Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects repeated use of the FTP 'STOR' command to transmit data to an external host within a short timeframe. The STOR command is used in the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to upload a file to the server. An unusual frequency of this command toward external destinations may indicate data exfiltration.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to suspicious URIs and subsequent inbound responses containing executable binary (PE) signatures, characteristic of Emotet malware command-and-control (C2) activity.
Detects encrypted WebSocket sessions over non-standard ports or TLS traffic patterns indicative of Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PaaS) session token exfiltration to unauthorized command and control (C2) infrastructure.
This rule monitors for HTTP POST requests to external networks containing 'gtag=' in the URI, which is a known technique used by the TrickBot malware to exfiltrate its group identifier during C2 communication.
This rule monitors for FTP 'STOR' commands followed by large data transfers (exceeding 64KB) initiated from internal hosts to external destinations. This pattern is often indicative of data exfiltration using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP).
Detects endpoint devices navigating through a sequence of two or more distinct cloud-native redirector platforms (specifically Azure Websites, Cloudflare Pages, and AWS S3 buckets) within a 5-minute window, followed by a connection to a non-cloud final destination. This behavior is highly characteristic of adversaries utilizing Traffic Direction Systems (TDS) or Bulletproof Redirect Engines to obfuscate malicious payloads and evade network security controls.
This rule identifies phishing emails containing multiple distinct redirect hops across various cloud hosting platforms (e.g., Azure Websites, Firebase, CloudFront). It flags emails as suspicious if they contain URLs from multiple monitored cloud platforms, indicating a likely bulletproof redirect chain, and correlates these emails with click data. It elevates the severity for emails sent to privileged user accounts such as admins, executives, or finance staff.
Detects processes that load .NET runtime assemblies (clr.dll/coreclr.dll) from non-standard paths while concurrently performing named pipe inter-process communication and initiating outbound network connections. This behavior is often indicative of fileless execution, living-off-the-land techniques, or lateral movement where a process is repurposed as a proxy or command-and-control conduit.
Detects network traffic consistent with the default Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 jQuery profile. The rule monitors for GET requests to the URI '/jquery-3.3.1.min.js' accompanied by a specific 'Accept' HTTP header, which is a known indicator of default Cobalt Strike beacon activity.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests where the Content-Length header indicates a data transfer of 5MB or greater. This pattern is indicative of potential unauthorized data exfiltration over the web protocol.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests containing a Content-Length header value indicating a body size exceeding 10MB. Large POST requests may indicate data exfiltration, large file uploads, or misuse of HTTP channels for data transfer to external destinations.
Detects anomalous browser activity where an endpoint retrieves configuration or scriptlets from the BadBlocker-related API, followed shortly by outbound network connections to suspicious domains or the exfiltration of sensitive browser-based session data like document.cookie, localStorage, or sessionStorage.
This rule detects instances where AutoGen Studio or related AI agents initiate potentially suspicious child processes such as command interpreters (cmd, powershell, bash) or known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) while simultaneously establishing outbound WebSocket connections to Model Context Protocol (MCP) endpoints. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to leverage AI agent automation capabilities for code execution or remote system interaction.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by identifying devices communicating with known suspicious remote IP addresses at regular, repeating intervals. It calculates the time difference between consecutive connections to specific suspicious IPs and identifies devices that establish at least three connections within one-hour bins, adhering to a 1 to 15-minute heartbeat interval.
This rule detects multiple outbound network connections to a specific set of known malicious C2 IP addresses on specific ports within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a multi-payload delivery pattern associated with malware families such as Remcos, Agent Tesla, and RedLine.
Detects network outbound connections to known CDN domains over port 8084. This activity is often associated with the use of specific C2 frameworks (e.g., SNOWLIGHT or VSHELL) that leverage legitimate cloud infrastructure to blend malicious traffic within common CDN communication patterns.
Detects network traffic associated with TrymeLocker malware, specifically targeting Telegram API communications containing hardcoded identifiers and geolocation lookups via ipinfo.io.
Detects anomalous network communication patterns and file system changes indicative of SoftEther VPN usage, particularly when linked to processes masquerading as VMware or communicating with known malicious C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for network connections on common SoftEther ports, connections to specific command-and-control IP addresses, and the creation of SoftEther configuration files like 'hamcore.se2' or 'vpn_bridge.config'.
This rule detects potential command and control (C2) activity associated with the SNOWLIGHT framework by identifying outbound WebSocket connections over HTTP to a specific known C2 IP (38.60.253.35) and port (8084). It correlates network flow logs (CommonSecurityLog) containing specific HTTP URL parameters (a=w64, t=ws_, p=8084) with EDR process network events (DeviceNetworkEvents) where the Windows Update Service process (wusvc.exe) is the initiator, indicating potential process masquerading or injection.
This rule detects network connections to known IP addresses associated with the FortiBleed vulnerability exploitation. These IP addresses have been categorized based on their observed roles in FortiBleed attacks, including C2, pentest lab, credential validation, and sniffer nodes. Monitoring these connections can help identify compromised systems communicating with FortiBleed infrastructure.
Detects evidence of RustDesk session permission bypass exploitation. The rule monitors for the presence of known Proof-of-Concept (PoC) file artifacts, suspicious child processes spawned by RustDesk, use of elevated tokens by RustDesk-initiated processes, compilation of PoC tools using cargo, and outbound network connections from RustDesk to known relay ports.
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