Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,879 detections
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Detects the Iron Man System kit's known template artifact path, and separately its randomized per-deployment admin-panel path shape combined with a Host header on a disposable TLD. Splitting these and requiring the disposable-TLD host on the generic admin-path rule avoids matching legitimate multi-tenant apps or hardened CMS installs that use similar random-path-plus-/admin/ obfuscation on ordinary domains.
Detects network activity and HTTP traffic associated with the Iron Man System kit, specifically targeting hardcoded C2 infrastructure (IP-based) and lure domain patterns involving specific brand tokens combined with disposable TLDs.
Detects network activity and HTTP traffic associated with the Iron Man System kit, specifically targeting hardcoded C2 infrastructure (IP-based) and lure domain patterns involving specific brand tokens combined with disposable TLDs.
This rule performs a hunting activity across multiple telemetry sources (Network, Email, Endpoint) to detect known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Anthropic threat intelligence reporting (September 2026). It looks for specific malware file names, command-line patterns, service installations, phishing email addresses, and C2 communication URLs.
This rule detects network traffic (DNS, TLS, HTTP, and TCP) originating from internal assets to known infrastructure associated with the QTFY proxy botnet/C2 framework. It identifies communication with specific C2 domains, proxy management systems, and associated malicious IP ranges.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries associated with the QTFY proxy infrastructure, including specific domains, known proxy management system IPs, and suspicious IP ranges. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) activity utilizing proxy services to obfuscate traffic.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries associated with the QTFY proxy infrastructure, including specific domains, known proxy management system IPs, and suspicious IP ranges. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) activity utilizing proxy services to obfuscate traffic.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at 'relay.php' that contain a hardcoded Authorization Bearer token ('crpx0_c2_2026') used by the CRPx0 ransomware. This activity indicates a compromised host is actively beaconing to C2 infrastructure for command execution, key exchange, or data exfiltration.
Detects potential lateral movement activity associated with the CRPx0 propagation technique. The rule monitors for WmiPrvSE.exe spawning unusual child processes (indicative of remote Win32_Process.Create execution) which are concurrently correlated with outbound network activity from the same host.
Detects high-frequency access requests to SharePoint or OneDrive services using the 'python-httpx' library. This behavior is indicative of automated scraping or mass data retrieval often associated with malicious actors or unauthorized automated tools.
This rule detects high-frequency network activity directed toward the Microsoft Graph API (graph.microsoft.com) utilizing the 'python-httpx' user agent. This pattern matches known exfiltration activity associated with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 threat groups, where automated scripts are used to move data out of the environment via legitimate cloud service APIs.
This rule identifies successful network connections from local devices to a predefined list of known malicious IP addresses within the last 7 days. Such connections often indicate active communication between a compromised endpoint and adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects potential installation of compromised Admin Menu Editor Pro plugin updates by identifying sequential download events for specific plugin versions from the 'adminmenueditor.com' domain within a 24-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain attack where a legitimate update mechanism is leveraged to deliver malicious payloads without integrity verification.
This rule monitors DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic for connections to domains that appear to be performing typosquatting, specifically targeting users by impersonating SSO and Passkey service providers. These domains mimic legitimate security portals to facilitate credential harvesting.
Detects high-frequency TLS sessions initiated from internal hosts to Microsoft identity, Graph API, and account management endpoints. This behavior often mimics legitimate interaction but may indicate an adversary rotating infrastructure, automating reconnaissance, or interacting with C2 channels disguised as legitimate SaaS traffic.
Detects DNS lookups and TLS SNI requests to known domains associated with Storm-3121 and Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These campaigns utilize passkey or Single Sign-On (SSO) themed lures to facilitate credential harvesting.
Detects DNS resolution attempts for graph.microsoft.com by processes other than standard web browsers or mail clients. This activity is indicative of scripted tools or malicious software attempting to enumerate or access Microsoft 365 mailbox content via the Graph API, bypassing normal user interaction.
Detects a multi-stage sequence of network connections to Microsoft cloud services (login.microsoftonline.com, graph.microsoft.com, and data exfiltration endpoints like sharepoint.com) consistent with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 adversary activity. This rule is designed for IDS/IPS monitoring of traffic patterns indicating authentication, reconnaissance, and potential data exfiltration from Microsoft 365 environments.
Detection of DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers matching domains associated with Storm-3121 and Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These campaigns mimic identity, SSO, and passkey registration processes to capture credentials or perform token theft.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan. It looks for instances where a known suspicious process (RegSvcs.exe or mobsync.exe) performs network communication within 5 minutes of a web browser on the same device navigating to a targeted banking URL.
Detects network communication associated with Mantax Otax Android malware, including traffic to identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and attempts to retrieve dynamic configuration files from GitHub.
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