Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the Python-based CastleLoader malware establishing persistent WebSocket (wss:// or ws://) command-and-control channels to randomized attacker endpoints. It specifically looks for network connections initiated by python.exe or pythonw.exe to URLs matching a WebSocket pattern, with at least 3 connections within a 5-minute window.
Detects anomalous behavior associated with msiexec.exe that aligns with activity patterns of infostealer malwares like Lumma Stealer and Amadey Bot. This includes cross-process injection from unsigned processes, spawning of msiexec.exe by LOLBins or script interpreters, suspicious outbound network connectivity, and unauthorized access to browser credential storage files.
Detects DNS lookups and network connections to known AI API endpoints (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Generative Language) initiated by non-standard processes. This rule excludes common web browsers, productivity applications, and development tools to identify potentially unauthorized or suspicious interaction with AI services from internal processes.
Detects DNS queries for known StegoAd command-and-control infrastructure domains, which are used as proxy relays and exfiltration endpoints.
Detects the installation of specific browser extensions in Microsoft Edge followed by network connection activity to external IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious browser extensions, such as those used for browser session hijacking, credential theft, or command and control (C2).
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to a list of known malicious IP addresses associated with the Payroll Pirate campaign (attributed to Storm-2755 and Storm-2657). Identifying these connections indicates potential communication with adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects malicious browser extension activity related to the StegoAd infostealer. The rule identifies a dual-indicator pattern consisting of outbound network connections to 'mitarchive.info' combined with concurrent read access to browser-specific credential store files (Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox) on the same host.
Detects network communication to the malicious domain 'mitarchive.info' from common web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave). This domain is associated with the StegoAd browser extension, which intercepts Google and WordPress login flows to exfiltrate stolen credentials and 2FA codes.
Detects execution of the AdaptixC2 agent (AdgNsy.exe), anomalous WMI lateral movement (WmiPrvSE.exe spawning processes from AppData\Local), and suspicious outbound network connections from AppData\Local processes to non-standard ports.
Detects potential exploitation of ImageMagick vulnerabilities where Ghostscript delegates are used to achieve arbitrary code execution. The rule monitors for suspicious Ghostscript command-line arguments (e.g., missing or disabled -dSAFER), child process creation (spawning shells or interpreters), execution of network tools, unauthorized file modifications with script/binary extensions, and outbound network connections initiated by Ghostscript processes.
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes masquerading as 'pythonw.exe' or 'userscreen.exe', specifically when they exhibit behavior associated with the APT37 NarwhalRAT. The rule identifies processes loading critical system DLLs (kernel32.dll, ntdll.dll) while simultaneously initiating network connections to known C2 infrastructure within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution of the AdaptixC2 agent (AdgNsy.exe) from AppData\Local directories and its subsequent internal network scanning activity against sensitive ports (445, 3389, 5985). The rule also monitors for potential dropper patterns associated with the Bumblebee loader, specifically involving processes like consent.exe or msiexec.exe dropping the binary.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of LSASS memory dumping followed by lateral movement via SMB administrative shares. The rule monitors for suspicious OpenProcess calls targeting lsass.exe, the subsequent creation of dump files in temporary directories, and concurrent access to admin shares (ADMIN$ or C$) from the same host, which is a common pattern for credential harvesting and lateral movement tools like 'lsassy'.
This rule detects the deployment and execution of the RustDesk remote access tool in conjunction with potential staging of installation artifacts and observed prior activity related to BumbleBee/Adaptix C2. It correlates process execution, file creation, and network connectivity to the RustDesk relay infrastructure to assign a risk score, helping identify potential unauthorized remote access or malicious persistence.
Detects network and process execution activity involving Google or Microsoft OAuth2 token endpoints from non-browser and non-trusted processes. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft or session hijacking attempts, where malicious tools (e.g., curl, python) are used to access authentication endpoints to bypass standard user interaction.
Detects the execution of 'AdgNsy.exe', a known malicious masquerading process associated with the AdaptixC2 beacon, attempting to scan internal network infrastructure by initiating outbound connections to sensitive ports including SMB (445), RDP (3389), LDAP (389/636), and 9401. This behavior indicates internal reconnaissance for lateral movement.
Detects HTTP GET requests to known malicious infrastructure used in SEO poisoning campaigns to distribute the Bumblebee malware loader. The rule monitors for specific URL paths and hostnames associated with lookalike domains delivering trojanized MSI files.
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-33017 in Langflow by monitoring for unauthenticated POST requests to the /api/v1/build_public_tmp/ endpoint, specifically using the identified exploit User-Agent, followed by outbound connections from the victim host to known attacker-controlled infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. The rule categorizes the threat based on the specific IP address, indicating potential C2, pentest lab activity, credential validation, or sniffer nodes.
Detects outbound network traffic to api.telegram.org. This pattern is commonly observed in malware such as Sauron ransomware to establish command and control (C2) channels and perform data exfiltration by abusing the legitimate Telegram Bot API.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with Emotet malware by monitoring for successful network connections to suspicious remote ports frequently used by the malware. The rule flags endpoints that establish connections to at least three of these high-risk ports within a one-hour window, which is indicative of automated C2 beaconing behavior.
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