Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors endpoint telemetry (File, Process, and Network events) to identify activity associated with a pre-defined set of known malicious file hashes, IP addresses, and domains. It correlates these indicators to detect potential malware execution, persistence, or command-and-control communication on monitored devices.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests to a specific URI path ('/wp-content/uploads/init/') on the domain 'wasmer.app', which is associated with Kimsuky (APT43) C2 beaconing activity. The presence of a token parameter in the URI and the structure of the request indicates an established connection for command and control purposes.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the Dropbox API endpoint (/2/files/upload) that appear to be unauthorized file uploads, specifically identifying patterns associated with the Kimsuky threat group. The rule triggers on both the presence of suspicious directory naming conventions (_lns/) in the Dropbox-API-Arg header and the use of hardcoded Authorization bearer tokens, both characteristic of Kimsuky's data exfiltration techniques.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the Dropbox API endpoint (/2/files/upload) that appear to be unauthorized file uploads, specifically identifying patterns associated with the Kimsuky threat group. The rule triggers on both the presence of suspicious directory naming conventions (_lns/) in the Dropbox-API-Arg header and the use of hardcoded Authorization bearer tokens, both characteristic of Kimsuky's data exfiltration techniques.
Detects DNS queries and established TLS connections to free.pinggy.io, a service often used to establish unauthorized reverse tunnels to internal networks, bypassing perimeter security controls.
This rule monitors network traffic to detect a specific 'Client Hello' beaconing behavior associated with the RMRLX Remote Access Trojan (RAT), identifying potential command-and-control communication directed at a known malicious IP address over TCP port 4561.
Detects established outbound TCP connections to a known AsyncRAT C2 IP address on port 4944. This rule identifies infected internal hosts communicating with a malicious server typically used for remote access and control.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by charmap.exe, a standard Windows utility that does not naturally communicate over the network. This activity is highly indicative of process injection or malicious code masquerading as a system utility to facilitate credential theft or command and control communication.
Detects network connection attempts from endpoints to known proxy service domains (IPRoyal, LightningProxies) that have been observed acting as infrastructure for CHOSEN BRICK Telegram-based C2 and exfiltration traffic.
Detects network connection attempts from endpoints to known proxy service domains (IPRoyal, LightningProxies) that have been observed acting as infrastructure for CHOSEN BRICK Telegram-based C2 and exfiltration traffic.
This rule detects outbound network connections from processes to known public cloud object storage providers (vultrobjects.com, storjshare.io, backblazeb2.com). These domains have been associated with the 'CHOSEN BRICK' threat actor's secondary data exfiltration paths for stolen assets such as screenshots, audio, and browser/email data.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
This rule detects network traffic originating from potential Casbaneiro or Ousaban malware that uses HTTP 302 redirects to redirect non-targeted IP addresses to Google or YouTube. This behavior is used as a geofencing and sandbox evasion technique to prevent security analysts and automated systems from seeing the actual malicious payload.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains or DGA-patterned domains (ending in .icu or .cfd), as well as the execution or file creation of files matching known malicious SHA256 hashes.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains or DGA-patterned domains (ending in .icu or .cfd), as well as the execution or file creation of files matching known malicious SHA256 hashes.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections to suspicious domain names characteristic of the Koktevrat malware's DGA. The rule identifies SNI strings that match a specific regex pattern (8-16 alphanumeric characters followed by .icu or .cfd TLDs), which is indicative of automated C2 communication.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
HBO Max ClickFix attacks IOC Hunt
Cortex XDR
Detects network activity (DNS queries or direct IP communication) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks targeting users under the guise of an HBO Max update or repair utility. The rule includes indicators for known malicious domains and IP addresses while incorporating filters to minimize false positives from security scanners, threat intel feeds, and automated crawlers by analyzing User-Agent strings and network source addresses.
HBO Max ClickFix attacks IOC Hunt
Cortex XDR
Detects network activity (DNS queries or direct IP communication) associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks targeting users under the guise of an HBO Max update or repair utility. The rule includes indicators for known malicious domains and IP addresses while incorporating filters to minimize false positives from security scanners, threat intel feeds, and automated crawlers by analyzing User-Agent strings and network source addresses.
This rule detects the execution of processes associated with CLI proxy routers (such as CLIProxyAPI or router-for-me) that establish network connections to multiple AI provider APIs (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini) within a short window. This pattern is indicative of efforts to bypass rate-limiting or allowlisting mechanisms commonly used by corporate environments to control and audit AI service interactions.
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