Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects various malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs) across multiple telemetry sources, including DNS queries, web network traffic, file executions, process creation, and email activity. It monitors for interactions with known malicious domains, URLs, file hashes, and specific sender email addresses to identify potential malware distribution or C2 activity.
This rule detects anomalous spikes in network connections from a device to major LLM provider API endpoints (OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Anthropic) by establishing a baseline for each device and identifying deviations exceeding a statistical threshold. Such behavior may indicate unauthorized data exfiltration or mass data processing using LLM services.
Detects network connections over port 443 to domains that have not been observed in the environment during the preceding 30-day window, specifically targeting domains with character-diversity patterns indicative of algorithmic generation rather than standard human-readable naming conventions.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) sweep for activities associated with the TOPHIT / VHX Harvester / @prime0 NPM typosquatting campaign. It detects known malicious C2 network connections (IPs and URLs), file artifacts (hashes) on endpoints, and suspicious email activity involving specific operator email addresses.
Detects network communication associated with SideCopy's ReverseRAT malware by monitoring for DNS lookups to a known malicious domain (dns.educationportals.biz) and outbound connections to a hardcoded C2 IP address (45.61.157.22).
Detects HTTP GET requests to Backblaze B2 storage hosting specific archive files identified as payloads for the RustyShade/RustyMove malware family, often used by the APT36 threat group.
Detects HTTP traffic containing the 'User-token' header, which is indicative of command-and-control (C2) communication patterns associated with the curlRAT backdoor, often attributed to North Korean threat actors such as APT37, Lazarus, or Kimsuky.
Detects network activity associated with a malicious NPM package (typosquatting) beaconing to a known C2 server (69.48.229.140) and performing command and control operations, including command polling and data exfiltration, specifically from a Node.js environment.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors for sustained, repeated network connections from specific processes (often legitimate binaries used by the NeedyMantis group for loader activities) to known NeedyMantis-associated C2 domains. It triggers when an initiating process, associated with known loader activity, maintains a persistent communication pattern consistent with an active WebSocket C2 session.
Detects outbound network connections (HTTPS/TLS) to known malicious domains used by TA419 for AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns. These domains are identified as part of a spoofed OneDrive document/file sharing theme intended to steal user credentials.
Detects DNS queries, HTTP host headers, and TLS SNI traffic associated with known credential-phishing domains used by the threat actor TA419. The rule monitors for communication to a specific list of domains identified as malicious or used in phishing campaigns.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to domains using file-sharing or cloud-sync themed keywords in combination with specific top-level domains (TLD) often associated with suspicious infrastructure. The rule specifically excludes well-known legitimate services such as OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox, Box, iCloud, and Google, and includes a detection threshold to minimize alerts for incidental traffic.
Detects outbound HTTPS traffic to domains using file-sharing or cloud-sync themed keywords in combination with specific top-level domains (TLD) often associated with suspicious infrastructure. The rule specifically excludes well-known legitimate services such as OneDrive, SharePoint, Dropbox, Box, iCloud, and Google, and includes a detection threshold to minimize alerts for incidental traffic.
Detects a multi-stage social engineering chain attributed to TA419. The activity begins with a benign trust-building email from specific domains or addresses, followed by a subsequent email to the same recipient containing a link to a known URL shortener or redirector, indicating a potential AitM phishing sequence.
Detects host and browser fingerprinting reconnaissance behavior associated with the Macfinger/ClickFix infection chain. The rule identifies multiple disparate indicators (ClickFix tracker domain, ipinfo.io geolocation lookups, and known AMOS C2 IP contact) occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window, effectively reducing noise from isolated or benign network lookups.
This analytic detects script execution (`wscript.exe` or `cscript.exe`) triggered from compressed files opened directly using
`explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`.
When a user double clicks on a ".js" file from within one of these compressed files. Its extracted temporally in the temp directory in folder with certain markers.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data, in order to look for a specific parent/child relationship and an initiated network connection.
This behavior is exploited by threat actors such as Scarlet Goldfinch to deliver and run malicious scripts as an initial access technique.
`explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`.
When a user double clicks on a ".js" file from within one of these compressed files. Its extracted temporally in the temp directory in folder with certain markers.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data, in order to look for a specific parent/child relationship and an initiated network connection.
This behavior is exploited by threat actors such as Scarlet Goldfinch to deliver and run malicious scripts as an initial access technique.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
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