Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This analytic detects network connections initiated by binaries that are not typically associated with network communication,
such as 'notepad.exe', 'calc.exe' or 'write.exe'.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information.
These applications are normally used for locally and do not require outbound network access. When they do initiate such connections, it may indicate process hollowing, code injection, or proxy execution, where adversaries abuse a trusted process to mask malicious activity.
such as 'notepad.exe', 'calc.exe' or 'write.exe'.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information.
These applications are normally used for locally and do not require outbound network access. When they do initiate such connections, it may indicate process hollowing, code injection, or proxy execution, where adversaries abuse a trusted process to mask malicious activity.
This analytic detects system binaries that are commonly abused in process injection techniques but are observed without any command-line arguments.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
Binaries such as `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution.
When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate
potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
Binaries such as `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution.
When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate
potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
This analytic identifies the use of `msxsl.exe` initiating a network connection to a non-private IP address.
Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it
to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner.
This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections
that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it
to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner.
This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections
that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
This analytic detects the use of `curl.exe` with insecure flags such as `-k`, `--insecure`, `--proxy-insecure`, or `--doh-insecure`
which disable TLS certificate validation.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
This behavior may indicate an attempt to bypass certificate validation to connect to potentially untrusted or malicious endpoints,
a common tactic in red team operations, malware staging, or data exfiltration over HTTPS.
which disable TLS certificate validation.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
This behavior may indicate an attempt to bypass certificate validation to connect to potentially untrusted or malicious endpoints,
a common tactic in red team operations, malware staging, or data exfiltration over HTTPS.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
Detects outbound network connections to domains, URLs, and IP:Port combinations identified as malicious in the ThreatFox OSINT feed. This rule covers various commodity malware C2 and payload delivery infrastructure.
Detects the first-ever observed network connection from a device to WhatsApp Web or Telegram Web within a 30-day lookback period. This behavior is used to identify potentially unauthorized companion-device linking to a user's messenger account, which could indicate credential theft or unauthorized access.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) and staging domains associated with the STAC4924 campaign. The rule performs strict matching on domain names to ensure that subdomains are identified while avoiding false positives from partial string matches within URLs.
Detects a suspected device-code phishing attack where a user visits a known malicious lure domain and shortly thereafter completes a successful Microsoft 365 device-code authentication. This rule correlates network events with sign-in logs within a 10-minute window to identify session hijacking attempts that bypass traditional MFA.
Detects a suspected device-code phishing attack where a user visits a known malicious lure domain and shortly thereafter completes a successful Microsoft 365 device-code authentication. This rule correlates network events with sign-in logs within a 10-minute window to identify session hijacking attempts that bypass traditional MFA.
Detects modifications to Azure DevOps pipelines or service connections that include indicators of outbound tunneling or reverse proxy tools (e.g., ngrok, socat, chisel, or SSH reverse tunnels). This behavior is characteristic of an attacker attempting to establish a command-and-control channel or bypass firewall restrictions by tunneling traffic out of the CI/CD pipeline execution environment.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests that contain a JPEG file signature ('FF D8 FF') in the body but lack a 'Content-Type' header. This pattern is indicative of potential C2 communication from a loader or malware family attempting to exfiltrate or receive data disguised as an image file while bypassing basic header-based inspection.
Detects network connections or DNS resolutions to known anonymous file-sharing, cloud storage, and messaging-bot API endpoints (e.g., transfer.sh, Telegram Bot API, Discord CDN) commonly abused by adversaries for data staging and exfiltration. This rule specifically targets non-browser processes that attempt to communicate with these endpoints, helping identify potentially malicious exfiltration activities.
Detects core NetScaler service processes (nsppe, httpd, aslearning) initiating outbound network connections to external, non-private IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation C2 beaconing activity on a compromised NetScaler appliance.
This rule detects a node.exe process initiating a network connection to a specific remote IP (69.48.229.140) on port 8080, followed by the termination of that same process within 45 seconds of the connection. This behavior is indicative of a short-lived beaconing process or an ephemeral network task associated with command-and-control activity.
This rule detects successful network connections to known malicious IP addresses or the domain 'forgitlab.com', which are associated with the Azazel malware threat infrastructure.
This rule detects successful network connections to known malicious IP addresses or the domain 'forgitlab.com', which are associated with the Azazel malware threat infrastructure.
Detects outbound network traffic associated with the Azazel operation, including connections to identified C2 infrastructure, open directory/upload listeners, domain-specific staging servers, and exfiltration attempts to MEGA cloud storage endpoints.
Detects the anomalous behavior of a Node.js process acting as a typosquatting agent. The detection identifies a node.exe process initiating a network connection to a known malicious C2 IP and port, followed by the termination of that same process within 45 seconds. This pattern is consistent with the agent crashing due to an unhandled exception (e.g., os.userInfo() failure) after beaconing.
This rule performs a multi-source correlation (network, DNS, file, and process telemetry) to detect artifacts associated with the Coruna campaign. It looks for known malicious file hashes (SHA1), C2 IP addresses, and specific domain/URL patterns in process command lines and network connections.
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