Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a 'config.ini' file within the 'UBP-Asset' directory, correlated with subsequent FTP network activity from known associated binaries (UBPUpdater.exe, UBPPatch.Psh, cmd.exe, or UBP.exe). This behavioral pattern is indicative of Quasar RAT being delivered or updated through a fraudulent install path.
Detects the creation of a 'config.ini' file within the 'UBP-Asset' directory, correlated with subsequent FTP network activity from known associated binaries (UBPUpdater.exe, UBPPatch.Psh, cmd.exe, or UBP.exe). This behavioral pattern is indicative of Quasar RAT being delivered or updated through a fraudulent install path.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
This rule monitors for known malicious file hashes (MD5) and network traffic (domains and specific URLs) associated with known threats. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential interactions with threat infrastructure.
Detects network communication with known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence of known malicious file hashes on the system. The rule correlates network connection events, file creation events, and process creation events against predefined lists of C2 infrastructure and malware indicators.
This rule detects network connections from monitored devices to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names. It monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with cryptomining activities, identifying potential resource hijacking on internal endpoints.
This rule detects network connections from monitored devices to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names. It monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with cryptomining activities, identifying potential resource hijacking on internal endpoints.
This rule detects network connections from monitored devices to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names. It monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with cryptomining activities, identifying potential resource hijacking on internal endpoints.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
This rule detects network connections to known cryptomining pool IP addresses and domain names, as well as file or process executions matching specific hashes associated with known miner samples. It monitors for communication to command-and-control (C2) servers potentially used for cryptomining operations.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects network communication with identified C2 infrastructure associated with VectraRAT, Amadey, and ClickFix campaigns, as well as the presence of a specific 'callback.json' artifact in temporary directories, which is commonly used for C2 address overrides.
Detects the installation or modification of a browser extension (manifest.json file creation) followed by network activity from the browser to trusted AI assistant domains within a five-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potentially malicious browser extensions or content scripts being introduced to intercept or manipulate user interaction with AI services.
Detects browser activity where a user agent navigates to common webmail services (Gmail, Outlook) followed quickly by network traffic to potentially malicious external infrastructure or non-standard endpoints, suggesting unauthorized email content exfiltration.
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