Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) sessions initiated towards the HOME_NET on port 3389. It specifically looks for the RDP connection initiation sequence (content:"|03 00|" with depth:2) and uses a threshold to detect multiple connections from the same source within a 5-minute window, which could indicate activity from a Managed Service Provider or other remote access scenarios.
This rule detects Server Message Block (SMB) access attempts from external sources to internal networks, specifically looking for NTLMSSP (NT LAN Manager Security Support Provider) authentication traffic. It triggers an alert if five such connections are observed from the same source IP within a 60-second window. This could indicate an attempt by a third-party vendor or an attacker to access internal resources via SMB.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate local group memberships on a target system via the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. Specifically, it looks for the 'NetLocalGroupEnum' function call within SMB traffic directed to the home network on port 445. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance phases of an attack, where an adversary is trying to discover local user groups to identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This rule detects unauthorized Kerberos service ticket requests directed at a Domain Controller (DC). It specifically looks for TCP traffic to port 88 (Kerberos) on the home network, with a content match for the byte sequence '|6b|' at the beginning of the payload. A threshold of 50 requests within 10 seconds from the same source IP triggers the alert, indicating a potential brute-force or enumeration attempt against Kerberos services.
This rule detects attempts to exploit the PrintNightmare vulnerability over SMB. It specifically looks for network traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the strings "spoolss" and "RpcAddPrinterDriverEx" in a case-insensitive manner, indicating an attempt to leverage the Print Spooler service for privilege escalation.
This rule detects network connections to port 9090 on the home network. The rule is specifically tagged with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1072 (System Configuration Discovery) and mentions 'Ansible/Remote Deploy', suggesting it aims to identify potential remote management or deployment activities that might use this port. It triggers on TCP SYN packets (flags:S) and uses a threshold of 5 connections from the same source within 60 seconds to reduce noise.
This rule detects an FTP brute force attempt by monitoring TCP connections to port 21 (FTP) on the home network. It triggers an alert if 20 or more TCP SYN packets (indicating new connection attempts) are observed from the same source IP address within a 60-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker repeatedly trying to guess FTP credentials.
This rule detects potential DCOM lateral execution attempts. It specifically looks for TCP traffic to port 135 (typically used by DCOM/RPC) on the home network, containing the byte sequence '|05 00 0b|' within the first 3 bytes of the payload. A threshold of 5 occurrences from the same source within 30 seconds is set to reduce false positives.
This rule detects LDAP bind requests originating from an external source to a domain controller (port 389) within the home network. It specifically looks for the 'bindRequest' content in TCP traffic and triggers an alert if 10 such requests are observed from the same source within a 30-second window. This could indicate an attempt to enumerate or authenticate against directory services from outside the internal network, potentially as part of initial access or reconnaissance.
Detects inbound RPC calls to the Server Service interface using operation number 12 (NetrSessionEnum), which may indicate remote session enumeration for account discovery and reconnaissance.
This rule detects unauthorized DNS server responses originating from external hosts. Specifically, it looks for UDP traffic on port 53 (DNS) with a specific content signature '|84 00|' at an offset of 2 bytes and a depth of 2 bytes, which corresponds to a DNS response header indicating a standard query response. The rule uses a threshold to alert if 10 such responses are observed from the same source within 30 seconds, suggesting a potential unauthorized or malicious DNS activity.
This rule detects a high volume of TCP connection attempts to port 135 (RPC) on the home network. A threshold of 20 connection attempts from a single source within 30 seconds triggers the alert. This pattern can indicate an attempt to exploit RPC services for remote execution, often seen in worm propagation or targeted attacks.
This rule detects DCOM remote execution attempts via the RPC Endpoint Mapper. It specifically looks for TCP traffic to port 135 (RPC Endpoint Mapper) with a specific content signature "|05 00 0b|" within the first 3 bytes of the payload, indicating a DCOM activation request.
This rule detects an SSH brute force attack by monitoring TCP connections to port 22 (SSH) on the home network. It triggers an alert if more than 20 TCP SYN packets are observed from a single source IP address within a 60-second window, indicating a high volume of connection attempts characteristic of a brute force.
This rule detects unauthenticated access attempts to the Docker Daemon API, specifically targeting TCP port 2375. It triggers on the initial SYN packet of a TCP connection to this port, indicating an attempt to establish a connection to the Docker API without authentication. This activity is often associated with privilege escalation attempts, as an unauthenticated Docker API can be exploited to gain control over the host system.
This rule detects attempts to establish a WinRM HTTPS connection (port 5986) to a host on the home network. It specifically looks for TCP SYN packets (flags:S) and triggers if three such connection attempts are made from the same source within 60 seconds. This pattern can indicate lateral movement activity using WinRM over HTTPS.
This rule detects a potential SSL/TLS Handshake Exhaustion Attack. It triggers when a high volume of TCP SYN packets (flags:S) are observed targeting port 443 (HTTPS) on the home network within a short timeframe. Specifically, it looks for more than 200 SYN packets to the same destination within a 5-second window, indicating an attempt to overwhelm the server with handshake requests, leading to a denial of service.
This rule detects TCP traffic to port 389 (LDAP) where the content of the packet contains both "sAMAccountName" and "admin" (case-insensitive). This combination suggests an attempt to query or manipulate an LDAP directory for an account named 'admin' using the sAMAccountName attribute, potentially indicating user account masquerading as a service account or reconnaissance activity.
This rule detects attempts to create a new local user account on a system via a remote Server Message Block (SMB) connection. It specifically looks for the string "NetUserAdd" (case-insensitive) within TCP traffic destined for port 445, which is commonly used by SMB. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or gain further access by creating new accounts.
This rule detects network traffic on port 445 (SMB) containing the string "TimeProviders" (case-insensitive). This pattern is indicative of a Time Provider DLL being registered for persistence, a technique used by attackers to maintain access to a system. The rule specifically looks for this activity in established TCP connections flowing to the home network.
This rule detects attempts to create a remote named pipe over SMB (Server Message Block) protocol. It specifically looks for TCP traffic directed to port 445 (SMB) on the home network, containing both the SMB signature (FF SMB) and the string "\pipe\" (case-insensitive), indicating an attempt to access or create a named pipe. This activity is often associated with inter-process communication, which can be leveraged by attackers for various purposes, including lateral movement, service execution, or privilege escalation.
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