Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
5,879 detections
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Detects network traffic directed towards known public DNS over HTTPS (DoH) resolvers, such as Cloudflare, Google, and Quad9. Adversaries often abuse DoH to tunnel Command and Control (C2) communication, effectively blending in with legitimate web traffic to evade traditional DNS monitoring.
Detects a process reading credential store files (Login Data) from multiple Chromium-based browsers, immediately followed by an HTTP POST request to a specific exfiltration endpoint associated with the Psychedelic Stealer malware.
This rule detects outbound network traffic originating from internal assets attempting to establish an SSH connection to a known malicious C2 infrastructure (190.211.124.187). This behavior is indicative of the CARBONATO malware utilizing a reverse SSH tunnel for command-and-control communication.
Detects network traffic destined for api.telegram.org that follows the specific URL structure pattern associated with the CARBONATO Hermes Agent bot command-and-control channel.
Detects the deployment of the Hermes Agent AI framework by the Carbonato botnet. The rule identifies the creation or modification of a 'SOUL.md' persona file within specific directories (/root/.hermes/ or /opt/netd/) followed by an outbound network connection to a known LLM gateway IP or the Telegram API. This pattern is indicative of a post-exploitation AI agent being installed for command and control or task execution.
Detects the downloading of Android application packages (.apk) from potentially untrusted or non-official third-party portals, which are often used in smishing or malvertising campaigns to deliver malicious applications to user devices.
Detects anomalous network behavior where a source host initiates a high volume of DNS TXT record queries to an external domain within a short timeframe. Such patterns are indicative of data exfiltration or C2 communication tunneling through DNS protocol.
Detects unauthorized exfiltration of sensitive information, such as camera credentials or location data, directed to the Telegram Bot API as part of the 'Operation CameraSwarm' campaign.
Detects HTTP POST requests originating from the internal network directed at a known suspicious C2 infrastructure IP address (156.227.0.13), indicating potential C2 check-in activity associated with AdaptixC2 malware.
This rule detects network traffic originating from internal hosts using a specific HTTP User-Agent string associated with the default configuration of the AdaptixC2 framework. This is a common indicator of a C2 implant performing heartbeat or command-and-control communication.
Detects HTTP GET requests to external servers for files identified as 'mscopilot.exe' or '65722.txt', which are associated with the AdaptixC2 framework/malware, indicating potential payload delivery or command and control activity.
Detects high-volume outbound network traffic (exceeding 50MB) directed towards known consumer-grade cloud storage and anonymous file-sharing services. This activity can indicate data exfiltration, as these services are frequently abused to bypass security controls while masking data movement within legitimate-appearing traffic.
Detects high-frequency outbound HTTP/HTTPS connections to a single external destination characterized by consistent, small payload sizes. This pattern is indicative of automated command-and-control (C2) beaconing, commonly observed in frameworks like Cobalt Strike or Sliver.
This rule identifies potential command and control (C2) beaconing activity by detecting periodic, low-jitter outbound network connections. It analyzes network logs to find connections to external IP addresses that maintain a consistent frequency over a period of time, specifically flagging hosts that demonstrate repetitive traffic patterns with low variation (jitter). The rule further filters by identifying 'rare' destinations, focusing on remote IPs that have been connected to by three or fewer hosts within the environment, which is a common indicator of targeted C2 infrastructure.
Detects potential C2 beaconing activity by identifying repeated network connections to the same external host that exhibit consistent payload sizes (low variance) and frequency, or by flagging HTTP requests containing default URI patterns associated with Cobalt Strike profiles.
This rule detects potential Cobalt Strike SMB beacon activity by identifying the creation of suspicious named pipes (commonly associated with Cobalt Strike) and correlating them with low-jitter, uniform outbound network communication patterns typical of command and control (C2) beaconing behavior.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
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