Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors network logs (proxy, web gateway, and DNS) to detect connections to a curated list of known malicious domains associated with phishing, credential harvesting, and malware delivery infrastructure.
This rule identifies suspicious outbound network traffic potentially related to data exfiltration or command-and-control (C2) communication. It monitors for connections to the Telegram Bot API utilizing 'sendMessage' methods, often used by malware for exfiltrating credentials or sensitive data, as well as connections to known 'Bluekit' PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) operator domains.
This rule monitors network and email gateway logs to detect activity related to the Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. It identifies traffic to known Bluekit command-and-control or phishing domains, detects the presence of rrweb scripts often associated with session recording on phishing pages, alerts on brand-impersonation phishing pages using specific keyword combinations, and flags the presence of FortiBleed campaign lures.
Detects potential fast-flux DNS behavior indicative of Bluekit PhaaS P2P infrastructure. The rule monitors for browser processes resolving a single domain to 5 or more distinct external IP addresses within a one-hour window, excluding known CDNs and cloud infrastructure.
This rule detects potentially malicious browser activity by monitoring for Google Chrome outbound network connections to known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with malicious browser extensions (e.g., BadBlocker). It also flags the installation or loading of specific, known-malicious browser extension IDs on endpoints.
Detects exploitation attempts against LB-LINK routers via parameter injection in the 'set_LimitClient_cfg' endpoint (CVE-2023-26801) and subsequent command-and-control behavior, including outbound connections to known RondoDox staging IPs and DNS queries for associated malicious domains.
Detects potential malicious browser extension activity by correlating internal browser process network connections to suspicious infrastructure (e.g., adblock-for-youtube.com) with subsequent network traffic from the same process PID to third-party domains within 60 seconds of visiting sensitive high-value websites (e.g., login portals, banking). The rule also alerts on any direct network connection to identified malicious exfiltration infrastructure.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the npm ecosystem. It identifies Node.js processes accessing .npmrc files (which contain authentication tokens) followed by immediate outbound network communication. Additionally, it detects suspicious command-line patterns associated with automated npm publishing (indicative of worm-like propagation) and the presence of npm credentials in the environment or command lines of non-npm processes.
Detects suspicious usage of the 'curl' command-line tool to perform PUT or POST requests with binary data to specific paths, potentially indicating data exfiltration or command and control communication. The rule excludes common web browsers as initiating processes to reduce false positives.
Detects the Havoc Demon utilizing execute-assembly to load post-exploitation .NET tooling (like Seatbelt or SharpHound) directly into memory without touching disk. This rule identifies processes loading 'mscoree.dll' (a .NET runtime component) and subsequently making network connections to non-localhost IP addresses, indicating potential in-memory .NET execution with C2 communication.
This rule detects network connection events where the AutoGen Studio application (identified by its image filename) initiates connections to localhost (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on ports 8080 or 8081. This is typical behavior for the AutoGen Studio web interface or API server running locally.
Detects FTP protocol being used for covert C2 communications
Detects phishing emails that spoof specific healthcare domains (nhs.uk, mayoclinic.org, clevelandclinic.org) using invoice or payment-related subjects, characterized by DMARC/DKIM/SPF authentication failures. The detection correlates these emails with a subsequent user network request to known open-redirect or intermediary SaaS platforms (holabrief.com, loopedin.io) within a 10-minute window, indicating a likely credential harvesting or malware delivery sequence.
Detects potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) in an AutoGen Studio environment by correlating an unexpected outbound network connection from the AutoGen process to an external endpoint, followed by the immediate spawning of a command interpreter (shell) child process containing common command-line interface indicators (e.g., whoami, curl, wget, encoded PowerShell).
Detects a potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) chain originating from AI orchestration frameworks (such as AutoGen/Uvicorn). The rule identifies an execution flow where an AI framework launches a browser automation process (e.g., Playwright/Chromium), which subsequently spawns a suspicious OS shell or LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary) that immediately initiates an external network connection. This behavior is indicative of an AI agent being coerced to bypass security controls via MCP (Model Context Protocol) WebSocket loopback trust, leading to command execution and external C2 communication.
Detects malware checking internet connectivity via external IP services
Detects access to paid threat intelligence portals for target research
Detects concurrent suspicious network beaconing to Telegram API or IPInfo and high-volume destructive file operations (deletion or modification) on a specific host, indicative of TrymeLocker ransomware activity.
This rule detects processes other than common web browsers (e.g., chrome, firefox, msedge) initiating outbound network connections on ports 80, 443, or 8084 to specific domains commonly associated with CDN, telemetry, or cloud-based update services. This behavior might indicate unauthorized processes communicating with external infrastructure, potentially for command and control or data exfiltration, masquerading as legitimate traffic.
Detects anomalous outbound TCP network connections on port 8084 originating from non-browser processes to known CDN providers (Akamai, Microsoft). This behavior is characteristic of VSHELL RAT C2 beaconing using domain blending techniques to mask communications within expected network noise.
Detects network communication with known SNOWLIGHT dropper C2 infrastructure (IP 38.60.253.35, port 8084), as well as unauthorized network activity originating from the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe) and suspicious file execution of a known malicious hash associated with this activity.
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