.
Detects unauthenticated network connections to the Peyara Remote Mouse service on TCP port 1313. This service is known to allow remote control of the host, and such unauthenticated Socket.IO connections are often leveraged by attackers to inject synthetic keyboard events, such as triggering the Windows Start menu.
Detects inbound network connections from external, non-private IP addresses to local ports 6081 and 6082. These ports are used by the PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal, which is actively targeted by CVE-2026-0300.
This rule detects a sequence of events indicative of ransomware deployment following a successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connection. Specifically, it looks for an inbound RDP connection (RemotePort 3389) to a device, followed within 60 minutes by the execution of known ransomware executables ('servertool.exe', 'encrypt.exe') on the same device. This pattern suggests an attacker gaining initial access or moving laterally via RDP and then deploying ransomware.
Detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious usage of the RustDesk remote access tool. The rule monitors for connections from new peer IDs, the spawning of command shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) by the RustDesk process, and the writing of executable or sensitive file types by RustDesk to non-standard directories.
This rule detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-4892 by correlating inbound DHCPv6 traffic (UDP/547) with a dnsmasq process crash (SIGSEGV/SIGABRT exit codes 132, 134, 135, 139) on the same host within a 60-second window. This vulnerability involves sending crafted DHCPv6 messages with oversized Client Identifier options to a dnsmasq server configured with --dhcp-script, leading to a denial of service.
Detects FTP protocol traffic (on port 21) initiated by a process named 'squid.exe' or containing 'squid' in its filename. This rule is designed to identify potential exploitation attempts related to the Squidbleed vulnerability, where a compromised Squid proxy might be used for unauthorized FTP communications.
This rule detects inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections (ports 3389, 3390, 3391) that are initiated by common scripting engines such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This behavior can be indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker uses scripts to establish remote access.
Detects exploitation attempts against LB-LINK routers via parameter injection in the 'set_LimitClient_cfg' endpoint (CVE-2023-26801) and subsequent command-and-control behavior, including outbound connections to known RondoDox staging IPs and DNS queries for associated malicious domains.
This rule detects WebSocket upgrade requests targeting Multi-Context Protocol (MCP) endpoints on AutoGen Studio default ports (8080/8081). It specifically flags connections originating from non-loopback addresses where the HTTP Origin header does not contain expected local indicators ('localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1'), which may indicate unauthorized cross-origin access or remote exploitation attempts against the local development environment.
Detects unauthorized inbound WebSocket connections from external (non-private) IP addresses to the AutoGen Studio MCP API endpoint at /api/mcp/ws/ on port 8081, followed by the execution of interpreter processes (autogenstudio, uvicorn, or python) on the same host, indicating a potential exploitation of an origin validation bypass for remote code execution.
Detects RDP connections originating from external internet addresses
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