Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
Detects outbound network communication patterns (DNS lookups and TLS SNI traffic) associated with the Koktevrat Android RAT. The rule monitors for connections to known malicious domains used for command-and-control (C2) operations.
This rule detects network traffic directed at known command and control (C2) domains associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically targeting the domain 'fb-market-play.cc'. This pattern is indicative of compromised hosts attempting to communicate with attacker infrastructure, often following an initial infection phase initiated via malicious links.
This rule detects network traffic directed at known command and control (C2) domains associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically targeting the domain 'fb-market-play.cc'. This pattern is indicative of compromised hosts attempting to communicate with attacker infrastructure, often following an initial infection phase initiated via malicious links.
This rule detects network traffic directed at known command and control (C2) domains associated with the Koktevrat malware, specifically targeting the domain 'fb-market-play.cc'. This pattern is indicative of compromised hosts attempting to communicate with attacker infrastructure, often following an initial infection phase initiated via malicious links.
This rule detects potentially malicious use of residential proxies by monitoring for outbound HTTP CONNECT requests originating from consumer devices in the internal network. The use of HTTP CONNECT is a common method for establishing tunnels through proxies to mask C2 communication or facilitate unauthorized access, often associated with botnets or malicious proxy networks.
This rule detects potentially malicious use of residential proxies by monitoring for outbound HTTP CONNECT requests originating from consumer devices in the internal network. The use of HTTP CONNECT is a common method for establishing tunnels through proxies to mask C2 communication or facilitate unauthorized access, often associated with botnets or malicious proxy networks.
This rule detects the execution of processes associated with CLI proxy routers (such as CLIProxyAPI or router-for-me) that establish network connections to multiple AI provider APIs (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini) within a short window. This pattern is indicative of efforts to bypass rate-limiting or allowlisting mechanisms commonly used by corporate environments to control and audit AI service interactions.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
Detects network connections to known command and control (C2) infrastructure, including hardcoded malicious domains, specific C2 IP addresses, and suspicious GitHub access patterns by processes other than standard web browsers, which may indicate malicious ingress tool transfer or C2 communication.
Detects outbound network traffic to the Telegram Bot API where the request body contains keywords associated with cryptocurrency wallet software (e.g., MetaMask, Phantom, Tron). This behavior is indicative of a malicious script, possibly embedded in a Google Docs sidebar or similar web-based application, exfiltrating host/browser information or wallet-related data to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot.
This rule detects network HTTP requests directed toward Google Scripts (script.google.com) or Google Docs (docs.google.com) where the referrer originates from Twitter or X. It further flags requests containing suspicious keywords like 'coindesk', 'conference', or 'hartmansdoeke', which are often associated with credential harvesting or malicious redirection campaigns leveraging trusted platforms.
Detects outbound network traffic (TCP and TLS) from internal hosts to known command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the FamousSparrow threat actor and their SparroWocky malware suite.
Detects outbound TLS and HTTP traffic directed towards 'testing.perplexity.com', an unlocked test subdomain reportedly associated with the BragJack campaign for AI agent hijacking. This indicates potential interaction with an adversary-controlled or compromised infrastructure used to intercept or manipulate AI agent sessions.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) directed towards the 'web12api.com' domain, as well as specific HTTP response structures commonly associated with adversary registration or command-and-control communication protocols.
This rule monitors for network connections to known command-and-control (C2) IP addresses and the execution or presence of files matching known hashes associated with the 'PhantomC2' threat group or malware family. It correlates data from DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify potential compromise.
Detects network communication with known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses associated with Phantom Stealer malware. This rule monitors both outbound connections from the internal network and inbound traffic from the identified malicious infrastructure.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the SparroWocky malware, often used by the FamousSparrow threat actor. The rule monitors for established TCP or TLS-encrypted connections on ports 443 and 8080 directed toward specific IP addresses identified as part of the C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests to the Telegram Bot API where the request body contains specific action keywords (e.g., VIEW or MOBILE). This pattern is often indicative of C2 communication using legitimate Telegram infrastructure to control compromised systems.
Detects outbound network connections (both TCP and TLS) from internal hosts to known command-and-control (C2) infrastructure associated with the SparroWocky malware family. This rule monitors for established connections to a curated list of malicious IP addresses over ports 443 and 8080.
Detects outbound TLS connections from internal hosts to known IP addresses associated with the SparroWocky command-and-control infrastructure, including the specific byte sequence used during the TLS handshake to signal a ready state.
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