Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects network connections to Bunny CDN infrastructure that contain common URL path indicators associated with phishing, a technique observed in activity attributed to UNC1151 (Ghostwriter).
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries originating from common web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, chromium.exe) towards domains related to Perplexity AI. Such activity may indicate data exfiltration or the use of AI tools for processing sensitive organizational data via browser-based interfaces.
This rule monitors outbound network connections from internal hosts to specific ports associated with database management (MySQL: 3306) and service orchestration/discovery (Nacos: 8848, 9848). It aggregates connection counts and distinct target IP addresses by source host and initiating process. High volumes of connections to these specific service ports from unexpected processes may indicate unauthorized discovery, brute-force attempts, or lateral movement.
Detects an unusually large data transfer (greater than 5MB) from an internal MySQL server to an external network, which may indicate unauthorized database record exfiltration or data dumping.
Detects outbound network communication to an IP address (64.20.53.230) identified as a staging server associated with the JadePuffer activity. This activity involves potential data exfiltration following self-narrated deletion payloads.
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
Detects instances where common package management utilities (pip, npm, wget, curl) establish network connections to domains outside of verified official package registry endpoints. This pattern is often used in software supply chain attacks to retrieve malicious packages from attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects browser search traffic being hijacked to the typosquatted domain 'perplexity-ai.online' by the malicious Chromium extension 'Search for perplexity ai'. The rule monitors for network connections to the malicious domain and the presence of extension-related file artifacts on the system. The extension utilizes chrome_settings_overrides to redirect browser Omnibox queries and exfiltrate user search activity to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects AI agent processes (e.g., claude, node) executing environment enumeration commands (env, printenv) following suspected prompt injection, combined with subsequent network traffic associated with credential exfiltration patterns.
This rule monitors for indicators of process hollowing or memory injection targeting ServiceModelReg.exe. It correlates suspicious events including the creation of suspended processes, memory writes, remote thread creation, specific debug strings (e.g., RUNPE, PEB patched), and outbound network connections. This approach aims to reduce noise from legitimate use of ServiceModelReg.exe by requiring multiple indicators of malicious behavior.
Detects HTTP POST requests directed at a specific suspicious endpoint (/service/save.php) on a known malicious host (83.138.53.110), consistent with the exfiltration behavior of the FortiBleed EKZ stealer malware. The rule identifies potential credential theft and exfiltration over standard web protocols.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the service executable is located outside of standard system directories (e.g., C:\Windows\ or C:\Program Files\), which is followed by outbound network communication to known SnappyClient C2 ports 3333 or 3334.
This rule detects outgoing TCP traffic that initiates a SOCKS5 handshake (indicated by the byte sequence |05 01 00|) on destination ports other than standard web ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443). This behavior is characteristic of TOR client traffic attempting to establish an anonymous connection to an external TOR relay or node via non-standard network ports.
Detects anomalous behavior associated with the 'tcc.exe' executable, which is often leveraged by the BeepRAT loader for malicious operations. The rule monitors for suspicious process start flags ('-nostdlib', '-run'), execution from unconventional locations (outside of standard Program Files), the spawning of common shell processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.), and unsolicited outbound network connectivity. This rule effectively flags potential loaders or backdoor activity originating from this binary.
Detects MCP (Model Context Protocol) server processes or developer tools spawned by IDE extensions performing environment variable enumeration to access cloud credentials (e.g., AWS, Azure, GCP, GitHub tokens) followed by anomalous outbound network connections, indicating potential exfiltration of sensitive developer environment secrets.
Detects network activity initiated by wscript.exe or DNS queries related to the Kimsuky downloader infrastructure, specifically identifying callbacks to the domain 'acnms.dmdoc.dynv6.net' and associated malicious bootservice.php script retrieval behavior.
This rule detects the execution of python.exe or python3.exe using the '-m init' command line flag while attempting to establish a network connection over specific, often non-standard, ports (4444, 1337, 9001, 9002, 5555, 6666, 7777, 8888). This pattern is commonly associated with reverse shells or C2 agent check-ins initiated via Python scripts.
Detects the creation of unrecognized Go-compiled binaries by common developer tools (e.g., node.exe, code.exe) in user-writable or temporary directories, followed shortly by outbound network connections to known C2 infrastructure (e.g., vercel.app, jsonkeeper.com). This behavior is consistent with the 'Contagious Interview' campaign attributed to the Lazarus Group.
Detects exploitation attempts against the Flowise Model Context Protocol (MCP) environment, specifically targeting the node_options case-sensitivity bypass (CVE-2026-20182). The rule monitors for malicious node child process spawning, command line injection via the --require flag, suspicious file creation (flowise_marker.txt), and unauthorized outbound network connections from the Flowise process.
Detects established TLS traffic originating from the internal network to external destinations on TCP port 99. This port is commonly used in legacy or non-standard configurations and, when combined with TLS, may indicate C2 relay infrastructure or unauthorized exfiltration channels.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity to the file sharing service 'easyupload.io' by monitoring DNS queries, HTTP POST requests, and general network connections to the domain.
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