Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,879 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,954
1,378
313
289
239
Contributors
1,807
1,529
1,304
180
173
Categories
20,462
11,849
5,879
5,158
4,866
Platforms
3,747
1,857
1,076
782
160
Products / Services
2,241
1,434
1,273
746
582
MITRE Techniques
2,448
2,151
1,129
937
790
CVEs
19
15
9
7
5
IDS Classtypes
834
334
94
23
20
IDS Protocols
689
276
235
117
23
This rule monitors Cisco Unified Communications Manager (UCM) environments for multiple stages of an attack chain, including potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against administrative interfaces, suspicious file modifications by service accounts, indicators of privilege escalation, and anomalous outbound network connections from core Cisco processes.
Detects suspected malicious activity associated with the Dropping Elephant threat group. The rule monitors for two behaviors: 1) IP address geolocation fingerprinting by identifying non-browser processes communicating with ipify.org and ip2c.org within a 60-second window, and 2) Direct network connections to known Dropping Elephant C2 domains, specifically gcl-power.org and chinagreenenergy.org.
This rule detects anomalous network connections or DNS queries to known Ethereum RPC infrastructure providers (Infura, Alchemy, Cloudflare-eth) or ports/domains associated with Ethereum mainnet activity. It specifically targets processes other than common browsers or known blockchain clients, as well as Java-based processes performing DNS lookups for these domains. This behavior is indicative of potential 'EtherHiding' techniques where malicious code or data is hidden within blockchain transactions or distributed via blockchain infrastructure.
Detects anomalous network communication patterns and file system changes indicative of SoftEther VPN usage, particularly when linked to processes masquerading as VMware or communicating with known malicious C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for network connections on common SoftEther ports, connections to specific command-and-control IP addresses, and the creation of SoftEther configuration files like 'hamcore.se2' or 'vpn_bridge.config'.
This rule detects processes that are not common browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox, etc.) initiating a network connection over the STUN protocol (UDP port 3478) while simultaneously running with a command-line argument containing '--kiosk'. This pattern often indicates potential command-and-control (C2) communication or unauthorized network traversal disguised as normal traffic from kiosk-mode applications.
Detects indicators of exploitation attempts targeting the c-ares asynchronous DNS library, specifically focusing on Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerabilities. The rule monitors for the presence of known proof-of-concept (PoC) file artifacts, execution of processes using specific command-line flags associated with c-ares exploit research, suspicious shell/calculator spawning from common network-enabled applications (curl, node, python), and anomalous high-frequency DNS-over-TCP traffic patterns.
Detects the execution of VBScript processes (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) that interact with WMI to enumerate installed antivirus products or perform external IP geolocation lookups via services like ip-api.com. This behavior is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan performing environment reconnaissance and victim-targeted execution.
Detects network requests from the Firefox browser process containing URI patterns and parameters often associated with data exfiltration or browser-based reconnaissance, including suspicious leakage parameters and local proxy/loopback communication attempts on non-standard ports.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting the Flowise 3.1.2 Custom MCP (Model Context Protocol) stdio interface. The detection monitors for the bypass of environment variable validation where lowercase 'node_options' is used to circumvent security controls blocking 'NODE_OPTIONS', potentially allowing unauthorized code execution via '--require'. It also alerts on the presence of associated PoC artifacts and anomalous outbound network activity from Flowise processes.
Detects suspicious network activity using the STUN/TURN protocol on port 3478 initiated by non-browser and non-conferencing processes. The rule specifically targets unsigned processes or those located in user-writable directories (such as Temp or AppData), which are common indicators of Grandoreiro malware sideloading and establishing C2 communication tunnels.
Detects outbound network connections to a known KuinaExtractor (k0to) infostealer C2 server. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to the malicious IP address 103.229.53.18 on port 3000 and correlates them with process information to identify the originating application.
Detects anomalous, high-volume data transfers to Telegram API endpoints (api.telegram.org, specific IP ranges), which is indicative of data exfiltration by malware such as KuinaExtractor. The rule monitors for cumulative outbound traffic exceeding 500MB within a 1-hour session window per process.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with Mythic implants. It monitors for high-frequency outbound connections (20 or more) from a single device to the same external IP address within a 30-minute window across common C2 listener ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 7443).
Detects DNS queries and network connection attempts to a set of known malicious domains associated with the threat actor UNC1151 (Ghostwriter). This rule monitors both DNS resolutions and direct network connection attempts to these indicators of compromise (IOCs), which are commonly used in spearphishing campaigns.
Detects outbound network connections to a known KuinaExtractor (k0to) infostealer C2 server. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to the malicious IP address 103.229.53.18 on port 3000 and correlates them with process information to identify the originating application.
This rule detects potential malicious activity involving PowerShell by correlating signs of an Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempt with an subsequent network connection to an external, non-standard port. The rule monitors for common command-line patterns used to disable or impair AMSI functionality within PowerShell processes, followed by suspicious outbound network traffic from the same process within a five-minute window.
Detects outbound network connections initiated by the Windows Installer utility (msiexec.exe) to non-private (external) IP addresses over standard web ports (80/443). Msiexec.exe can be abused to download and execute malicious payloads or packages from remote locations.
Detects outbound network connections from workstations or servers to common message broker ports (MQTT 1883/8883, AMQP 5672). These protocols are sometimes abused for command-and-control (C2) communication, as they allow for pub/sub messaging patterns that can blend into legitimate network traffic.
This rule detects network connections to Google API domains (oauth2.googleapis.com, accounts.google.com, or any *.googleapis.com on port 443) initiated by processes that are not common browsers or Google update/crash handler executables. The detection is further narrowed down to processes executing from 'AppData' or 'Temp' directories, or specifically 'vaultsvc.exe', which are often indicators of suspicious or malicious activity.
Detects network activity originating from popular web browsers (Chrome, Chromium, Edge, Brave) directed towards known malicious or suspicious browser extension domains. This rule flags beaconing, API requests, and remote configuration fetches associated with potentially malicious or unwanted browser extensions.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of data exfiltration: an unknown process creates an image file in a temporary folder, followed by the creation of an archive file (ZIP/RAR) by the same or a related process within 10 minutes, and concludes with a successful outbound network connection to a non-private IP address from the same device.
Page 196 of 280