Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'Identifies when an RDP connection is made to multiple systems and above the normal connection count for the previous 7 days.
Connections from the same system with the same account within the same day.
RDP connections are indicated by the EventID 4624 with LogonType = 10'
Connections from the same system with the same account within the same day.
RDP connections are indicated by the EventID 4624 with LogonType = 10'
'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit a pattern observed by Silk Typhoon actors.
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
The same query can be run on HTTPProxy logs from on-premise hosted Exchange servers.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/'
Pivot from downloads detected by Windows Defender Antivirus to other files downloaded from the same sites.
To learn more about the download URL info that is available and see other sample queries,.
Check out this blog post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Threat-Intelligence/Hunting-tip-of-the-month-Browser-downloads/td-p/220454.
To learn more about the download URL info that is available and see other sample queries,.
Check out this blog post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Threat-Intelligence/Hunting-tip-of-the-month-Browser-downloads/td-p/220454.
'Azure AD Connect (AAD Connect) is a critical service that handles connections between on-premise Active Directory and Azure AD.
Due to the critical nature of AAD Connect threat actors may attempt to compromise the service in order to access credentials.
This query looks for SSH connections to host that appear to run AAD Connect. The results should be reviewed to determine if the
SSH connection is legitimate.'
Due to the critical nature of AAD Connect threat actors may attempt to compromise the service in order to access credentials.
This query looks for SSH connections to host that appear to run AAD Connect. The results should be reviewed to determine if the
SSH connection is legitimate.'
To evade security software and analyst tools, Nobelium malware enumerates the target system looking for certain running processes, loaded drivers, and registry keys, with the goal of disabling them.
The Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor is one of the processes the malware attempts to disable.
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint has built-in protections against many techniques attackers use to disable endpoint sensors ranging from hardened OS protection, anti-tampering policies, and detections for a variety of tampering attempts, including "Attempt to stop Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor", "Tampering with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor settings", or "Possible sensor tampering in memory".
Successfully disabling Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can prevent the system from reporting observed activities.
However, the multitude of signals reported into Microsoft Defender XDR provides a unique opportunity to hunt for systems where the tampering technique used might have been successful.
The following advanced hunting query can be used to locate devices that should be reporting but aren't:
The Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor is one of the processes the malware attempts to disable.
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint has built-in protections against many techniques attackers use to disable endpoint sensors ranging from hardened OS protection, anti-tampering policies, and detections for a variety of tampering attempts, including "Attempt to stop Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor", "Tampering with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor settings", or "Possible sensor tampering in memory".
Successfully disabling Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can prevent the system from reporting observed activities.
However, the multitude of signals reported into Microsoft Defender XDR provides a unique opportunity to hunt for systems where the tampering technique used might have been successful.
The following advanced hunting query can be used to locate devices that should be reporting but aren't:
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
'This query will dynamically identify Exchange servers using common web paths used by the application in the csUriStem. The query
will then collect MDE alerts from the SecurityAlert table using the identified Exchange Server hostnames.'
will then collect MDE alerts from the SecurityAlert table using the identified Exchange Server hostnames.'
This query looks for signs of impacket dcomexec module.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/impacket-part-2/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/impacket-part-2/
'Identifies connection attempts (success or fail) from clients with very short or very long User Agent strings and with less than 100 connection attempts.'
First query digs in print spooler drivers folder for any file creations,
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Exploitation of CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep).
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query detects devices with RDP connections that could be exploitation attempts.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query detects devices with RDP connections that could be exploitation attempts.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
Get all filtering events done by the Windows filtering platform.
This includes any blocks done by Windows Firewall rules, but also blocks triggered by some 3rd party firewalls.
When no Firewall rules are configured, the default behavior is to block all incoming network connections.
This includes any blocks done by Windows Firewall rules, but also blocks triggered by some 3rd party firewalls.
When no Firewall rules are configured, the default behavior is to block all incoming network connections.
'This will check for Rare User Agent strings over the last 3 days. This can indicate potential probing of your IIS servers.'
'Extracts MDATP Alerts that indicate a command was executed by a web shell. Uses time window based querying to idneitfy the potential web shell location on the server, then enriches with Attacker IP and User Agent'
'The alert shows users that join a Zoom meeting from a time zone other than the one the meeting was created in.
You can also whitelist known good time zones in the tz_whitelist value using the tz database name format https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones'
You can also whitelist known good time zones in the tz_whitelist value using the tz database name format https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones'
'This finds connections to server files requested by only one client. Effective when actor uses static operational IP addresses. Threshold can be modified. Larger execution window increases reliability of results.'
'Threat actors can use JPEG files to hide malware, or other malicious code from inspection. This query looks for the downloading of abnormally large JPEG files from a source where large JPEG files have not been downloaded.
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
Ref: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/'
This query looks for events that are near in time to a detected event.
It shows how you could avoid typing exact timestamps, and replace it with a simple query to get the timestamp of your pivot event (e.g. a detected event).
This is useful when you have queries that you run often - e.g. as part of your regular investigation of an alert.
Original query: filter for network logon events right before some timestamp.
It shows how you could avoid typing exact timestamps, and replace it with a simple query to get the timestamp of your pivot event (e.g. a detected event).
This is useful when you have queries that you run often - e.g. as part of your regular investigation of an alert.
Original query: filter for network logon events right before some timestamp.
'This query will detect paths suspicious associated with ProxyLogon exploitation'
'Looks for activity that might indicate exploitation of the ProxyToken vulnerability - CVE-2021-33766
Ref: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server'
Ref: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2021/8/30/proxytoken-an-authentication-bypass-in-microsoft-exchange-server'
The following queries pivot from an IP address assigned to a machine to the relevant machine or logged-on users.
To read more about it, check out this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Advanced-hunting-now-includes-network-adapters-information/m-p/224402#M74.
Query #1: get machines that have used a given local IP address at a given time - as configured on their network adapters.
To read more about it, check out this post: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/What-s-New/Advanced-hunting-now-includes-network-adapters-information/m-p/224402#M74.
Query #1: get machines that have used a given local IP address at a given time - as configured on their network adapters.
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