Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,879 detections
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Detects outbound network traffic established by a client using the default self-signed TLS certificate generated by Metasploit for Meterpreter Reverse HTTPS sessions. The rule looks for the common default subject fields 'CN=metasploit' and 'O=msf' within the TLS handshake.
Detects network activity initiated by PowerShell or PWSH processes connecting to a known GIFTEDCROOK C2 IP address or utilizing high non-standard ports (>=8000) for outbound communication. This rule monitors for potential beaconing or command and control activity originating from non-Microsoft signed processes in public network ranges.
Detects command and control (C2) activity attributed to threat actor UAC-0226 by monitoring for direct network connections to known hardcoded C2 IP addresses from suspicious process paths or PowerShell, and by identifying beaconing patterns (regular HTTPS intervals) originating from non-browser processes in sensitive locations like ProgramData or AppData/Local/Temp.
This rule detects a sequence of behaviors indicative of credential theft followed by data staging and exfiltration. It identifies processes accessing sensitive browser credentials or KeePass database files, followed by the creation of a ZIP archive within user profile directories, and concludes with an outbound HTTPS connection to a non-trusted, non-Microsoft external destination by the same process.
Detects outbound WebSocket connections from endpoints to known infrastructure associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for successful connections or attempts to specific domains (glitch.me, onrender.com, theworkpc.com) or connections containing WebSocket-related headers in the metadata, which indicate C2 activity.
Detects processes that install a low-level keyboard hook (WH_KEYBOARD_LL) and are simultaneously involved in suspicious activity, such as network connections to non-private IP addresses and file writes to typical temporary directories (e.g., C:\Windows\Temp, C:\Users\Public). This behavior is characteristic of keylogging activity and subsequent data exfiltration or staging.
Detects processes attempting to connect to the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) IP address (169.254.169.254) or referencing it in the command line. This behavior is often associated with credential theft or reconnaissance on cloud instances.
Detects potential lateral movement activity where PowerShell or the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) host process (wsmprovhost.exe) initiates network connections to multiple distinct destination IP addresses over the WinRM default ports (5985/5986). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary using legitimate remote administration tools to pivot or spread across a network.
Detects anomalous network activity originating from 'NearShareReceive.exe' (Windows Near Share) to public IP addresses on non-standard ports, potentially indicating unauthorized use of the Near Share feature for data staging or exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of python.exe or python3.exe using the '-m init' command line flag while attempting to establish a network connection over specific, often non-standard, ports (4444, 1337, 9001, 9002, 5555, 6666, 7777, 8888). This pattern is commonly associated with reverse shells or C2 agent check-ins initiated via Python scripts.
Detects suspicious behaviors during npm package lifecycle events, specifically node.exe spawning command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) or initiating network connections to known malicious or suspicious domains typically associated with npm supply chain attacks.
Detects potential command and control (C2) activity from node.exe to known malicious domains associated with the Polymarket Trap / wshu.net campaign. Additionally, it monitors for suspicious child process spawning by node.exe, including usage of downloader utilities (curl, wget, PowerShell) or execution of downloaded scripts/archives (npm, .tgz files) indicative of malicious post-exploitation activity.
Detects network activity and process execution patterns associated with the Amadey loader and Operation FlutterBridge. The rule monitors for unauthorized file downloads from self-hosted GitLab repositories using raw paths, delivery of malicious archives like 'protected.zip', and the execution of common downloaders (PowerShell, cmd, curl, wget) triggered by known Amadey process artifacts (Yfgfwb.exe).
This rule detects suspicious network connections originating from internal IP addresses to common service ports (DNS, SMB, RDP, WinRM) on remote, non-internal IP addresses. It flags instances where a single process on a device makes 10 or more such connections within an hour, which could indicate reconnaissance, lateral movement, or data exfiltration attempts.
This rule detects devices making a high volume of successful network connections to GitHub's API endpoints (api.github.com or api.releases). A count of 5 or more successful connections within an hour from a single device is considered suspicious and could indicate data exfiltration, automated tooling, or unusual development activity.
This rule detects successful network connections to known paste sites like Pastebin or Gist. Adversaries often use these services to host malicious code, exfiltrate data, or for command and control (C2) communications. Monitoring such connections can help identify potential data exfiltration attempts or the download of malicious content.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe followed by suspicious network or file system activity. ServiceModelReg.exe is a legitimate Windows utility that may be abused by adversaries for process hollowing or masquerading to evade defenses.
Detects high-volume, rapid outbound network requests from Opera or Opera GX browser processes, characteristic of CSS attribute-selector trigram enumeration used in XS-Leak attacks to exfiltrate sensitive information from loaded web pages.
Detects network activity associated with the EKZ Stealer malware, specifically an HTTP POST request used to exfiltrate base64-encoded credentials to a known malicious destination at 83.138.53.110/service/save.php.
Detects instances where the Outlook process (OUTLOOK.EXE) initiates a network connection over SMB (port 445) to an external, non-private IP address. This behavior is highly suspicious as Microsoft Outlook should typically not be performing direct SMB connections to external systems, and this is often indicative of an adversary attempting to leverage malicious documents or templates to perform credential harvesting via NTLM relay or SMB authentication captures.
This rule detects activities associated with the NotDoor malware used by APT28 for email-based exfiltration. It specifically monitors for the creation of staging files in temporary directories, the use of Outlook.exe to establish external SMTP connections on common mail ports, and the transmission of emails to known adversary-controlled addresses.
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