Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious network connections to GitHub and Postimg where specific assets are retrieved by a non-browser User Agent. This behavior is associated with the TWINLOOT campaign, where a Python-based implant retrieves fake loading-screen assets as part of a C2 communication sequence, utilizing legitimate image and video hosting services as dead-drop resolvers.
A host repeatedly queries the same DNS domain within a short period, which may indicate automated command-and-control beaconing.
Detects network connection events to specific known malicious IP addresses (45.158.196.23, 45.158.196.184) over TCP port 8888. This activity is indicative of potential command and control (C2) communication or unauthorized remote access.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known command-and-control (C2) server IP addresses associated with C2Looper malware on port 8888.
Detects periodic (beaconing) HTTP POST requests directed to '/api/beacon' from endpoints. The detection logic monitors for consecutive connections occurring within a 3-second interval, specifically searching for JSON payloads containing identification fields (id, user, host, pid) characteristic of C2Looper backdoor traffic.
Detects periodic beaconing and configuration polling by the TWINLOOT implant using Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop mechanism. The rules identify specific TLS SNI patterns and HTTP requests for 'cfg.json' files hosted on Azure Blob storage using non-browser user-agents.
This rule detects the outbound transmission of the Remote Framebuffer (RFB) protocol handshake, which is used by Virtual Network Computing (VNC) software. This is often indicative of unauthorized remote access tools or screen sharing being initiated from a host within the protected network to an external destination.
Detects repeated network requests to specific JSON files hosted on GitHub (e.g., beacon.json) initiated by processes other than standard web browsers or git. This behavior is indicative of a C2 heartbeat mechanism where an agent periodically retrieves configuration or tasking files from a public repository.
Detects the use of curl.exe or curl to communicate with the malicious domain 'i.apee.my.id', initiated by a VS Code integrated terminal process. This behavior is indicative of malicious VS Code extensions exfiltrating data via a hidden terminal session.
Detects user activity involving unsanctioned or 'Shadow IT' applications that have a low or poor Cloud Confidence Index (CCI) rating, as reported by Netskope. This rule helps identify potential security risks associated with the use of unapproved or newly observed cloud services.
Detects the ESET Management Agent (ERAAgent.exe) initiating outbound network connections using non-standard socket families, specifically AF_VSOCK (virtual socket) or VMCI (Virtual Machine Communication Interface). These interfaces are typically used for inter-process communication between a host and a guest virtual machine, or between guest virtual machines, and may indicate malicious activity such as lateral movement from a virtualized environment, virtual machine escape attempts, or unauthorized communication within an ESXi host environment.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to a URI path '/api/beacon' containing a specific JSON structure ('id', 'user', 'host', 'pid'), which is characteristic of the C2Looper beaconing behavior.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections from common container runtime processes (e.g., containerd.exe, dockerd.exe) to well-known cloud instance metadata services (169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200) or suspicious attempts to access container image manifests, which are indicative of SSRF attacks, credential theft from the metadata API, or potential container escape attempts.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known malicious IP addresses associated with AdaptixC2 infrastructure. This rule identifies both general TCP connections and HTTP beaconing activity to these C2 servers, which are used for command and control purposes.
Detects user activity involving unsanctioned or 'Shadow IT' applications that have a low or poor Cloud Confidence Index (CCI) rating, as reported by Netskope. This rule helps identify potential security risks associated with the use of unapproved or newly observed cloud services.
This rule detects potential infection by fake-VPN browser extensions associated with the 'Myxa VPN' campaign by monitoring for specific file paths and filenames linked to known malicious extension IDs. Additionally, it monitors for network connections to known command-and-control IP addresses associated with this campaign.
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections from common container runtime processes (e.g., containerd.exe, dockerd.exe) to well-known cloud instance metadata services (169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200) or suspicious attempts to access container image manifests, which are indicative of SSRF attacks, credential theft from the metadata API, or potential container escape attempts.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from the local network to an external destination where the server provides a self-signed certificate. Self-signed certificates are often used by malware for command-and-control (C2) communication or by data exfiltration tools to establish encrypted channels while avoiding the need for legitimate, verifiable PKI infrastructure.
This rule detects the installation of a new VS Code extension occurring in close temporal proximity to network communication with the official VS Code marketplace or unpkg domains. This pattern is designed to surface potential supply chain compromises where malicious extensions may be deployed to developers' machines.
Detects network activity associated with the TWINLOOT malware, identifying command-and-control communication through TLS ALPN, custom HTTP User-Agent strings, and specific SNI values for known C2 infrastructure.
Detects HTTP GET requests to known Mirage2FA phishing infrastructure domains and specific URI patterns associated with the retrieval of JavaScript loaders. This rule monitors for specific URL paths ('/xls/') and naming conventions (e.g., 'a1p2i.js') characteristic of the Mirage2FA phishing kit, which is used to harvest 2FA tokens.
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