Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to known IP addresses associated with AnyDesk relay infrastructure, which may indicate unauthorized use of remote access tools.
This rule identifies processes that initiate network connections with a significant time delay (greater than 300 seconds) after the process was initially created. This pattern of delayed connection can be indicative of C2 beaconing behavior, where malware sleeps for a period of time before attempting to check in with a command-and-control server.
Detects HTTP traffic identified as MarkiRAT command and control beaconing, characterized by a specific multipart POST request structure directed at a known malicious URI and domain.
This rule identifies network traffic containing specific strings associated with known malicious command-and-control (C2) behavior, such as hardcoded PHP script names often used by web shells, connection attempts to Telegram API servers for exfiltration, and other identifiable strings often associated with threat actor interaction.
Detects known malicious indicators, including C2 domain connections, suspicious file hashes, and specific mutexes often associated with malware execution.
Detects the execution of specific suspicious filenames ('YEPlayer.exe', 'Pis2rayVPN.msi', 'YEMPlayer.msi') or command-line references to these files, combined with correlated network activity to specific suspicious domains associated with masqueraded 'microsoft.comi-site.website' URLs.
This rule monitors proxy and network detection and response (NDR) logs for outbound HTTPS requests to Cloudflare R2 (*.r2.dev) and Cloudflare Pages (*.pages.dev) domains. These platforms are frequently abused by adversaries for hosting malicious payloads, particularly in ClickFix-style social engineering campaigns. The rule specifically flags connections that involve the download of common executable, script, or archive file extensions, as well as recurring traffic patterns to these domains.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access or activity related to MySQL databases. It monitors for external network connections to the MySQL default port (3306) that originate from non-private IP addresses, and identifies suspicious process command lines using Python's PyMySQL library that attempt to authenticate as the 'root' user.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed to the 'avenger-sync.live' domain by the PamStealer malware. The rule identifies specific C2 or exfiltration traffic patterns, including the '/api/sync' URI and a specific JSON-formatted data envelope in the request body, commonly used by the malware for communication.
Detects outbound network traffic consistent with CrySome RAT Command and Control (C2) communication, including direct connections to a known hardcoded IP address on port 5555 and the observation of the '##CRYCFG##' configuration marker within the TCP stream.
Detects excessive network activity patterns by ff-agent which may indicate beaconing or unauthorized scanning activity. Note that this rule requires a backend capable of correlation or statistical aggregation.
This rule detects outbound TLS 1.2 traffic communicating over TCP port 99, which is a non-standard port for TLS/HTTPS traffic. This behavior is indicative of potential command-and-control (C2) communication where an adversary is attempting to hide traffic using encryption on an unconventional port.
Detects instances where 'db.dll' is loaded by a process, followed closely by outbound network activity from processes typically associated with disk analysis tools like WinDirStat or suspected DLL hijacking patterns using uxtheme.dll. This behavior often suggests the presence of a malicious payload or credential harvesting module being used to interact with remote databases.
This Suricata rule detects potential exfiltration of stolen data by the StealC or Amadey malware families. It specifically looks for an HTTP POST request to a .php URI containing a 'PK' header (the magic bytes for a ZIP file), suggesting the transmission of compressed stolen logs to a C2 server.
Detects outbound web requests to OpenAI, Anthropic, or Google Gemini API endpoints that contain suspected API keys (OpenAI 'sk-proj-', Anthropic 'sk-ant-', or Google 'AIza' prefixes) in the request stream, potentially indicating hardcoded credentials, malicious script activity, or data exfiltration.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, HTTP requests, and TLS SNI) associated with the PamStealer malware communicating with its known command and control domain maccyapp.com.
Detects the execution of a hidden PowerShell process that initiates a TCP network connection using the .NET System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient class. This pattern is commonly used in fileless reverse shell implementations where a command-line process (like cmd.exe) spawns PowerShell to establish an outbound connection to an attacker-controlled remote host.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain associated with the SnappyClient RAT (Operation Turb00). The detection logic correlates: 1. Execution of known malicious processes (AlphVector, WizardDa42, VirtualAr, or Crisp); 2. Persistence mechanisms including specific registry keys (CadenceOptimizer) or file artifacts (shortcut links, scheduled tasks, Mayanex data dir, or CorsairUtil DLL); and 3. Outbound network traffic on ports 3333 or 3334 to external IP addresses.
Detects potential remote code execution (RCE) via CVE-2026-55200 in libssh2-linked applications. The rule monitors for two signals: firstly, a post-exploitation child process (such as a shell or interpreter) spawned by a common libssh2-reliant application (e.g., ssh, curl, git, php) shortly after an outbound connection to TCP ports 22 or 2222; secondly, anomalous outbound network connections to port 2222 originating from these same libssh2-linked binaries.
Detects anomalous activity associated with the exploitation of RustDesk session permission bypass vulnerabilities. Specifically identifies 'rustdesk.exe' spawning suspicious child processes (indicative of post-exploitation command execution) or initiating outbound network connections on non-standard relay ports, which may signal a compromised remote access session.
This rule identifies endpoints that have transferred a total of more than 50MB of data to a single external, non-private IP address. The detection filters out RFC1918 private subnets and local loopback traffic, aggregating byte counts and connection attempts per endpoint, computer, and destination. This is indicative of potential data staging or exfiltration activities.
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